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THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER

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CHECK YOUR PREMISES

By AYN RAND

Choose Your Issues

Objectivism is a philosophical movement; since politics is a branch of philosophy, Objectivism advocates certain political principles—specifically, those of laissez-faire capitalism—as the consequence and the ultimate practical application of its fundamental philosophical principles. It does not regard politics as a separate or primary goal, that is: as a goal that can be achieved without a wider ideological context.

Politics is based on three other philosophical disciplines: metaphysics, epistemology and ethics—on a theory of man's nature and of man's relationship to existence. It is only on such a base that one can formulate a consistent political theory and achieve it in practice. When, however, men attempt to rush into politics without such a base, the result is that embarrassing conglomeration of impotence, futility, inconsistency and superficiality which is loosely designated today as "conservatism." Objectivists are *not* "conservatives." We are *radicals for capitalism*; we are fighting for that philosophical base which capitalism did not have and without which it was doomed to perish.

A change in a country's political ideas has to be preceded by a change in its cultural trends; a *cultural* movement is the necessary precondition of a *political* movement. Today's culture is dominated by the philosophy of mysticism (irrationalism)—altruism—collectivism, the base from which only *statism* can be derived; the statist (of any brand: communist, fascist or welfare) are merely cashing in on it—while the "conservatives" are scurrying to ride on the enemy's premises and, somehow, to achieve political freedom by stealth. It can't be done.

Neither a man nor a nation can have a practical policy without any basic principles to integrate it, to set its goals and guide its course. Just as the United States, having abandoned its own principles, is floundering aimlessly in international affairs, is unable to act and is merely *reacting* to the issues chosen and raised by Soviet Russia—so, in domestic affairs, the "conservatives" are unable to act and are merely *reacting* to the issues chosen and raised by the statist, thus accepting and helping to propagate the statist's premises.

When the statist proclaim that their slave-system will achieve material prosperity, the "conservatives" concede it and rush to urge people to sacrifice their "materialistic" concerns in order to preserve freedom—thus helping the statist (and their own audiences) to evade the fact that only freedom makes it possible for men to achieve material prosperity. When the statist announce that our first duty is to support the entire population of the globe—the "conservatives" rush into debates on whether Asia, Africa or South America should

be the first recipient of our handouts. When the statist set up a "Peace Corps" to send young Americans into unpaid (though tax-supported) servitude to foreign nations—"conservative" youth rush to propose an "*effective* Peace Corps." When certain statist groups, counting, apparently, on a total collapse of American self-esteem, dare go so far as to urge America's surrender into slavery without a fight, under the slogan "*Better Red Than Dead*"—the "conservatives" rush to proclaim that they prefer to be dead, thus helping to spread the idea that our only alternative is communism or destruction, forgetting that the only proper answer to an ultimatum of that kind is: "*Better See The Reds Dead*."

While public attention is distracted by headlines about the latest whim of Khrushchev or of some other tribal chief, while the "conservatives" gallop obediently down any sidetrack set up by their enemies, two enormously dangerous issues are sneaking up on us, undiscussed, unopposed and unfought. They seem to be a double move planned by the statist, one to destroy intellectual freedom, the other to destroy economic freedom. The chief means to the first is the Federal Communications Commission, to the second—the Anti-Trust laws.

When a government official—Mr. Newton N. Minow, Chairman of the F.C.C.—cynically threatens "those few of you who really believe that the public interest is merely what interests the public," the principle (and precedent) he seeks to establish is clear: that the public is not the judge of its own interest, but *he* is; that the people's vote of approval, freely and *individually* cast in the form of preference for certain television programs, is to be superseded by *his* edict; that television stations are not to be guided by their viewers' wishes (he calls them "the nation's whims") nor by their own wishes, but by *his*—under penalty of having their licenses revoked for unspecified and unspecifiable offenses (which action, somehow, is *not* to be regarded as a whim).

One can easily see what would happen to our entire communications industry (including the press) if such a precedent were accepted in one of its branches—and one would expect the intellectuals of a free country to raise their voices in such a protest that it would sweep Mr. Minow out of Washington. Instead, most of the press congratulated him on his "courage"—the courage of an armed bureaucrat who threatens the livelihood, property and professions of legally disarmed victims.

The Anti-Trust laws—an unenforceable, uncompliant, unjudicable mess of contradictions—have for decades kept American businessmen under a silent, growing reign of terror. Yet these laws were created and, to this day, are upheld by the "conservatives," as a grim monument to their lack of political philosophy, of economic knowledge and of any concern with principles. Under the Anti-Trust laws, a man becomes a criminal from the moment he goes into business, no matter what he does. For instance, if he charges prices which some bureaucrats judge as too high, he can be prosecuted for monopoly or for a successful "intent to monopolize"; if he charges prices lower than those of his competitors, he can be prosecuted for "unfair competition" or "restraint of trade"; and if he charges the same prices as his competitors, he can be prosecuted for "collusion" or "conspiracy." There is only one difference in the legal treatment accorded to a criminal or to a businessman: the criminal's rights are protected much more securely and objectively than the businessman's.

The full, brutal injustice of that legislation has now come into the open: seven distinguished businessmen (in the so-called "Electrical Conspiracy" case) were sentenced to jail for breaking a law which they could not avoid breaking without breaking a number of other laws. To my knowledge, no public voices were raised to defend them. Instead, the headlines screamed abuse at helpless, legally throttled, martyred victims who were deprived even of the opportunity of self-defense (by the threat of treble damages).

In subsequent columns, I shall discuss these two issues at greater length. For the present, I will merely point out that in the F.C.C. and in the Anti-Trust Division the government possesses the legal weapons it needs to transform this country into a totalitarian state—and if the "conservatives" do not

(continued on page 4)

BOOKS

*Planned Chaos** by Ludwig von Mises

Reviewed by BARBARA BRANDEN

Ludwig von Mises, the most distinguished economist of our age, is an intransigent advocate of freedom and capitalism. With brilliant lucidity and ruthless logic, *Planned Chaos* discusses the major collectivist ideologies of the twentieth century, as they have been put into practice in various countries: interventionism (the so-called "mixed economy"), fascism, nazism, socialism, communism. Originally written as an epilogue to *Socialism* (an encyclopedic and devastating analysis of the fallacies of collectivist economic doctrines), *Planned Chaos* is now available as a separate book.

A central point of *Planned Chaos* is Professor Mises' eloquent refutation of one of the most disastrous myths of the twentieth century: the belief that capitalism and socialism are not the only alternative economic systems, that there is a "third way." This alleged "third way" is interventionism, the hampered market economy, in which the state "seeks to influence the market by the intervention of its coercive power, but it does not want to eliminate the market altogether."

Professor Mises demonstrates that interventionism, politically and economically, is unstable, impractical and futile. Unless it is abandoned and the free market restored, it leads necessarily to full socialism. As one illustration, he cites the futility of government enforced minimum wage rates: if minimum rates are fixed at the market level, they are useless; if they are raised above the level the free market would have determined, the result is permanent unemployment of a great part of the potential labor force, which cannot be absorbed into the market at economically unjustified wages. In the latter case, the government then has no choice but to add new regulations in the hope of making its initial regulation work. Since any interference with the free market produces harmful economic consequences, a government which will not abandon interventionist policies faces the constant necessity of taking further measures in the attempt to eliminate the consequences of past measures—until all economic freedom has been legislated out of existence and socialism has replaced capitalism.

Socialism, in this century, has taken two different forms. "The one pattern—we may call it the Marxian or Russian pattern—is purely bureaucratic. All economic enterprises are departments of the government just as the administration of the army and the navy or the postal system. . . . The second pattern—we may call it the German or *Zwangswirtschaft* system—differs from the first one in that it, seemingly and nominally, maintains private ownership of the means of production, entrepreneurship, and market exchange. . . . But the government tells these seeming entrepreneurs what and how to produce, at what prices and from whom to buy, at what prices and to whom to sell. The government decrees at what wages laborers should work and to whom and under what terms the capitalists should entrust their funds. Market exchange is but a sham." Thus socialism, nazism and fascism are equally "leftist"; they differ, not in basic principle or goal, but only in techniques of implementation.

The American New Deal and the Fair Deal (and, one may add, the New Frontier) have followed the pattern of the nazi or fascist variety of socialism. Many New Dealers consciously and admittedly adopted Mussolini's corporate state as their model. Today, the state is not moving in the direction of making all economic enterprises departments of the government, but in the direction of making private ownership nominal, of telling "seeming entrepreneurs what and how to produce, at what prices and from whom to buy, at what prices and to whom to sell." (Consider, for example, the government's farm policy, or President Kennedy's recent efforts to dictate steel prices.)

* Published by F.E.E., \$2.00. Available from NBL BOOK SERVICE, INC., 165 East 35th St., New York 16, N.Y. (N.Y.C. residents add 3% sales tax; outside the U.S., add 15¢.)

The nazi slogan: "The commonweal ranks above private profit," would be unreservedly endorsed by any socialist, and by any advocate of interventionism. This slogan implies, Mises states, "that profit-seeking business harms the vital interests of the immense majority and that it is the sacred duty of popular government to prevent the emergence of profits by public control of production and distribution." If the nazis, the socialists and the interventionists are agreed in their estimate of "profit-seeking business," it is not astonishing that they are agreed in their estimate of how the "menace" of profit seeking should be dealt with: the annihilation of the freedom that makes profit seeking possible—that is, the annihilation of freedom.

Those who advocate interventionism deceive themselves and/or seek to deceive others if they pretend that the end they will achieve is anything other than totalitarian statism. The interventionist aims at the substitution of governmental force for the choices of individuals dealing by voluntary agreement on the free market. As Professor Mises points out: "If a man were to say: 'I do not like the mayor elected by majority vote; therefore I ask the government to replace him by the man I prefer,' one would hardly call him a democrat. But if the same claims are raised with regard to the market, most people are too dull to discover the dictatorial aspirations involved."

For the reader who seeks to untangle the twisted pretensions of interventionism and to understand the fundamental political-economic alternative now confronting the world, *Planned Chaos* offers invaluable material. In an age when men are told that all extremes are evil, that one must neither demand complete freedom nor accept full slavery, but must endorse a "middle of the road," Mises demonstrates that nothing but one or the other extreme is possible. "The issue," he writes, "is always the same: the government or the market. There is no third solution." The choice is coercion—or voluntary trade; slavery—or freedom.

Excerpts from Ayn Rand's lecture, *America's Persecuted Minority: Big Business*

(see *Objectivist Calendar*, p. 4)

The smallest minority on earth is the individual. Those who deny individual rights, cannot claim to be defenders of minorities.

Every ugly, brutal aspect of injustice toward racial or religious minorities is being practiced toward businessmen. For instance, consider the evil of judging people by a double-standard and of denying to some the rights granted to others. Today's "liberals" recognize the workers' (the majority's) right to their livelihood (their wages), but deny the businessmen's (the minority's) right to their livelihood (their profits). If workers struggle for higher wages, this is hailed as "social gains"; if businessmen struggle for higher profits, this is damned as "selfish greed." If the workers' standard of living is low, the "liberals" blame it on the businessmen; but if the businessmen attempt to improve their economic efficacy, to expand their markets and to enlarge the financial returns of their enterprises, thus making higher wages and lower prices possible, the same "liberals" denounce it as "commercialism." If a non-commercial foundation—that is: a group which did not have to earn its funds—sponsors a television show, advocating its particular views, the "liberals" hail it as "enlightenment," "education," "art" and "public service"; if a businessman sponsors a television show and wants it to reflect his views, the "liberals" scream, calling it "censorship," "pressure" and "dictatorial rule." When three locals of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters deprived New York City of its milk supply for fifteen days—no moral indignation or condemnation was heard from the "liberal" quarters; but just imagine what would happen if businessmen stopped that milk supply for one hour—and how swiftly they would be struck down by that legalized lynching or pogrom known as "trust-busting."

INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION DEPARTMENT

[Subscribers are invited to send in the questions that they find themselves unable to answer in philosophical or political discussions. As many questions as space permits will be answered. No questions will be answered by mail.]

■ **Objectivism advocates the moral principle that man should be guided exclusively by reason. But what about the emotional side of human nature?**

To answer this question, one must begin—as in all philosophical issues—by giving precise definitions to the concepts involved.

Reason is the faculty that perceives, identifies and integrates the evidence of reality provided by man's senses. Reason is man's tool of cognition, the faculty by means of which he acquires knowledge—the knowledge he needs in order to act and to deal with existence.

An emotion is the psychosomatic form in which man experiences his estimate of the relationship of things to himself. An emotion is a value-response. It is the automatic psychological result of a man's value-judgments.

Just as love is man's emotional response to that which he values—so fear is his response to that which threatens his values. Just as desire is the consequence of love: man's wish to achieve and possess that which he regards as his good—so hatred is the consequence of fear: his wish for the destruction of that which endangers his good. Just as happiness is the consequence of fulfilled desire, the emotion that results from the achievement of one's values—so suffering is the emotion that results from the frustration of one's desire or the destruction of one's values.

Man's value-judgments are not innate. Having no innate knowledge of what is true or false, man can have no innate knowledge of what is good or evil. His values, and his emotions, are the product of the conclusions he has drawn or accepted, that is: of his basic premises.

A man's basic premises and values may be rational (that is, consonant with the facts of reality) or irrational, contradictory and self-defeating; he may hold them consciously or subconsciously, explicitly or implicitly, he may have chosen them independently and by deliberation or absorbed them uncritically from the assertions of others, by a process of cultural osmosis. But whatever the case, it is a man's basic premises that determine what he will regard as good or evil, desirable or undesirable, for him or against him, conducive or inimical to his welfare. Thus a man's values—and his emotions—are the product of the thinking he has done or has failed to do.

Reason and emotion—thinking and feeling—are not two contradictory or mutually inimical faculties, but their functions are not interchangeable. Emotions are not tools of cognition. What one feels in regard to any fact or issue is irrelevant to the question of whether one's judgment of it is true or false, right or wrong. It is not by means of one's feelings that one perceives reality.

In the psychology of a rational man, the relationship of cognition and evaluation—of reason and emotion—is that of cause and effect. Irrationality consists of the attempt to reverse this relationship: to let one's emotions—one's wishes or fears—determine one's thinking, guide one's actions and serve as one's standard of judgment, which means: the attempt to judge what is true or false by the standard of what is "pleasant" or "unpleasant." Philosophically, this attempt is the cause of mysticism; psychologically, it is the cause of neurosis.

The man who asserts that reason and emotion are antagonists is merely confessing that his emotions are the product of values which he knows to be irrational and which he does not care to change. When, in response to the statement that men should be guided by reason, a man demands: "But what about the emotional side of human nature?"—the meaning of

his demand is: "But what about my irrational wishes?" The man who knows that the values behind his emotions and desires are rational, does not find his reason clashing with his emotions and does not regard rationality as an "inhibiting restriction." He is the only man capable of experiencing profound, intense, undivided emotions—because there are no contradictions, no conflicts, among the values from which they come.

If, in any issue, you find that your emotions clash with your reason and you are tempted to reject reason—identify what this means. Reason is your faculty of perceiving reality; to act against reason is to act against reality. To attempt the irrational is to attempt to make the impossible succeed.

When you hear such bromides as: "The heart is superior to the mind"—"There is something higher than reason"—"Men cannot live by logic"—"Rational analysis kills"—remind yourself of what reason is, then translate these bromides into their actual meaning, as follows: "The heart is superior to reality"—"There is something higher than reality"—"Men cannot live in accordance with reality"—"Knowledge of reality kills." Then remember that the most consistent exponent of these beliefs is a schizophrenic.

Emotions do not have to be your enemies, your torturers and your destroyers—which is what they become when you follow them blindly. Emotions are the means of experiencing the enjoyment of life. But they offer that experience only to the man who does not substitute his emotions for his mind.

—NATHANIEL BRANDEN

An excerpt from Nathaniel Branden's forthcoming book, *Who is Ayn Rand?*

(see *Objectivist Calendar*, p. 4)

The Objectivist ethics is especially significant for the psychotherapist because it is the first psychological morality. It is the first morality to define the issue of good and evil in terms of the actions of one's consciousness—that is, in terms of the manner in which one uses one's consciousness. It ties virtue and vice to the action directly subject to man's volition: the choice to think or not to think. The evils that a man may commit existentially, in action, are made possible only by the primary evil committed inside his consciousness: evasion, the refusal to think, the rejection of reason—just as the good that a man may achieve is made possible by his choice to think, to identify, to integrate, to accept reason as an absolute.

The Objectivist morality does not require infallibility or omniscience of man: it merely requires that he choose to be conscious—that is, to perceive reality. The issue is a moral one, because man is a being who has to be conscious by choice.

This approach to morality is reflected in the Objectivist treatment of desires. Altruistic moralities tell man to sacrifice his desires. Hedonistic moralities tell man to indulge them. Other schools of morality tell man to seek a compromise, to mediate among his desires and the other claims upon him. But all of these schools share a fundamental premise, whether one consults Plato, Epicurus, Augustine, Calvin, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Bentham, Nietzsche or Dewey: they all, implicitly or explicitly, regard desires and emotions as irreducible primaries, as the given—then proceed to tell man what attitude to take toward them. The Objectivist morality recognizes that man's desires and emotions proceed from and are caused by his premises, that his premises are the result of his thinking—and that the issue of morality is not to be fought over desires and emotions (which are only a consequence), but over the thinking a man has done or has failed to do. Objectivism teaches man that his mind and his emotions do not have to be antagonists, that his conscious convictions and his desires do not have to clash; it teaches man how they are to be integrated, how to bring them into non-contradictory harmony; it teaches man how he can determine the content of his desires and emotions. (It defines the principles involved; to develop their full implementation is the task of the science of psychology.)

The Crisis Over Berlin

By ALAN GREENSPAN

Over a piece of real estate scarcely a tenth the size of Rhode Island, the Russians have brought the world to the brink of war. One would reasonably conclude from the Soviets' unremitting pressure on West Berlin that they fear the city is a threat which can overrun the whole communist empire. As absurd as it may sound, the Russians are right: West Berlin is a threat to the whole communist system. But the threat is not military; it is ideological. The city, with its broad boulevards, new buildings and prosperous industries, stands as a monument to freedom and free enterprise amid the drabness of East Germany. It is hardly imaginable that the communists can vaunt the wonders of their "workers' paradise" while the glitter of West Berlin makes a mockery of their pretensions. West Berlin must be destroyed, threaten the Soviets. The city must be reduced to the level of its surroundings. Its spirit must be broken. Communism cannot stand the comparison.

This is the cause of the Berlin crisis. The Russians will not, and cannot, let up until they have brought the city under communist rule. The Soviet allegation that West Berlin is a military threat because of the Western garrison stationed there is too absurd for rebuttal. The city is surrounded and militarily indefensible. The charge that West Berlin is a base for spies should be—but probably is not—true. The claim that West Berlin harbors hoodlums who kidnap East Berliners cannot really be taken seriously. The Russians will never acknowledge the real reason for their continual provocations and threats toward West Berlin. To acknowledge it would be to admit that communism is a failure in the area in which it vociferously avers superiority: the ability to achieve material prosperity.

History rarely offers so controlled an experiment in rival economic systems as has been seen in Berlin during the last decade. In the late 1940's, when the rest of Western Europe was sinking under a morass of socialistic experiments, West Germany, including West Berlin, turned instead to free enterprise (at least predominantly). The results were dramatic: from a country defeated and devastated by war, it arose to become spectacularly prosperous. Meanwhile, East Germany and East Berlin barely emerged from the rubble.

As the discrepancies in freedom and material well-being between the two halves of Germany grew, the exodus from the Eastern sector became a torrent. West Berlin was a showplace of free enterprise, and the exit to freedom. Finally, in desperation, the gauleiters of East Berlin cynically slammed shut the escape hatch and built a wall which turned the "workers' paradise" of East Germany into a huge concentration camp.

While the communists have been quick to grasp the ideological significance of Berlin, the "global strategists" of the West evidently cannot, or will not. The welfare statist both in this country and abroad, who are responsible for the formulation of Western foreign policy, have laboriously evaded coming to grips with the meaning and nature of the issue at stake. Their mental block is not difficult to understand: West Berlin is more than an affront to the communist world—it is a slap in the face to their own socialist programs at home. They are caught between their fear of a communist victory—and their terror of identifying that *capitalism* is the only alternative, and that *that* is the issue at stake in West Berlin. The contradiction they refuse to resolve or acknowledge has paralyzed them and made them blusteringly ineffectual against the Russians.

West Berliners, sensing compromise and abandonment in our overeagerness to confer with the Russians—and knowing whose are the lives we are willing to "negotiate"—are beginning to leave in droves. The flow of new capital investment in the city is slowly drying up. To make matters worse, the West German government is offering subsidies to keep people from leaving. The subsidies, contemptuously labeled "jitter bonuses" by the people, serve only to accelerate the exodus.

Mr. Greenspan is President of Townsend-Greenspan & Co., Inc., New York, economic consultants.

The story of West Berlin is at once a salute to the efficacy of a free economy and a tragic commentary on the destructiveness of compromise, of mixed premises and mixed purposes, of an ostensible fight for freedom by Western leaders who do not wish to know or have anyone else know what is being fought for. West Berlin is a symbol of crisis for *both* the East and the West.

Choose Your Issues (from page 1)

know it, the present administration seems to know it. The "trial balloons" are being sent up with growing frequency.

Any person who claims to be an advocate of freedom and who wonders what practical action he can take, should choose *these* two issues as his first concern: they involve the fundamental principles of our culture. He should study these issues, watch their developments and make himself heard in public, on any scale open to him, great or modest, from private discussions to national forums. It is with these two issues that the "practical" fight for freedom should begin.

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ In June, 1962, Random House will publish *Who is Ayn Rand?* by Nathaniel Branden. This book discusses: the moral revolution of *Atlas Shrugged*, and the relevance of Ayn Rand's philosophy to the cultural and political crisis of our time; the application of Objectivism to basic problems of psychology; the esthetic principles underlying Ayn Rand's novels, and her concept of man's relationship to existence, which holds the key to her literary method. The title essay—contributed by Barbara Branden—is a biographical study, concerned primarily with Ayn Rand's intellectual and artistic development.

■ *Nathaniel Branden Lectures* has incorporated under the new name of NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE. In addition to offering lecture courses, the Institute will publish papers and essays on the Objectivist philosophy and its application to the social sciences. The first of these, published in December, 1961, is "The Objectivist Ethics" by Ayn Rand, a paper originally given at the University of Wisconsin 1961 Symposium on "Ethics in Our Time." (This paper is now available from THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER, INC. Price \$1. N.Y.C. residents add 3% sales tax.)

■ The next New York series of "Basic Principles of Objectivism" will be given at the Hotel Roosevelt, 45th St. & Madison Ave., at 7:30 P.M. on twenty consecutive Tuesday evenings, beginning February 13. Registration is now open.

■ Barbara Branden will speak on N.Y.C. radio station WBAI-FM (99.5 on the dial) on Friday, January 5, at 7 P.M. Her topic: "The Moral Antagonism of Capitalism and Socialism." This program will be rebroadcast on Saturday, January 6, at 9:15 A.M.

■ Ayn Rand gave a lecture at the Ford Hall Forum, Boston, on Sunday, December 17. Her topic: "America's Persecuted Minority: Big Business."

■ In mid-September, New American Library brought out *The Fountainhead* with a new jacket design; a second printing of this edition, in October, brought the total number of paperback copies in print to over 1,000,000. New American Library also published a paperback edition of *Anthem*, in September; the first printing was over 300,000 copies; six weeks later, a second printing was announced.

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CHECK YOUR PREMISES

By AYN RAND

Antitrust: the Rule of Unreason

It is a grave error to suppose that a dictatorship rules a nation by means of strict, rigid laws which are obeyed and enforced with rigorous, military precision. Such a rule would be evil, but almost bearable; men could endure the harshest edicts, provided these edicts were known, specific and stable; it is not the known that breaks men's spirits, but the unpredictable. A dictatorship has to be capricious; it has to rule by means of the unexpected, the incomprehensible, the wantonly irrational; it has to deal not in death, but in *sudden* death; a state of chronic uncertainty is what men are psychologically unable to bear.

The American businessmen have had to live in that state for seventy years. They were condemned to it by that judicial version of the doctrine of Original Sin which presumes men to be guilty with little or no chance to be proved innocent and which is known as the Antitrust laws.

No business-hating collectivist could have gotten away with creating so perfect an instrument for the destruction of capitalism and the delivery of businessmen into the total power of the government. It took the so-called "conservatives," the alleged defenders of capitalism, to create the Antitrust laws. And it takes the intellectual superficiality of today's "conservatives" to continue supporting these laws, in spite of their meaning, record and results.

The alleged purpose of the Antitrust laws was to protect competition; that purpose was based on the socialistic fallacy that a free, unregulated market will inevitably lead to the establishment of coercive monopolies. But, in fact, no coercive monopoly has ever been or ever can be established by means of free trade on a free market. Every coercive monopoly was created by government intervention into the economy: by special privileges, such as franchises or subsidies, which closed the entry of competitors into a given field, by legislative action. (For a full demonstration of this fact, I refer you to the works of the best economists.) The Antitrust laws were the classic example of a moral inversion prevalent in the history of capitalism: an example of the victims, the businessmen, taking the blame for the evils caused by the government, and the government using its own guilt as a justification for acquiring wider powers, on the pretext of "correcting" the evils.

Since "free competition enforced by law" is a grotesque contradiction in terms, Antitrust grew into a haphazard accumulation of non-objective laws, so vague, complex, contradictory and inconsistent that any business practice can now be construed as illegal, and by complying with one law a businessman opens himself to prosecution under several others. No two jurists can agree on the meaning and application of these laws. No one can give an exact definition of what con-

stitutes "restraint of trade" or "intent to monopolize" or any of the other, similar "crimes." No one can tell what the law forbids or permits one to do. The interpretation is left entirely up to the courts. "The courts in the United States have been engaged ever since 1890 in deciding case by case exactly what the law proscribes. No broad definition can really unlock the meaning of the statute . . ." (A. D. Neale, *The Antitrust Laws of the U.S.A.*, Cambridge University Press, 1960, p. 13.)

Thus a businessman has no way of knowing in advance whether the action he takes is legal or illegal, whether he is guilty or innocent. Yet he has to act; he has to run his business.

Retroactive law—which means: a law that punishes a man for an action which was not legally defined as a crime at the time he committed it—is a form of persecution practiced only in dictatorships and forbidden by every civilized legal code. It is not supposed to exist in the United States and it is not applied to anyone—except to businessmen. A case in which a man cannot know until he is convicted whether the action he took in the past was legal or illegal, is certainly a case of retroactive law.

At first, Antitrust was merely a potential club, a "big stick" over businessmen's heads; but it soon became actual. From their hesitant, sluggish beginnings in a few vaguely semi-plausible cases, Antitrust prosecutions accelerated by a progression of logical steps to such judicial decisions as: that established businesses have to share with any newcomer the facilities it had taken them years to create, if the lack of such facilities imposes a real hardship on the would-be competitor (*Associated Press* case, 1945)—that business concerns have no right to pool their patents and that the penalty for such pools is either the compulsory licensing of their patents to any and all comers or the outright confiscation of the patents; and if a businessman, who is a member of such a pool, sues a competitor who has infringed his patent, the competitor not only wins the case, but collects treble damages from the man whose patent he had infringed (*Kobe v. Dempsey Pump Company*, 1952)—that if a would-be competitor's efficiency is so low that he is unable even to pay a royalty on the patents owned by stronger companies, he is entitled to such patents royalty-free (*General Electric* case, 1948)—that business concerns must, not merely make a gift of their patents to any rival, but must also *teach* him how to use these patents (*I.C.I. and duPont* case, 1952)—that a business concern must not anticipate increases in the demand for its product and must not be prepared to meet them by expanding its capacity "before others entered the field," because this might *discourage* newcomers (*ALCOA* case, 1945).

Is the basic line clear? Do you observe the nature of the principle that dictated the decisions in these cases?

A. D. Neale identifies it as follows: "There is an element of pure 'underdogery' in the law; an element of throwing the weight of the enforcement authorities into the scale on the side of the weaker parties, which has little to do with the economic control of monopoly." (P. 461).

I identify it as: the penalizing of ability for being ability, the penalizing of success for being success, and the sacrifice of productive genius to the demands of envious mediocrity.

Who were the profiteers of Antitrust? Many businessmen supported it from the start: some innocently, some not. These last were the kind who seek to rise, not by free trade and productive ability, but by *political favor and pull*, which means: not by merit, but by *force*. They are the typical products of a "mixed economy" and their numbers multiply as the economy grows more "mixed."

The other group of profiteers was the bureaucrats and the statist. As the trend toward statism grew, the statist found an invaluable instrument for the persecution and the eventual enslavement of businessmen. Observe that the most outrageous Antitrust cases date from the 1940's. Power, in a statist sense, means *arbitrary* power. An *objective* law protects a country's freedom; only a *non-objective* law can give a statist the chance he seeks: a chance to impose his arbitrary will—his policies, his decisions, his interpretations, his enforcement, his punishment or favor—on disarmed, defenseless victims.

(continued on page 6)

BOOKS

*Economics in One Lesson** by Henry Hazlitt

Reviewed by R. HESSEN

Economists, most notably Professor Ludwig von Mises, have repeatedly demonstrated that the only economic system consonant with a free and prosperous society is laissez-faire capitalism. But the influence of statist theorists and historians in the past few decades has resulted in the medley of errors, half-truths, misconceptions and misrepresentations which constitutes most laymen's "knowledge" of capitalism and its history.

It is the extraordinary merit of Henry Hazlitt to have detected the central fallacy involved in most of the popular errors and to have patiently presented and refuted scores of the standard arguments against free enterprise. In *Economics in One Lesson*, he has written the finest primer available for students of capitalism. Clear, vigorous, logical and thoroughly engrossing, the book has richly earned its status as a classic in the literature of freedom.

"The whole argument of this book," writes Hazlitt, "may be summed up in the statement that in studying the effects of any given economic proposal we must trace not merely the immediate results but the results in the long run, not merely the primary consequences but the secondary consequences, and not merely the effects on some special group, but the effects on everyone."

When people clamor for a protective tariff, an export subsidy, a minimum wage law, or a farm price-support law, what they see is only the immediate benefit to the businessmen or workers or farmers whom the new law is designed to aid. What they fail to see is that some taxpayer, consumer or property-owner must bear the cost and burden of the dole or restriction; that every dollar taken in taxes and spent by the government means there is one less dollar to be spent by the individual who earned it; that "temporary" subsidies to unprofitable farms or industries will either merely delay their collapse or lead to a permanent subsidization of inefficient production methods or of surplus goods.

The blindly irresponsible, range-of-the-moment nature of the statist's economic theories can best be illustrated by the following popular fallacies:

(a) The notion that a little inflation is necessary to stimulate economic growth. When warned that inflation (by eroding the purchasing power of money) has calamitous cumulative long-range effects on savings, prices and wages, the inflationists shrug it off with the Keynesians' insipid wisecrack: "In the long run we will all be dead." Hazlitt retorts: "Today is already the tomorrow which the bad economist yesterday urged us to ignore."

(b) The notion that machines are a threat to the livelihood of workers, and that the unions and the government should halt automation in the name of maintaining or achieving full employment. In answer, Hazlitt cites the fact that in England in 1760, 7900 people were engaged in the home production of cotton textiles. If the workers or a short-sighted government had been able to bar the introduction of Arkwright's cotton-spinning machinery, they would have barred the day, just 27 years later, when 320,000 persons were employed in the newly-mechanized industry, an increase of 4,400 per cent.

Hazlitt demonstrates that technological unemployment is a temporary phenomenon; that new machines create more jobs than they destroy; that a rising standard of living and an increase in the general economic welfare can be achieved, not by an increase in employment as such, but only by an

* Published by Harper & Bros., \$3.75. Available from NBL BOOK SERVICE, INC., 165 East 35th St., New York 16, N.Y., for \$2.95 (N.Y.C. residents add 3% sales tax; outside the U.S., add 15%).

Mr. Hessen received his M.A. in History from Harvard University, and is now on the staff of NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE.

increase in production. "It is . . . no trick," he writes, "to employ everybody, even (or especially) in the most primitive economy. Full employment—very full employment; long, weary, back-breaking employment—is characteristic of precisely the nations that are most retarded industrially."

These are a few random samples of Hazlitt's critical acuity. I suggest that before sending any economic queries to our Intellectual Ammunition Department, you read this book; it will give you most of the basic answers.

Antitrust: the Rule of Unreason (from page 5)

He does not have to exercise his power too frequently nor too openly; he merely has to have it and let his victims know that he has it; fear will do the rest.

In the light of this, consider the new phase of Antitrust enforcement. In February of 1961, in Philadelphia, seven businessmen, representing some of America's greatest industrial concerns, were sentenced to jail in the "Electrical Conspiracy" case. This case involved twenty-nine companies manufacturing electrical equipment. The charge against them was that they had made secret agreements to fix prices and rig bids. But without such agreements, the larger companies could have set their prices so low that the smaller ones would have been unable to match them and would have gone out of business, whereupon the larger companies would have faced prosecution, under these same Antitrust laws, for "intent to monopolize."

It is evil enough to impose ruinous fines under laws which the victims have no way to comply with, laws which everyone concedes to be non-objective, contradictory and undefinable. It is obscene, under such laws, to impose jail sentences on men of distinguished achievement, outstanding ability and unimpeachable moral character, who had spent their lives on so responsible a task as industrial production.

But this, perhaps, is the clue to the purpose of that disgraceful verdict. It created in the public's mind the impression that industrial production is some sort of sinister underworld activity and that businessmen, by their nature and profession, are to be treated as criminals.

Such was the obvious implication of the disgusting howling that went on in the press. The same humanitarians who rush to the defense of any homicidal dipsomaniac, did not hesitate to release all of their repressed hatred and malice on seven silent, defenseless men whose profession was business. That the leftist press would enjoy it, is understandable and, at least, consistent. But what is one to think of the alleged "conservative" press? Take a look at the February 17, 1961, issue of *Time* magazine; with its story about the verdict, *Time* published photographs of six of the victims—six faces with intelligence and determination as their common characteristic—and under them, the caption: "A drama that U.S. business will long remember to its shame."

The same humanitarians of the press who clamor that penitentiaries are a useless, vengeful form of cruelty to juvenile switch-blade killers questing for "kicks" and that these sensitive victims of society should be "given a chance" and should be sent to garden rest-homes for rehabilitation—these same humanitarians have remained silent while a bill is proposed in Congress to the effect that an executive convicted of an Antitrust violation may not, thereafter, be given employment by any business concern and is thus to be deprived of the right to earn a living.

No, all this is not the result of a communist conspiracy. It is the result of something much harder to fight: the result of a culture's cynical, goal-less disintegration, which can benefit no one but the communists and the random little power-lusters of the moment, who fish in muddy waters.

It is futile to wonder about the policies or the intentions of the present administration. Whether the whole administration or any one of its members is consciously dedicated to the destruction of American business, does not matter. What matters is that if any of them are, they have the machinery to accomplish it and no opposition: a culture without goals, values or political principles can offer no opposition to anything.

(continued on page 8)

THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER

INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION DEPARTMENT

[Subscribers are invited to send in the questions that they find themselves unable to answer in philosophical or political discussions. As many questions as space permits will be answered. No questions will be answered by mail.]

■ Why does Objectivism reject ethical hedonism?

Ethical hedonism is the doctrine that pleasure is the standard of moral value, the criterion to be used in determining good and evil, virtue and vice—that the right action in any situation is the action which produces the most pleasure (and/or the least pain).

Hedonists disagree about many questions, such as: Should one pursue short-range or long-range pleasure? Should one pursue one's own selfish pleasure (egoistic hedonism)—or "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" (the Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill)? But the doctrine of pleasure as the ethical standard is the fundamental uniting them all.

The feeling of pleasure, however, like any emotional response, is not a psychological primary; it is a consequence, an effect, of one's previously formed value-judgments. To say, therefore, that men should determine their values by the standard of what gives them pleasure, is to say: Men should determine their values by the standard of whatever they already value. This means that hedonism is a circular and content-less morality which can define no values or virtues and has to count on whatever random values any man happens to have acquired.

In practice, men have no way of obeying the tenets of hedonism, except by taking their already formed feelings—their desires and aversions, their loves and fears—as the given, as irreducible primaries the satisfaction of which is the purpose of morality, regardless of whether the value-judgments that caused these feelings are rational or irrational, consistent or contradictory, consonant with reality or in flagrant defiance of it.

Objectivism holds that such a policy is suicidal; that if man is to survive, he needs the guidance of an objective and rational morality, a code of values based on and derived from man's nature as a specific type of living organism, and the nature of the universe in which he lives. Objectivism rejects any subjectivist ethics that begins, not with facts, but with: "I (we, they) wish . . ." Which means: it rejects hedonism of any variety.

—LEONARD PEIKOFF

■ What is the Objectivist answer to those who claim that the rights of the individual must be subordinated and sacrificed to the interests of society?

There is no term that has been used more indiscriminately than the term "society," and with so total a lack of understanding of its meaning.

"Society" is an abstraction; in a political context, it denotes a group or number of individual men who live in the same geographical area and who deal with one another. Society is not a separate entity endowed with some sort of autonomous existence, apart from the individual men of whom it is composed. Society as such does not exist; only individual men exist.

What, therefore, does it mean to declare that man must live for society? It means that one individual must sacrifice himself to other individuals. What does it mean to declare that the rights of society supersede the rights of the individual? It means that some men's rights are to be sacrificed for the sake of other men. What does it mean to declare that public good comes above individual good? It means that some gang of men have a good lobby in Washington, have had themselves designated as "the public," and are now empowered to swing a club over the heads of other men who, for the time being, are not the public.

For precisely the same reasons that it is evil to sacrifice

Mr. Peikoff is presently completing his doctoral dissertation in philosophy at New York University.

FEBRUARY, 1962

one individual to another individual, it is evil to sacrifice him to two individuals or two hundred or two billion. Numbers do not change the moral principle involved. If one man has no claim to the life of another, neither does a group of men have such a claim. As Kira, the heroine of *We The Living*, observes: "If you write a whole line of zeroes, it's still—nothing."

■ Why do Objectivists maintain that without property rights, no other rights are possible?

The right of property is the right of use and disposal. If one is not free to use that which one has produced, one does not possess the right of liberty. If one is not free to make the products of one's work serve one's chosen goals, one does not possess the right to the pursuit of happiness. And—since man is not a ghost who exists in some non-material manner—if one is not free to keep and to consume the products of one's work, one does not possess the right of life. In a society where men are not free privately to own the material means of production, their position is that of slaves whose lives are at the absolute mercy of their rulers.

—NATHANIEL BRANDEN

An excerpt from Nathaniel Branden's forthcoming book, *Who is Ayn Rand?*

The principle of justice, which is central in the ethical philosophy of Ayn Rand, is the principle most conspicuously avoided in the ethics of altruism. The question of justice is one which the advocates of altruism clearly prefer not to hear raised. Their reticence is not difficult to understand, when one remembers what altruism advocates. Just as altruism teaches that wealth does not have to be earned, so it teaches that love does not have to be earned. . . .

One of the foremost contemporary spokesmen for this "non-commercial" view of human relationships is psychologist Erich Fromm who, with impressive consistency, is a socialist, a devotee of Zen Buddhism and an advocate of the theory that love should be liberated from such unspiritual concepts as the "deserved" and the "undeserved." "In essence, all human beings are identical," he declares in *The Art of Loving*. "We are all part of One; we are One. This being so, it should not make any difference whom we love." Fromm criticizes capitalism for what he (correctly) terms its "fairness ethics." It is capitalism, he holds, that makes the practice of love so difficult. He writes: "It may even be said that the development of fairness ethics is the particular ethical contribution of capitalist society. . . . In pre-capitalist societies, the exchange of goods was determined either by direct force, by tradition, or by personal bonds of love and friendship. In capitalism, the all-determining factor is the exchange on the market. . . . If our whole social and economic organization is based on each one seeking his own advantage, if it is governed by the principle of egotism tempered only by the ethical principle of fairness, how can one do business, how can one act within the framework of existing society and at the same time practice love? . . . The principle underlying capitalist society and the principle of love are incompatible." It is socialism, he argues, that will make love possible. . . .

Here one may observe, in unusually explicit statement, the diametrical opposite of Ayn Rand's view of proper human relationships as expressed by the "trader principle." Ayn Rand does not believe that fairness (justice) "tempers" or "limits" self-interest, as Fromm evidently does; she regards fairness or justice as indispensable to, and inseparable from, self-interest. Nor does she think that, in regard to moral worth, "all human beings are identical." She draws moral distinctions between a hero and a scoundrel, or a murderer and his victim. Nor does she think that "it should not make any difference whom we love." In her ethics, it should and does make a difference.

To love, she states, is to value; love, properly, is the consequence and expression of admiration—"the emotional price paid by one man for the joy he receives from the virtues of another." Love is not alms, but a moral tribute.

(continued on page 8)

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

- Ayn Rand will give her lecture on "America's Persecuted Minority: Big Business" at Columbia University, Wollman Auditorium, Ferris Booth Hall, on Thursday, February 15, 8 P.M. The lecture is open to the public, admission free.
- On March 1, Ayn Rand will begin a twelve-week series of radio programs for the Columbia University station WKCR (590 kc AM, 89.9 mc FM). Under the general title of "Ayn Rand on Campus," these programs will be broadcast weekly, on Thursday, at 8:30 P.M. to 9:30 P.M. The format will be as follows: on six alternate weeks, Miss Rand will give one of the lectures she has delivered at various universities. On the other six programs, Professor John Hospers of the Philosophy Department of Brooklyn College will discuss Objectivism and the lecture of the preceding week, with Ayn Rand, Nathaniel Branden and Barbara Branden. Professor Hospers is the author of: *Meaning and Truth in the Arts—An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis—Human Conduct: an introduction to the problems of ethics.*
The schedule of the programs is as follows:
March 1—"America's Persecuted Minority: Big Business." (This program will be a recording of Ayn Rand's lecture at Columbia University on February 15.)
March 8—Discussion of preceding lecture by Prof. Hospers, Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden.
March 15—"The Objectivist Ethics."
March 22—Discussion by Prof. Hospers, Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden.
March 29—"The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Our Age."
April 5—Discussion by Prof. Hospers, Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden.
April 12—"Conservatism: an Obituary."
April 19—Discussion by Prof. Hospers, Ayn Rand and Barbara Branden.
April 26—"Our Esthetic Vacuum."
May 3—Discussion by Prof. Hospers, Ayn Rand and Barbara Branden.
May 10—"Faith and Force: the Destroyers of the Modern World."
May 17—Concluding remarks by Prof. Hospers and Ayn Rand.
These programs will be available to Educational radio stations and University stations, for cost of tape and postage. If a station in your community is interested, its representative may write to: Bruce E. Goldman, President, WKCR, 208 Ferris Booth Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N.Y.
- In addition to the forthcoming series given in New York by Nathaniel Branden Institute on "Basic Principles of Objectivism," which begins on February 13, the Institute began a new Tape Transcription series of the same course in Indianapolis on January 20 and in Boston on January 23. Tape series are also scheduled to begin in Los Angeles on February 9 and in Washington, D.C., on February 11. Mr. Branden will deliver the opening night's lecture of the Washington series in person.
- On January 2, Ayn Rand addressed Professor John Hospers' class in Ethics, at Brooklyn College; and on January 10, she addressed his graduate seminar. The subject of discussion on both occasions was the Objectivist ethics.
- In December, the Presidents' Professional Association, Inc. (affiliated with the American Management Association, Inc.) made a video-tape recording of a talk by Ayn Rand on "Capitalism versus Communism." This recording is to be used on closed-circuit television by the P.P.A.'s educational discussion-groups for presidents of industrial concerns.

■ Random House has brought out the fifth printing of *Atlas Shrugged* in its hardcover edition; in paperback, New American Library has ordered its tenth printing (100,000 copies), to be brought out in February.

Antitrust: the Rule of Unreason (from page 6)

Intentionally or not, the purpose achieved by those jail sentences is: intimidation—or, more precisely: terrorization. The Antitrust laws give the government the power to prosecute and convict any business concern in the country any time it chooses. The threat of sudden destruction, of unpredictable retaliation for unnamed offenses, is a much more potent means of enslavement than explicit dictatorial laws. It demands more than mere obedience; it leaves men no policy save one: *to please* the authorities; to please—blindly, uncritically, without standards or principles; to please—in any issue, matter or circumstance, for fear of an unknowable, unprovable vengeance. Anyone possessing such a stranglehold on businessmen, possesses a stranglehold on the wealth and the material resources of the country, which means: a stranglehold on the country.
Businessmen are already helpless and almost silenced. It is only the intellectuals who still have a chance to be heard. That is why I suggest to you the following test: if you hear an alleged "conservative" who quibbles bravely over taxes, budgets or school-aid, but supports the Antitrust laws—you may be sure that he is futile as a fighter for capitalism. To combat petty larceny as a crucial danger, at a time when murder is being committed, is to sanction the murder.
What should we do? We should demand a re-examination and revision of the entire issue of Antitrust. We should challenge its philosophical, political, economic and moral base. We should have a Civil Liberties Union—for businessmen. The repeal of the Antitrust laws should be our ultimate goal; it will require a long intellectual and political struggle; but, in the meantime and as a first step, we should urge that the jail-penalty provisions of these laws be abolished.
Businessmen are the one group that distinguishes capitalism and the American way of life from the totalitarian statism that is swallowing the rest of the world. All the other social groups—workers, professional men, scientists, soldiers—exist under dictatorships, even though they exist in chains, in terror, in misery and in progressive self-destruction. *But there is no such group as businessmen under a dictatorship.* Their place is taken by armed thugs: by bureaucrats and commissars. So if you want to fight for freedom, you must begin by fighting for its unrewarded, unrecognized, unacknowledged, yet best representatives—the American businessmen.

Excerpt from: Who is Ayn Rand? (from page 7)

If love did *not* imply admiration, if it did not imply an acknowledgment of moral qualities that the recipient of love possessed—what meaning or significance would love have, and why would Fromm or anyone consider it desirable? Only one answer is possible, and it is not an attractive one: when love is divorced from values, then "love" becomes, not a tribute, but a moral blank check: a promise that one will be forgiven anything, that one will not be abandoned, that one will be taken care of.

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THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER

Edited and Published by AYN RAND and NATHANIEL BRANDEN

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CHECK YOUR PREMISES
By AYN RAND
"Have Gun, Will Nudge"

Mr. Newton N. Minow, Chairman of the F.C.C., is performing a great, educational public service—though not in the way he intends. He is giving the public an invaluable object lesson on the nature and results of a "mixed economy."
The basic evil in any theory of a "mixed economy"—an economy of freedom mixed with controls—is the evasion of the fact that a government holds a legal monopoly on the use of physical force and that political power is the power of coercion. While a dictatorship rests on a blunt acknowledgment of this fact, on the motto that "might is right"—a "mixed economy" rests on pretending that no such distinction exists, that might and right can be safely scrambled together if we all agree never to raise this issue.
The current policy of the F.C.C. has provided a spectacle of not raising that issue, on a grand scale.
First, Mr. Minow announces that any television or radio station which does not satisfy his unstated criterion of an unspecified public service, will lose its license, that is: will be silenced forever. Then, while the victims mumble feeble protests, vaguely referring to *censorship*, Mr. Minow assumes an air of injured innocence and asserts that his sole intention is "to nudge, to exhort, to urge those who decide what goes on the air to appeal to our higher as well as our lower tastes." And President Kennedy declares: "Mr. Minow has attempted not to use *force*, but to use *encouragement* in persuading the networks to put on better children's programs, more public service programs."
No one has stepped forward to ask Mr. Kennedy whether his word usage is correct; and, if it is, whether we should claim that a holdup man who points a gun, is not attempting to use force, but to use encouragement in persuading a citizen to hand over his wallet.
No one has challenged Mr. Minow's description of censorship: "I dislike censorship as much as anyone else. Yet today we have censorship in a very real sense . . . There is censorship by ratings, by advertisers, by networks, by affiliates which reject programming offered to their

area. I want to free expression rather than stifle it. All sections of the community should be served rather than have them cut out by censorship which decrees they cannot see or hear something." (*Show Business Illustrated*, September 19, 1961.)
Let's see whether we can adopt Mr. Minow's concept of censorship: it would mean that the failure of a bad play is "censorship by the box office"—that the frustration of a lady who, weighing three hundred pounds, does not get a chance to model filmy negligees, is "censorship by advertisers"—that the plight of an inventor who finds no backers for his perpetual motion machine, is "censorship by bankers"—that the bankruptcy of a manufacturer who offers us gadgets which we don't buy, is "censorship by consumers"—and that free expression is stifled, whenever a manuscript molds in its author's trunk, cut out by "the censorship of publishers" who decree that we cannot read or hear something. What, then, is non-censorship? Mr. Minow's edicts.
So long as people evade the difference between economic power and political power, between a private choice and a government order, between intellectual persuasion and physical force—Mr. Minow has reason to assume that he can safely stretch their evasions all the way to the ultimate inversion: to the claim that a *private* action is coercion, but a *government* action is freedom.
It is true, as Mr. Minow assures us, that he does not propose to establish censorship; what he proposes is much worse. Censorship, in its old-fashioned meaning, is a government edict that forbids the discussion of some specific subjects or ideas—such, for instance, as sex, religion or criticism of government officials—an edict enforced by the government's scrutiny of all forms of communication prior to their public release. But for stifling the freedom of men's minds the modern method is much more potent; it rests on the power of non-objective law; it neither forbids nor permits anything; it never defines or specifies; it merely delivers men's lives, fortunes, careers, ambitions into the arbitrary power of a bureaucrat who can reward or punish at whim. It spares the bureaucrat the troublesome necessity of committing himself to rigid rules—and it places upon the victims the burden of discovering how to please him, with a fluid unknowable as their only guide.
No, a federal commissioner may never utter a single word for or against any program. But what do you suppose will happen if and when, with or without his knowledge, a third-assistant or a second cousin or just a nameless friend from Washington whispers to a television executive that the commissioner does not like producer X or does not approve of writer Y or takes a great interest in the career of starlet Z or is anxious to advance the cause of the United Nations?
What makes it possible to bring a free country down to such a level? If you doubt the connection between altruism and statism, I suggest that you count how many times—in the current articles, speeches, debates and hearings—there appeared the magic formula which makes all such outrages possible: "*The Public Interest.*"
What is the public interest? No specific definition has ever been or ever can be given by anyone. Since the concept is not used in its literal meaning, to designate the personal

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BOOKS

*Prosperity Through Freedom**

by Lawrence Fertig

Reviewed by EDITH EFRON

For fourteen years, Lawrence Fertig has been combating collectivism in America by popularizing the basic principles of free enterprise in his column for the Scripps-Howard newspapers. His latest book, *Prosperity Through Freedom*, applies these principles to a wide range of current events, and offers a highly readable survey of the economics behind the headlines.

The most interesting aspect of the book is journalistic rather than theoretical. Filled with statistics, quotations from liberal and libertarian theorists, and information gathered from an impressive number of American and foreign sources, this book provides an arsenal of factual ammunition for advocates of free enterprise.

In a section which examines the myth of Soviet superiority, Mr. Fertig reports in some detail on an important, but little known, study of Russian industry published by Professor G. Warren Nutter under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research, in 1957. Accepting Soviet figures at their face value, Professor Nutter shows that in such basic industries as electric power, natural gas, steel ingots, cement, freight cars, and others, the Soviet time-lag behind the United States was greater in 1955 than it was in 1913. In certain instances, the rate of deterioration is startling. In 1913, the Russian time-lag behind the U.S. in the production of crude petroleum was only 14 years; by 1937, the lag had widened to 26 years; and by 1955, the lag was up to 34 years. Again in 1913, the Russian lag in the production of freight cars was only 33 years; by 1937, the lag had increased to 57 years; and by 1955, the Russians were behind by 69 years. The Nutter study concludes that, according to their own "public relations" statistics, the Russians are about 35 years behind us in quantity of goods produced and about 55 years behind us in production per capita—and the lags have generally been increasing. Professor Nutter's wry concluding comment is worth quoting: "It hardly seems likely that Soviet authorities have practiced the art of understatement in heralding their achievements."

In another fascinating section of Mr. Fertig's book, called "How Our Experts Almost Ruined Germany," he reveals the details of the fiscal advice given to the West German government in 1948 by a commission of American economists. The commissioners' report was declassified only in April, 1961, and one can understand the State Department's reluctance to make its contents known. The report recommended deficit spending and a cheap money policy. It advocated inflationary measures and criticized Germany's "excessive concern for price stability." It objected to granting industry high depreciation allowances, on the grounds that "it was an expenditure of tax funds

which would otherwise have been collected by the government." And it concluded that "the nostalgic hopes . . . looking toward a revival of the nineteenth century role of a capital market are doomed to disappointment."

The report landed in a German wastebasket. The West German government did precisely the opposite; in the words of Economics Minister Erhard, it "re-introduced the old rules of a free economy, the rules of *laissez-faire*." The result was "the miracle of German recovery." And what happened to the spurned American commissioners? They went home, reports Mr. Fertig, to continue advocating the same destructive policies for America. One of these commissioners, Professor Walter W. Heller, is now head of President Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisers.

Regrettably, Mr. Fertig is not entirely consistent as a theorist. His advocacy of capitalism is diluted by an occasional concession to economic interventionism. For instance, he challenges particular policies of the Federal Reserve System or the specific administration of the Anti-trust laws, but he does not challenge the basic principle or the validity of such institutions. It is also regrettable that he did not present his research in a more scholarly form; more detailed references would have been desirable.

For readers who are swamped by statist-slanted news stories, however, *Prosperity Through Freedom* will be a welcome corrective, a lead to a better understanding of current events, and an eminently valuable book.

"Have Gun, Will Nudge" (from page 9)

interest of every citizen of a country, but is used to imply and establish a conflict, the opposition of *private* interests to *public* interest—its use can convey only one meaning: the right of some men (those who, by some undefined criterion, are *the public*) to sacrifice the interests of other men (of those who, for unspecified reasons, are *not* the public). Once that collectivist formula becomes the moral standard of a society, the rest is only a matter of time.

Mr. Paul Rand Dixon, F.T.C. Chairman, has announced: "Private rights are important but the public interest is a greater right."

An article entitled "His Master's Voice?" by Shirley Scheibla in *Barron's* magazine for January 1, 1962, offers the following warning: "The [Communications] Act gives the [Federal Communications] Commission a broad grant of authority to regulate broadcasting 'in the public interest.' Since neither Congress nor the courts ever have been able to agree on a working definition of what constitutes the 'public interest,' the commissioners need only decide that it is served by the way they happen to vote."

That such is the ultimate goal of our present trend, is indicated in Mr. Minow's "vast wasteland" speech of May 9, 1961. While all the concrete-bound, range-of-the-moment modern mentalities have been clamoring over the issue of Westerns *versus* spelling-bees, the ominous key-sentence of that speech has been passed by in comparative silence: the threat to "those few of you who really believe that the public interest is merely what interests the public."

Here is an open declaration that the public is not competent to judge its own interest. Who, then, is? Who will be its guardian and determine its interest, which supersedes any individual rights? Mr. Newton N. Minow.

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INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION DEPARTMENT

[Subscribers are invited to send in the questions that they find themselves unable to answer in philosophical or political discussions. As many questions as space permits will be answered. No questions will be answered by mail.]

■ Should a rational advocate of capitalism co-operate with those "conservatives" who base their advocacy of capitalism on religious faith?

Reason is the faculty that perceives, identifies and integrates the evidence of reality provided by man's senses. To base one's convictions on reason, is to base them on the facts of reality. *Faith* is the acceptance of an idea without evidence or proof, or in spite of evidence to the contrary.

To rest one's advocacy of capitalism on faith, is to concede that *reason* is on the side of one's enemies. Such a position implies that a free society cannot be rationally justified—that there are no *rational* arguments why men should not murder and enslave one another—that logic is on the side of dictatorships, firing squads and concentration camps, but men should renounce logic in favor of such "irrationalities" as freedom, justice, individual rights, achievement, prosperity and progress.

The implications of tying capitalism to faith have come nakedly into the open in the explicit irrationalism of many "conservative" groups. Intending to bring the mystical concept of Original Sin into political theory, they declare that man is depraved by nature, that reason is impotent, that man should not attempt to create a perfect political system or to establish a rational society on earth—but should settle for capitalism, instead.

The communists allege that *their* political philosophy is rational and has been scientifically proved. The mystical "conservatives" concede it and retreat into the world of the supernatural, surrendering *this* world to communism—a victory that the communists' irrational ideology could never win on its own merits.

Collectivism gained its intellectual influence and appeal by promising a *scientific* approach to social problems—a promise which it could not and did not keep. Today, disillusioned by the horrors which collectivism has achieved in practice, people, particularly young people, are seeking a rational alternative—which, in fact, only capitalism can provide. But instead of proof, logic or science, today's mystical "conservatives" have nothing better to offer than appeals to faith, revelation and the supernatural. In our age, in the presence of the triumphs of science, no thinking man will listen to the voices from the Dark Ages speaking of Original Sin and the futility of human endeavor; no thinking man will reject reason and the achievements of man's mind. If the "conservatives" succeeded in convincing him that he must accept capitalism on faith or not at all, he would, properly, answer: Not at all.

To claim that capitalism rests on religious faith is to contradict the fundamental principles of the United States; in America, religion is a private matter which must not be brought into political issues.

One need not be an atheist in order to fight for capitalism—provided one keeps the two issues separate. A ra-

tional advocate of capitalism *can* co-operate with religious people who share his political principles, but only in a strictly secular movement, that is: only in a movement that does not claim religion as the base and justification of its political principles.

The greatest single threat to capitalism today is the attempt to put capitalism, mysticism and Original Sin over on the public as one "package deal." No attacks by collectivists could do more to discredit capitalism than is done by this kind of attempt. Its result can be only to consign capitalism to the "lunatic fringe" of political thought and to remove it from the realm of serious, civilized discussion.

A rational advocate of capitalism should repudiate any individual or group that links capitalism to the supernatural. He commits treason to his own cause if and when he co-operates with the mystical "conservatives," if and when he sanctions them as creditable spokesmen for the cause of freedom.

—BARBARA BRANDEN

■ What is the Objectivist view of the claim, made by many social theorists today, that man's primary psychological need is to receive the approval and esteem of other men?

Before one can make any statement concerning man's fundamental needs, it is necessary to define precisely the meaning of "need" in this context. A living organism's *needs* are those things which the organism requires, by its nature, for its survival and well-being. Thus we can observe that man needs food, water, air, etc. Such needs are *objectively demonstrable*, and the standard by which one judges them to be needs is clear-cut and unequivocal: that which man's survival *in fact* requires.

The same principle applies to man's psychological needs. It can be shown that man has a need of self-esteem—a need to be confident of his judgment and his capacity to deal with reality. Man's mind is his basic means of survival. The absence of confidence in one's own mind results in a state of neurosis characterized by varying degrees of anxiety, ineffectuality, helplessness—that is, of incompetence to deal with existence. Again, the standard establishing this need is the requirements of man's survival.

A *desire* or a *wish* is not equivalent to a *need*; the fact that a great many men may desire a thing, does not prove that it represents a need inherent in human nature.

No advocate of the theory that man's primary psychological need is to receive the approval of other men, has offered any *proof* of such a claim; it is generally offered as an assertion which, presumably, one is to accept as self-evident.

Now consider the exact implications of this theory; taken literally, it means: (a) that man's survival, well-being and mental health require that no other consideration, such as, for instance, truth, facts, reason or reality, ever be permitted to take precedence over social approval—and that in the event of any clash, it is truth, facts, reason and reality that are to be sacrificed; (b) that if a man sees his fellow men pursuing a course of self-destruction, he should join them—in the interests of his survival—rather than risk their opprobrium; (c) that if a man remains loyal to his own rational judgment, in defiance of the opposition of others, he jeopardizes his psychological

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Edith Efron is a journalist whose articles have appeared in such publications as Life, Look, and The New York Times Magazine.

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ On March 1, Ayn Rand will appear on the CBS-TV network program "The Great Challenge: America's Continuing Revolution." 10 to 11 P.M., EST. (See your local listings.)

■ Ayn Rand will speak at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., on March 14; and at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, on March 15.

■ Nathaniel Branden will give public readings of three plays by Ayn Rand. April 2: *The Night of January 16th* (original version). April 9: *Ideal*. April 16: *Think Twice*. Those who live in the Greater New York area will shortly receive an announcement giving them full details.

■ Correction: Ayn Rand's series of radio programs for the Columbia University station WKCR will be broadcast only on FM (89.9 on your dial).

"Have Gun, Will Nudge" (from page 10)

Consider the implications. If the public is not competent to judge television programs and its own entertainment—how can it be competent to judge political issues? Or economic problems? Or nuclear policies? Or international affairs? And since—on the above premise—the answer is that it can't, shouldn't its guardians protect it from those books and newspapers which, in the guardians' judgment, are not consonant with the public interest and would only confuse the poor incompetent that's unable to judge?

Today—when rule by precedent has all but replaced rule by law, and nothing protects us from enslavement but the fragile barrier of custom—consider the consequences of a precedent such as Mr. Minow is seeking to establish.

Bear in mind what I said about the issue of Antitrust last month, when you evaluate the significance of the following: the article "His Master's Voice?" mentions that General Electric and Westinghouse have both applied for renewal of their broadcasting licenses, and: "Although FCC officials are unable to explain how they would improve program quality by forcing these two companies out of the field, the Commission currently is pondering whether the applications should be turned down on the ground that both firms have been convicted of antitrust violations."

Do you observe the nature of the pincer-movement or the squeeze-play—and the nature of the possibilities inherent in non-objective law?

For the special consideration of all those who are engaged in any branch of the communications industry, I submit the following: In January, 1961, in a case involving censorship of motion pictures (*Times Film Corp v. City of Chicago*), the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the censor, by a majority of one (in a five to four decision). The dissenting opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren, stated: "The decision presents a real danger of eventual censorship for every form of communication, be it newspapers, journals, books, magazines, television, radio or public speeches. . . . I am aware of no constitutional principle which permits us to hold that the communication of ideas through one medium may be censored while other media are immune. . . . It is not permissible, as I read the Constitution, for government to release one movie and refuse to release another because of an official's concept of the prevailing need or the public good."

That is the reason why one should fight against the terrorization and enslavement of television. That is the

issue at stake in the F.C.C. hearings—not the issue of whether today's television programs are good or bad (most of them are atrocious, particularly in the public affairs department)—not the issue of whether some cowboys, gangsters and private-eyes should be sacrificed in favor of more newsreels, slanted documentaries and panel discussions of political topics, with big close-ups of selfless public servants from Washington.

Intellectual Ammunition (from page 11)

well-being, but if he surrenders his judgment in obedience to widely-held beliefs which he knows to be false, he secures his psychological well-being; (d) that an abject second-hander, such as Peter Keating, is the epitome of mental health, whereas a man of independence and integrity, such as Howard Roark, is neurotically self-destructive because he always asks "What is true?" and not "What do others believe is true?"

To hold the approval of others as one's primary motive and goal, is to be a selfless, mindless, blind parasite incapable of thought and unfit for survival. That a great many men, who dread the responsibility of independent judgment, have chosen this state, is undeniable. But the inescapable result of this state is anxiety, insecurity, the sense of inner emptiness—neurotic symptoms that testify to the incompatibility of such dependence with mental health. The normalcy or healthiness of a psychological condition is not established by its statistical prevalence, but by its appropriateness to the requirements of man's survival. At one time, bubonic plague was dismayingly widespread, but this did not lead physicians to regard it as man's normal or healthy condition. If a person declares that gaining the approval of others is the dominating concern of his life, it is the responsibility of psychologists to recognize his state as a *disease*, and to discover and correct the underlying premises that *cause* his fear of independence—rather than to announce that this fear is an intrinsic attribute of human nature.

Man's survival and his mental health demand that he place *nothing* above his own rational judgment. It was not the parasitical practitioners of "togetherness" who brought mankind out of the cave. And it is not men of intransigent rationality and sovereign intellect who collapse in anxiety and neurosis, crying that they have no sense of personal identity.

How would Objectivism answer the person who claims that man's deepest psychological need is to receive the approval and esteem of others? This Objectivist would tell him: "Speak for yourself, brother." —NATHANIEL BRANDEN

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Counterfeit Individualism

By NATHANIEL BRANDEN

The theory of individualism is a central component of the Objectivist philosophy. Individualism is at once an ethical-political concept and an ethical-psychological one. As an ethical-political concept, individualism upholds the supremacy of individual rights, the principle that man is an end in himself, not a means to the ends of others. As an ethical-psychological concept, individualism holds that man should think and judge independently, valuing nothing higher than the sovereignty of his intellect.

The philosophical base and validation of individualism, as Ayn Rand has shown in *Atlas Shrugged*, is the fact that individualism, ethically, politically and psychologically, is an objective requirement of man's proper survival, of man's survival *qua* man, *qua* rational being. It is implicit in, and necessitated by, a code of ethics that holds *man's life* as its standard of value.

The advocacy of individualism as such is not new; what is new is the Objectivist validation of the theory of individualism and the definition of a consistent way to practice it.

Too often, the ethical-political meaning of individualism is held to be: doing whatever one wishes, regardless of the rights of others. Writers such as Nietzsche and Max Stirner are sometimes quoted in support of this interpretation. Altruists and collectivists have an obvious vested interest in persuading men that such is the meaning of individualism, that the man who refuses to be sacrificed intends to sacrifice others.

The contradiction in, and refutation of, such an interpretation of individualism is this: since the only rational base of individualism as an ethical principle is the requirements of man's survival *qua* man, one man cannot claim the moral right to violate the rights of another. If he denies inviolate rights to other men, he cannot claim such rights for himself; he has rejected the base of rights. No one can claim the moral right to a contradiction.

Individualism does not consist merely of rejecting the belief that man should live for the collective. A man who seeks escape from the responsibility of supporting his life by his own thought and effort, and wishes to survive by conquering, ruling and exploiting others, is not an individualist. An individualist is a man who lives for his own sake *and by his own mind*; he neither sacrifices himself to others nor sacrifices others to himself; he deals with men as a trader—not as a looter; as a Producer—not as an Attila.

It is the recognition of this distinction that altruists and collectivists wish men to lose: the distinction between a trader and a looter, between a Producer and an Attila.

If the meaning of individualism, in its ethical-political context, has been perverted and debased predominantly by its avowed antagonists, the meaning of individualism, in its ethical-psychological context, has been perverted and debased by its

professed supporters: by those who wish to dissolve the distinction between an independent judgment and a subjective whim. These are the alleged "individualists" who equate individualism, not with independent thought, but with "independent feelings." There are no such things as "independent feelings." There is only an independent mind.

An individualist is, first and foremost, a *man of reason*. It is upon the ability to think, upon his rational faculty, that man's life depends; rationality is the precondition of independence and self-reliance. An "individualist" who is neither independent nor self-reliant, is a contradiction in terms; individualism and independence are logically inseparable. The basic independence of the individualist consists of his loyalty to his own *mind*: it is his perception of the facts of reality, his understanding, his judgment, that he refuses to sacrifice to the unproved assertions of others. That is the meaning of intellectual independence—and that is the essence of an individualist. He is dispassionately and intransigently fact-centered.

Man needs knowledge in order to survive, and only reason can achieve it; men who reject the responsibility of thought and reason, can exist only as parasites on the thinking of others. And a parasite is not an individualist. The irrationalist, the whim-worshiper who regards knowledge and objectivity as "restrictions" on his freedom, the range-of-the-moment hedonist who acts on his private feelings, is not an individualist. The "independence" that an irrationalist seeks is *independence from reality*—like Dostoevsky's *Underground* man who cries: "What do I care for the laws of nature and arithmetic, when, for some reason, I dislike those laws and the fact that twice two makes four?"

To the irrationalist, existence is merely a clash between his whims and the whims of others; the concept of an *objective* reality has no reality to him.

Rebelliousness or unconventionality as such do not constitute proof of individualism. Just as individualism does not consist merely of rejecting collectivism, so it does not consist merely of the absence of conformity. A conformist is a man who declares, "It's true because others believe it"—but an individualist is *not* a man who declares, "It's true because I believe it." An individualist declares, "I believe it because I see in reason that it's true."

There is an incident in *The Fountainhead* that is worth recalling in this connection. In the chapter on the life and career of collectivist Ellsworth Toohey, Ayn Rand describes the various groups of writers and artists that Toohey organized: there was "... a woman who never used capitals in her books, and a man who never used commas . . . and another who wrote poems that neither rhymed nor scanned . . . There was a boy who used no canvas, but did something with bird cages and metronomes . . . A few friends pointed out to Ellsworth Toohey that he seemed guilty of inconsistency; he was so deeply opposed to individualism, they said, and here were all these writers and artists of his, and every one of them was a rabid individualist. 'Do you really think so?' said Toohey, smiling blandly."

What Toohey knew—and what students of Objectivism would do well to understand—is that such subjectivists, in their rebellion against "the tyranny of reality," are less independent and more abjectly parasitical than the most commonplace Babbitt whom they profess to despise. They originate or create nothing; they are profoundly *selfless*—and they struggle to fill the void of the egos they do not possess, by means of the only form of "self-assertiveness" they recognize: defiance for the sake of defiance, irrationality for the sake of irrationality, destruction for the sake of destruction, whims for the sake of whims.

A psychotic is scarcely likely to be accused of conformity; but neither a psychotic nor a subjectivist is an exponent of individualism.

Observe the common denominator in the attempts to corrupt the meaning of individualism as an ethical-political concept and as an ethical-psychological concept: the attempt to divorce individualism from *reason*. But it is only in the context of reason and man's needs as a rational being that the principle

(continued on page 16)

Ten Thousand Commandments*

by Harold Fleming

Reviewed by AYN RAND

Antitrust is a peculiar underground in American life: it is a secret torture chamber where executions take place in open, public sight, yet remain unseen, rendered invisible by such a screen of unintelligible legal complexities that few laymen can hope to see through it. Harold Fleming has split that screen—by means of a brilliantly incisive common sense—and has presented a coherent view of the chaos beneath. His book is a primer for laymen, condensed with unusual skill, simplicity and accuracy. If you want to grasp the essentials of Antitrust—its issues, methods and meaning—I suggest that you begin by reading *Ten Thousand Commandments*. No abstract estimates, such as "injustice," "persecution," "terrorization," can convey the nature of what is going on, without the shocking facts. These facts have to be read to be believed.

"The trouble," writes Mr. Fleming, "isn't simply that almost every businessman in the United States could now, by the new rules, be haled into court by government officials and be fined, branded a criminal . . . and subjected to treble damage suits by competitors and customers. It is that the policies and practices by which American business has grown so phenomenally productive have one and all in recent years been damned, discouraged, and suppressed."

Mr. Fleming shows how the alleged crime of "injury to competition" was switched into "injury to competitors"—by a succession of court decisions reinterpreting non-objective, undefinable statutes—and injury to actual competitors was switched into injury to potential competitors. The alleged crime of abusing an undefined "monopoly power" (the abuse consisting of "excluding" competitors) was switched into the crime of "intent" to abuse it, and then into the crime of possessing "an opportunity for abuse," regardless of whether a business concern ever took that opportunity or not. "Thus it seems that a company may now find itself violating the Sherman Act even though (1) it 'excludes' competitors only by keeping ahead of them (Alcoa case); (2) it doesn't even keep ahead of them (Tobacco case); and (3) it doesn't try to (Griffith case)."

The alleged crime of "conspiracy" was switched from an actual secret agreement into a presumed "meeting of the minds"—then into "consciously parallel action" of independent companies—and then: "In the Schine case the high Court said, 'The concerted action of the parent company, its subsidiaries, and the named officers and directors in that endeavor was a conspiracy which was not immunized by reason of the fact that the members were closely affiliated rather than independent.' That would seem to mean that it is illegal for the officers of different departments of an integrated company to cooperate."

What is the net result of this nightmare? "Since the essential purpose of all the variegated attacks has been to hamper the more successful business for the benefit of the less successful business, the result has been not to clarify the law, but to dissolve it. . . . What is left is merely a rule that the bigger companies are almost invariably wrong on some count or other and the little companies almost invariably right."

It would be hard to find a clearer indication of the fact that the morality of altruism—the sacrifice of success to failure, of ability to need—is the basic cause and motive power of Antitrust. It is unfortunate that Mr. Fleming does not seem to grasp the full meaning of his own statement. In the last two chapters of his book, attempting to explain and evaluate the monstrous facts he has presented, he resorts to some vague, superficial generalities, such as the suggestion

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that some sort of "Freudian" fear is the motive for the persecution of businessmen.

But he is too good a reporter to let his theory interfere with the facts he is presenting. And his book is so good that the inadequacy of his explanation can be safely overlooked. The facts speak for themselves.

Child Labor and the Industrial Revolution

By R. HESSEN

The least understood and most widely misrepresented aspect of the history of capitalism is child labor.

One cannot evaluate the phenomenon of child labor in England during the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, unless one realizes that the introduction of the factory system offered a livelihood, a means of survival, to tens of thousands of children who would not have lived to be youths in the pre-capitalistic eras.

The factory system led to a rise in the general standard of living, to rapidly falling urban death rates and decreasing infant mortality—and produced an unprecedented population explosion.

In 1750, England's population was 6 million; it was 9 million in 1800 and 12 million in 1820, a rate of increase without precedent in any era. The age distribution of the population shifted enormously; the proportion of children and youths increased sharply. "The proportion of those born in London dying before five years of age" fell from 74.5% in 1730-49 to 31.8% in 1810-29. (Mabel C. Buer, *Health, Welfare and Population in the Early Days of the Industrial Revolution*, p. 30.) Children who hitherto would have died in infancy now had a chance for survival.

Both the rising population and the rising life expectancy give the lie to the claims of socialist and fascist critics of capitalism that the conditions of the laboring classes were progressively deteriorating during the Industrial Revolution.

One is both morally unjust and ignorant of history if one blames capitalism for the condition of children during the Industrial Revolution, since, in fact, capitalism brought an enormous improvement over their condition in the preceding age. The source of that injustice was ill-informed, emotional novelists and poets, like Dickens and Mrs. Browning; fanciful medievalists, like Southey; political tract writers posturing as economic historians, like Engels and Marx. All of them painted a vague, rosy picture of a lost "golden age" of the working classes, which, allegedly, was destroyed by the Industrial Revolution. Historians have not supported their assertions. Investigation and common sense have deglamorized the pre-factory system of domestic industry. In that system, the worker made a costly initial investment, or paid heavy rentals, for a loom or frame, and bore most of the speculative risks involved. His diet was drab and meager, and even subsistence often depended on whether work could be found for his wife and children. There was nothing romantic or enviable about a family living and working together in a badly lighted, improperly ventilated, and poorly constructed cottage.

How did children thrive before the Industrial Revolution? In 1697, John Locke wrote a report for the Board of Trade on the problem of poverty and poor-relief. Locke estimated that a laboring man and his wife in good health could support no more than two children, and he recommended that *all children over three years of age (!)* should be taught to earn their living at working schools for spinning and knitting, where they would be given food. "What they can have at home, from their parents," wrote Locke, "is seldom more than bread and water, and that very scantily too."

Professor Ludwig von Mises reminds us: "The factory owners did not have the power to compel anybody to take a factory job. They could only hire people who were ready to work for the wages offered to them. Low as these wage rates were, they were nonetheless much more than these paupers could earn in any other field open to them. It is a distortion of facts to say that the factories carried off the housewives from the nurseries and the kitchen and the children from their

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INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION
DEPARTMENT

[Subscribers are invited to send in the questions that they find themselves unable to answer in philosophical or political discussions. As many questions as space permits will be answered. No questions will be answered by mail.]

■ How does one lead a rational life in an irrational society, such as we have today?

I will confine my answer to a single, fundamental aspect of this question. I will name only one principle, the opposite of the idea which is so prevalent today and which is responsible for the spread of evil in the world. That principle is: *Never fail to pronounce moral judgment.*

Nothing can corrupt and disintegrate a culture or a man's character as thoroughly as does the precept of *moral agnosticism*, the idea that one must never pass moral judgment on others, that one must be morally tolerant of anything, that the good consists of never distinguishing good from evil.

It is obvious who profits and who loses by such a precept. It is not justice or equal treatment that you grant to men when you abstain equally from praising men's virtues and from condemning men's vices. When your impartial attitude declares, in effect, that neither the good nor the evil may expect anything from you—whom do you betray and whom do you encourage?

But to pronounce moral judgment is an enormous responsibility. To be a judge, one must possess an unimpeachable character; one need not be omniscient or infallible, and it is not an issue of errors of knowledge; one needs an unbreached integrity, that is: the absence of any indulgence in conscious, willful evil. Just as a judge in a court of law may err, when the evidence is inconclusive, but may not evade the evidence available, nor accept bribes, nor allow any personal feeling, emotion, desire or fear to obstruct his mind's judgment of the facts of reality—so every rational person must maintain an equally strict and solemn integrity in the courtroom within his own mind, where the responsibility is more awesome than in a public tribunal, because *he*, the judge, is the only one to know when he has been impeached.

There is, however, a court of appeal from one's judgments: objective reality. A judge puts himself on trial every time he pronounces a verdict. It is only in today's reign of amoral cynicism, subjectivism and hooliganism that men may imagine themselves free to utter any sort of irrational judgment and to suffer no consequences. But, in fact, a man is to be judged by the judgments he pronounces. The things which he condemns or extols exist in objective reality and are open to the independent appraisal of others. It is his own moral character and standards that he reveals, whenever he blames or praises. If he condemns America and extols Soviet Russia—or if he attacks businessmen and defends juvenile delinquents—or if he denounces a great work of art and praises trash—it is the nature of his own soul that he confesses.

It is their fear of *this* responsibility that prompts most people to adopt an attitude of indiscriminate moral neutrality. It is the fear best expressed in the precept: "Judge not, that ye be not judged." But that precept, in fact, is an abdication of moral responsibility: it is a moral blank check one gives to others in exchange for a moral blank check one expects for oneself.

There is no escape from the fact that men have to make choices; so long as men have to make choices, there is no escape from moral values; so long as moral values are at stake, no moral neutrality is possible. To abstain from condemning a torturer, is to become an accessory to the torture and murder of his victims.

The moral principle to adopt in this issue, is: "Judge, and be prepared to be judged."

The opposite of moral neutrality is not a blind, arbitrary, self-righteous condemnation of any idea, action or person that does not fit one's mood, one's memorized slogans or one's

snap-judgment of the moment. Indiscriminate tolerance and indiscriminate condemnation are not two opposites: they are two variants of the same evasion. To declare that "everybody is white" or "everybody is black" or "everybody is neither white nor black, but gray," is not a moral judgment, but an escape from the responsibility of moral judgment.

To judge means: to evaluate a given concrete by reference to an abstract principle or standard. It is not an easy task; it is not a task that can be performed automatically by one's feelings, "instincts" or hunches. It is a task that requires the most precise, the most exacting, the most ruthlessly objective and *rational* process of thought. It is fairly easy to grasp abstract moral principles; it can be very difficult to apply them to a given situation, particularly when it involves the moral character of another person. When one pronounces moral judgment, whether in praise or in blame, one must be prepared to answer "Why?" and to prove one's case—to oneself and to any rational inquirer.

The policy of always pronouncing moral judgment does not mean that one must regard oneself as a missionary charged with the responsibility of "saving everyone's soul"—nor that one must give unsolicited moral appraisals to all those one meets. It means: (a) that one must know clearly, in full, verbally identified form, one's own moral evaluation of every person, issue and event with which one deals, and act accordingly; (b) that one must make one's moral evaluation known to others, when it is rationally appropriate to do so.

This last means that one need not launch into unprovoked moral denunciations or debates, but that one *must* speak up in situations where silence can objectively be taken to mean agreement with or sanction of evil. When one deals with irrational persons, where argument is futile, a mere "I don't agree with you" is sufficient to negate any implication of moral sanction. When one deals with better people, a full statement of one's views may be morally required. But in no case and in no situation may one permit one's own values to be attacked or denounced, and keep silent.

Moral values are the motive power of a man's actions. By pronouncing moral judgment, one protects the clarity of one's own perception and the rationality of the course one chooses to pursue. It makes a difference whether one thinks that one is dealing with human errors of knowledge or with human evil.

Observe how many people evade, rationalize and drive their minds into a state of blind stupor, in dread of discovering that those they deal with—their "loved ones" or friends or business associates or political rulers—are not merely mistaken, but *evil*. Observe that this dread leads them to sanction, to help and to spread the very evil whose existence they fear to acknowledge.

If people did not indulge in such abject evasions as the claim that some contemptible liar "means well"—that a mooching bum "can't help it"—that a juvenile delinquent "needs love"—that a criminal "doesn't know any better"—that a power-seeking politician is moved by patriotic concern for "the public good"—that communists are merely "agrarian reformers"—the history of the past few decades, or centuries, would have been different.

Ask yourself why totalitarian dictatorships find it necessary to pour money and effort into propaganda for their own helpless, chained, gagged slaves, who have no means of protest or defense. The answer is that even the humblest peasant or the lowest savage would rise in blind rebellion, were he to realize that he is being immolated, not to some incomprehensible "noble purpose," but to plain, naked human evil.

Observe also that moral neutrality necessitates a progressive sympathy for vice and a progressive antagonism to virtue. A man who struggles not to acknowledge that evil is evil, finds it increasingly dangerous to acknowledge that the good is the good. To him, a person of virtue is a threat that can topple all of his evasions—particularly when an issue of justice is involved, which demands that he take sides. It is then that such formulas as "Nobody is ever fully right or fully wrong" and "Who am I to judge?" take their lethal effect. The man who begins by saying: "There is some good in the worst of

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OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ Nathaniel Branden will address the Psychology Club at Brooklyn College on April 9, 12:30 P.M., in Room 3127, Ingersoll Hall. His subject is "Self-Esteem and Social Approval." Open to the public; admission free.

■ Nathaniel Branden will offer a seven lecture course on contemporary psychological theories, at NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE, beginning April 23. He will present the essentials of his own theory of neurosis in the concluding two lectures. Those who live in the Greater New York area will receive an announcement giving them full details. Later this year, the course will be made available via tape recordings to NBI groups across the country.

■ Paintings by Frank O'Connor and Joan Blumenthal will be on exhibit in the Robert Brackman Student Show at the Art Students League, 215 West 57th St., New York City, April 23 through April 28. Weekdays: 9 A.M. to 10 P.M.; Saturdays: 9 A.M. to 4 P.M.

■ Ayn Rand will speak at Boston University on April 25. Her subject is "The Esthetic Vacuum of Our Age."

■ Ayn Rand's lecture on "America's Persecuted Minority: Big Business" has been published by NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE and is available from THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER. Price: 50¢ (N.Y.C. residents add 2¢ sales tax).

Counterfeit Individualism (from page 13)

of individualism can be justified. Torn out of this context, any advocacy of "individualism" becomes as arbitrary and irrational as the advocacy of collectivism.

This is the basis of Objectivism's total opposition to any alleged "individualists" who attempt to equate individualism with subjectivism.

And this is the basis of Objectivism's total repudiation of any self-styled "Objectivists" who permit themselves to believe that any compromise, meeting ground or rapprochement is possible between Objectivism and that counterfeit individualism which consists of declaring: "It's right because I feel it" or "It's good because I want it" or "It's true because I believe it."

Child Labor (from page 14)

play. These women had nothing to cook with and to feed their children. These children were destitute and starving. Their only refuge was the factory. It saved them, in the strict sense of the term, from death by starvation." (*Human Action*, p. 615.)

Factory children went to work at the insistence of their parents. The children's hours of labor were very long, but the work was often quite easy—usually just attending a spinning or weaving machine and retying threads when they broke. It was not on behalf of such children that the agitation for factory legislation began. The first child labor law in England (1788) regulated the hours and conditions of labor of the miserable children who worked as chimney sweeps—a dirty, dangerous job which long antedated the Industrial Revolution, and which was not connected with factories. The first Act which applied to factory children was passed to protect those who had been sent into virtual slavery by the parish authorities, a government body: they were deserted or orphaned pauper children who were legally under the custody of the poor-law officials in the parish, and who were bound by these officials into long terms of unpaid apprenticeship in return for a bare subsistence.

Conditions of employment and sanitation are acknowledged to have been best in the larger and newer factories. As successive Factory Acts, between 1819 and 1846, placed greater and greater restrictions on the employment of children and adolescents, the owners of the larger factories, which were more easily and frequently subject to visitation and scrutiny by the Factory Inspectors, increasingly chose to dismiss child-

ren from employment rather than be subjected to elaborate, arbitrary and ever-changing regulations on how they might run a factory which employed children. The terrible result of this bureaucratic meddling was that these dismissed children, who needed to work in order to survive, were forced to seek jobs in smaller, older and more out-of-the-way factories, where the conditions of employment, sanitation and safety were markedly inferior. Those who could not find new jobs were reduced to the status of their counterparts a hundred years before, that is, to irregular agricultural labor, or worse—in the words of Professor von Mises, to "infest the country as vagabonds, beggars, tramps, robbers and prostitutes."

Child labor was not ended by legislative fiat; child labor ended when it became economically unnecessary for children to earn wages in order to survive—when the income of their parents became sufficient to support them. The emancipators and benefactors of those children were not bureaucrats, but manufacturers and financiers. Their efforts and investments in machinery led to a rise in real wages, to a growing abundance of goods at lower prices and to an incomparable improvement in the general standard of living.

The proper answer to the critics of the Industrial Revolution is given by Professor T. S. Ashton: "There are today on the plains of India and China men and women, plague-ridden and hungry, living lives little better, to outward appearance, than those of the cattle that toil with them by day and share their places of sleep by night. Such Asiatic standards, and such unmechanized horrors, are the lot of those who increase their numbers without passing through an industrial revolution." (*The Industrial Revolution*, p. 161.)

Let me add that the Industrial Revolution and its consequent prosperity, were the achievement of capitalism and cannot be achieved under any other politico-economic system. As proof, I offer you the current spectacle of Soviet Russia which combines industrialization—and famine.

Intellectual Ammunition (from page 15)

us," goes on to say: "There is some bad in the best of us"—then: "There's *got* to be some bad in the best of us"—and then: "It's the best of us who make life difficult—why don't they keep silent?—who are *they* to judge?"

And then, on some gray, middle-aged morning, such a man realizes suddenly that he has betrayed all the values he had loved in his distant spring, and wonders how it happened, and slams his mind shut to the answer, by telling himself hastily that the fear he had felt in his worst, most shameful moments was right and that values have no chance in this world.

An irrational society is a society of moral cowards—of men paralyzed by the loss of moral standards, principles and goals. But since men have to act, so long as they live, such a society is ready to be taken over by anyone willing to set its direction. The initiative can come from only two types of men: either from the man who is willing to assume the responsibility of asserting rational values—or from the thug who is not troubled by questions of responsibility.

No matter how hard the struggle, there is only one choice that a rational man can make in the face of such an alternative.

—AYN RAND

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CHECK YOUR PREMISES

By AYN RAND

Who Will Protect Us from Our Protectors?

Objectivists hold that the political philosophy of collectivism is based on a view of man as a congenital incompetent, a helpless, mindless creature who must be fooled and ruled by a special elite with some unspecified claim to superior wisdom and a lust for power.

Those who are inclined to doubt it, would do well to study President Kennedy's message to Congress of March 15, 1962, on the subject of "Protection for Consumers." It is an extraordinarily revealing and enlightening document.

"The Federal Government [is] by nature the highest spokesman for all the people," said President Kennedy. Leaving aside, for the moment, the highly ambiguous implications of such a sweeping statement, let us take him at his word—and see where it will lead us.

The first moral obligation of any spokesman, high or low, is to practice what he preaches. Let us attempt, therefore, to apply the ethical principles enunciated in Mr. Kennedy's message, to the policies of the Federal Government and of our political leaders.

Mr. Kennedy starts by promulgating a queer concept: "the rights of the consumers." These rights, apparently, are something other than the rights possessed by *all* men, and belong only to consumers, or: to men in their capacity as consumers. Since the only other human capacity relevant in this context is that of *producers*, it appears that consumers possess these rights, but producers do not. What are these rights? Mr. Kennedy lists them as follows: (1) *The right to safety*—(2) *The right to be informed*—(3) *The right to choose*—(4) *The right to be heard*. Apparently, the producers have no right to safety, no right to be informed, no right to choose, no right to be heard. Let us accept even that for a moment—for a very brief moment—and let us consider only these consumers' "rights," as Mr. Kennedy defines them.

(1) "The right to safety—to be protected against the marketing of goods which are hazardous to health or life."

It is true that such marketing is immoral. It is also true that our *safety* is critically imperiled today—but ptomaine poisoning is not the worst danger threatening us. So, by the same principle, shouldn't the government be prevented from selling us the kind of policies which are *hazardous* to health, wealth, liberty or life?

(2) "The right to be informed—to be protected against fraudulent, deceitful or grossly misleading information, advertising, labelling, or other practices, and to be given the facts he needs to make an informed choice."

Quite true. But the most critical choice we have to make today—a choice whose consequences are much more crucial

than those of buying the wrong kind of laundry detergent—a choice in which our future, our freedom, our work, our property and our lives are at stake—is the choice of a candidate and a political program at election time. So shouldn't our political leaders refrain from *fraudulent, deceitful or grossly misleading* promises, slogans, generalities, evasions, equivocations, or other practices—and shouldn't they *give us the facts we need to make an informed choice*? Is there any other field today as swamped with confusion and misinformation as the field of politics—yet is there any other field in which the need for an informed choice is so enormously urgent?

(3) "The right to choose—to be assured, wherever possible, access to a variety of products and services at competitive prices . . ."

This is a highly dubious formulation—since nobody can claim a "right" to the products and services of others. But let us assume that Mr. Kennedy merely meant that *variety* is desirable. If so, shouldn't we have access to a variety of political ideas and viewpoints? Shouldn't we be offered some choice other than the stale, gray statism of two indistinguishable political parties?

(4) "The right to be heard—to be assured that consumer interests will receive full and sympathetic consideration in the formulation of Government policy . . ."

This applies to any opponent of businessmen. But when, in the last few decades, has any opponent of statism been *heard* in Washington? When has he received *full and sympathetic consideration* from the government or from those privileged pressure groups and cliques which are fostered, aided and abetted by the government? When has he received anything but smears, threats, defamations, denunciations, license-revoking or Antitrust suits?

To "protect" these "consumers' rights," Mr. Kennedy asked for more power and more money: for "new legislative authority" and "increased appropriations," to create new and/or enlarged government agencies with new and/or wider powers.

A double standard of ethics—a demand that some men practice what others do not have to practice—is morally indefensible. Yet that double standard underlies Mr. Kennedy's entire message, which seems to be addressed to the psychology of those concrete-bound people who cannot see past the range of the moment or connect one specific issue to another or look for fundamental moral principles.

"The march of technology—" said Mr. Kennedy, "affecting for example, the foods we eat, the medicines we take, and the many appliances we use in our homes—has increased the difficulties of the consumer along with his opportunities . . . Many of the new products used every day in the home are highly complex. The housewife is called upon to be an amateur electrician, mechanic, chemist, toxicologist, dietician and mathematician—but she is rarely furnished the information she needs to perform these tasks proficiently."

Well, the march of collectivism and statism—affecting every aspect of our lives, surrendering an ever-growing degree of arbitrary power to the government—has increased the difficulties of the voter (though not his opportunities). When the government was restricted to its proper function—that of policeman and umpire—an honestly applied common sense was sufficient for a voter to make an intelligent choice. But when the government controls every aspect of a complex industrial civilization, and the voter is asked to choose the men who will determine the fate of industry, science, art and every other human activity—what knowledge will be sufficient to make *that* choice? Today, the voter—that same housewife, for instance—is called upon to be an amateur philosopher, psychologist, sociologist, economist, industrial expert, nuclear physicist, TV program director, urban planner, jungle missionary, to name only a few—but she is rarely furnished the information she needs to perform these tasks proficiently.

"Important steps are being taken," said Mr. Kennedy, "to help assure more adequate protection for the savings that prudent consumers lay aside . . ."

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BOOKS

*The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality**

by Ludwig von Mises

Reviewed by EDITH EFRON

At a time when "conservative" and "liberal" thought alike manifests a violent opposition to *laissez-faire* capitalism, it is important to understand not only the overt "intellectual" hostility that capitalism provokes, but also the covert psychological motivation that underlies this hostility. In a book entitled *The Anti-Capitalistic Mentality*, Professor Ludwig von Mises discusses some crucial aspects of this motivation.

In any statist or religious-caste society, where men are not equal before the law, says Professor von Mises, an individual's wealth or poverty, fame or ignominy, may be attributable to "the system," and do not necessarily reflect his intelligence, productiveness or competence. But in a *laissez-faire* capitalist society, where men are equal before the law, where they earn their wealth and distinction by trading their skills and achievements in a free market, a man's long-range failure, like his long-range success, is an objective reflection of his ability. It is precisely this inexorable rule of capitalism—"to each according to his ability"—that wounds the self-esteem of the "frustrated mediocrity," and engenders the widespread hatred for the *laissez-faire* system.

Ironically, Mises points out, the most passionately voiced charge against capitalism claims that it is an "unjust" system. The man who hates and fears *laissez faire* does not confess that what he resents is precisely the implacable justice of this system. He prefers to evade the fact that reason and effort are the cause of both an individual's and a nation's wealth; and he projects, instead, a wishful fantasy as an alternative theory.

Industrial production and wealth, asserts the anti-capitalist, are not to be attributed to any individual's creative thought or action, but are a "free gift of nature." Such "gifts" as refrigerators, automobiles, lifesaving drugs and cyclotrons multiply automatically across the centuries through the intervention of impersonal agencies called "Science," "Technology" and "Progress," and each man is morally entitled to his "fair share" of these "gifts."

"The doctrines of Marx received approval," writes Mises, "simply because they adopted this popular interpretation of events and clothed it with a pseudophilosophical veil. . . . In the scheme of Marx, the 'material productive forces' are a superhuman entity independent of the will and actions of men." Only the State, according to this "gift of nature" theory of wealth, can achieve "social justice" by wresting the "gifts" from the hands of the evil, greedy rich, who have appropriated more than their "fair share," and by redistributing them "fairly" among the virtuous, non-greedy poor.

Such is the rationale of the Welfare State, which gives the apathetic bum his "fair share" of the wages of the hard-working laborer, and gives the incompetent businessman his "fair share" of a great corporation's patents. Such, too, is the rationale of our foreign aid program which is righteously determined to give the "backward nations" their "fair share" of America's productivity—a notion that makes sense, Mises observes, only if one assumes that "the Lord presented mankind with a definite quantity of machines and expected that these contrivances would be distributed equally among the various nations." The driving motive of these irrational policies, Mises states bluntly, is the desire to destroy the hated system which rewards men according to their abilities, and to substitute one which will "give to the frustrated mediocrity 'according to his needs.'"

* Published by D. Van Nostrand Co., \$3.75. Available from NBL BOOK SERVICE, INC., 165 East 35th St., New York 16, N.Y., for \$2.95 (N.Y.C. residents add 3% sales tax; outside the U.S., add 15%).

Edith Efron is a journalist whose articles have appeared in such publications as Life, Look, and The New York Times Magazine.

The "gift of nature" theory of wealth may be temporarily soothing to precarious egos, but it is not a safe guide to action in practical reality. Industrial wealth does not, in fact, fall like perpetual manna from the Marxian skies. Indeed, it is blatantly absent in the socialist nations which are officially committed to that theory. In this country, Mises demonstrates, the continued pursuit of a subverted "justice" which penalizes the productive for the sake of the non-productive, must destroy our industrial wealth as it destroys the free market and free political institutions, which are its preconditions. The choice before us, he concludes, is: the adoption of *laissez-faire* capitalism or an inevitable collapse into dictatorship and barbarism.

This challenging and informative book contains an excellent analysis of the operation of a free-market economy, as well as a provocative discussion of the impact of the anti-capitalistic mentality on America's cultural and intellectual life. There are occasional points in the book to which one must take exception: for instance, one must dispute the author's psychological theory which attributes creativeness to a primary human desire to escape discomfort; one must also question his apparent (and puzzling) regard for such mystical philosophers as Croce, Bergson and Whitehead. But these are minor flaws in a book that provides a cogent and illuminating analysis of the most dangerous trend in our society.

Who Will Protect Us from Our Protectors?

(from page 17)

Protection—from whom? The only real threat to people's savings, which shrinks them and can wipe them out, is *inflation*. Inflation is not caused by the actions of private citizens, but by the government: by an artificial expansion of the money supply required to support deficit spending. No private embezzlers or bank robbers in history have ever plundered people's savings on a scale comparable to the plunder perpetrated by the fiscal policies of statist governments. Should this knowledge have been withheld from us?

"Excessive and untimely use of credit," said Mr. Kennedy, "arising out of ignorance of its true cost is harmful both to the stability of the economy and to the welfare of the public. Legislation should therefore be enacted requiring lenders and vendors to disclose to borrowers in advance the actual amounts and rates which they will be paying for credit."

Nobody forces a man to borrow money and nobody hides from him the cost of such credit, though it may be difficult to compute; a borrower who is neither lazy nor irresponsible can compute it. But which one of us can compute his share of the cost of the government's "excessive and untimely use of credit"? Which one of us can compute what he pays to the government in hidden taxes with every purchase he makes? And if any of the proposals in Mr. Kennedy's message become laws, shouldn't they carry a provision requiring the government to disclose what part of a product's price represents the cost of the additional bureaus and bureaucrats assigned to "protect" us?

Mr. Kennedy gave special emphasis to the issue labeled "Truth in Packaging." The consumers, he said, "have the right to know what is in the package they buy . . . a right to expect that packages will carry reliable and readily usable information about their contents."

Doesn't this principle apply to the kind of political packages or package-deals that are put over on us daily? Don't we have a right to expect *reliable and readily usable information* about the content of the packages labeled "New Deal," "Fair Deal," "New Frontier"?

The consumer may not realize, said Mr. Kennedy, that "changes in the customary size or shape of the package" may deceive him. If the new size or shape of a carton contains half-an-ounce less breakfast cereal than did the old one, what damage does the consumer suffer, compared to the disasters that result from changes in the customary meaning of political terms, concepts and principles? And if the consumer does not know "whether the 'large economy size' is really a bargain," has he any way of knowing whether a gigantic Welfare State economy is a bargain?

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INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION DEPARTMENT

[Subscribers are invited to send in the questions that they find themselves unable to answer in philosophical or political discussions. As many questions as space permits will be answered. No questions will be answered by mail.]

■ Since everything in the universe requires a cause, must not the universe itself have a cause, which is God?

There are two basic fallacies in this argument. The first is the assumption that, if the universe required a causal explanation, the positing of a "God" would provide it. To posit "God as the creator of the universe is only to push the problem back one step farther: Who then created God? Was there a still earlier God who created the God in question? We are thus led to an infinite regress—the very dilemma that the positing of a "God" was intended to solve. But if it is argued that no one created God, that God does not require a cause, that God has existed eternally—then on what grounds is it denied that the universe has existed eternally?

It is true that there cannot be an infinite series of antecedent causes. But recognition of this fact should lead one to reappraise the validity of the initial question, *not* to attempt to answer it by stepping outside the universe into some gratuitously invented supernatural dimension.

This leads to the second and more fundamental fallacy in this argument: the assumption that the universe as a whole *requires* a causal explanation. It does not. The universe is the total of that which exists. Within the universe, the emergence of new entities can be explained in terms of the actions of entities that already exist: the cause of a tree is the seed of the parent tree; the cause of a machine is the purposeful reshaping of matter by men. All actions presuppose the existence of entities—and all emergences of new entities presuppose the existence of entities that caused their emergence. All causality presupposes the existence of *something that acts as a cause*. To demand a cause for all of existence is to demand a contradiction: if the cause exists, it is part of existence; if it does *not* exist, it cannot be a cause. *Nothing* cannot be the cause of *something*. *Nothing* does not exist. Causality presupposes existence, existence does not presuppose causality: there can be no cause "outside" of existence or "anterior" to it. The forms of existence may change and evolve, but the fact of existence is the irreducible primary at the base of all causal chains. Existence—not "God"—is the First Cause.

Just as the concept of causality applies to events and entities within the universe, but not to the universe as a whole—so the concept of time applies to events and entities within the universe, but not to the universe as a whole. The universe did not "begin"—it did not, at some point in time, "spring into being." Time is a measurement of motion. Motion presupposes entities that move. If nothing existed, there could be no time. Time is "in" the universe; the universe is not "in" time.

The man who asks: "Where did existence come from?" or: "What caused it?"—is the man who has never grasped that *existence exists*. This is the mentality of a savage or a mystic who regards existence as some sort of incomprehensible miracle—and seeks to "explain" it by reference to *non-existence*.

Existence is all that exists, the non-existent does not exist; there is nothing for existence to have come out of—and *nothing* means *nothing*. If you are tempted to ask: "What's outside the universe?"—recognize that you are asking: "What's outside of existence?" and that the idea of "something outside of existence" is a contradiction in terms; *nothing* is outside of existence, and "nothing" is not just another kind of "something"—it is *nothing*. Existence exists; you cannot go outside it, you cannot get under it, on top of it or behind it. Existence exists—and *only* existence exists: *there is nowhere else to go.*

—NATHANIEL BRANDEN

Who Will Protect Us from Our Protectors?

(from page 18)

Speaking of the labeling of drugs, Mr. Kennedy said that the consumers "should be able to identify the drug by a simple, common name in order to avoid confusion . . ."

The simple, common name for all the political theories and measures advanced in Washington in the past decades is: *socialism*. And if no political mislabeling was involved, how are we to explain the fact that Norman Thomas and the Socialist party never won a popular vote of significant size, yet all the planks of their early platforms have now been enacted into law by two political parties which did not attach that label to the package they were selling?

Perhaps the most ominously dangerous issue in Mr. Kennedy's message is the unstressed, unobtrusive package-deal which equates *harmful* drugs with *ineffectual* drugs—and proposes to place both under the control of bureaucrats who would have the power to bar from the market any drug they chose to designate as "ineffectual." Mr. Kennedy did not specify who would be entrusted with such totalitarian authority over so complex, so crucial, so controversial an activity as medical research. He referred to that proposed ruler or group of rulers only as "an impartial scientific source."

It is not necessary to comment on the fate of any great scientific innovator delivered into the power of his professional colleagues. One example is sufficient: if Mr. Kennedy's proposal had been put into effect in the nineteenth century, the world would never have heard of Pasteur, who was violently opposed by the best "scientific sources," by virtually the entire medical profession of his time.

No first-rate man or first-rate mind will devote his life to the excruciating task of pursuing new knowledge (or to any task), if the value and future of his work are to be determined by the arbitrary judgment of any one man or group, whose verdict is final and backed by the power of a gun. Such would be the end of medical research in the United States. And such is the reward, proposed by our President, for those independent scientists and drug manufacturers whose great, lifesaving achievements he cited in the same message.

There are two unstated premises on which the message is built, the "undisclosed" ingredients within the package we are expected to absorb: (1) the axiom that private citizens are, by nature, either helpless fools or ruthless scoundrels, but *government officials can do no wrong*; (2) businessmen, by nature, are the people's enemy. The second premise is necessary to make people accept the first.

The first premise makes a moral double standard possible: it divides men into two different species, the rulers and the subjects, each living by a different moral code. It is the basic social premise of statism, best expressed in the concept of "The Divine Right of Kings."

But in order to justify it, the statists have to rouse people to an hysterical fear of some malevolent enemy who threatens them with constant, unpredictable dangers. In my lecture on *America's Persecuted Minority: Big Business*, I said: "Every dictatorship or potential dictatorship needs some minority group as a scapegoat which it can blame for the nation's troubles and use as a justification of its own demands for dictatorial powers. In Soviet Russia, the scapegoat was the bourgeoisie; in Nazi Germany, it was the Jewish people; in America, it is the businessmen." I submit Mr. Kennedy's message in evidence.

Dishonest or unprincipled individuals exist in every group or profession, and they exist among businessmen as well as among bureaucrats. But Mr. Kennedy charges *all* businessmen with collective guilt for individual crimes, and absolves *all* bureaucrats. If he decries the crooked businessmen who attempt to defraud the public, what about corrupt government officials? Consider the number of known cases of bribery, pull-peddling, favor-dispensing, five-percenting, deep-freezes, vicuña coats, etc. Consider the notorious cases of bribery of government inspectors, such as building inspectors, for in-

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Who Will Protect Us from Our Protectors?

(from page 19)

stance. Then project the possibilities inherent in placing more industries under the control of government inspectors endowed with wider, more autocratic powers—and ask yourself whom or what this would “protect.”

The truth of the matter is that there is no such thing as “consumers’ rights,” just as there can be no “rights” belonging to some special group or race and to no others. There are only *the rights of man*—rights possessed by every individual man and by *all* men as individuals. The right to be protected from physical injury or fraud belongs to *all* men, not merely to “consumers,” and does not require any special protection other than that provided by the *criminal law*.

Observe that all the alleged threats to our “safety,” listed in Mr. Kennedy’s message, are not political or economic matters, but matters that belong to the jurisdiction of the criminal code. If a businessman—or any other citizen—willfully and knowingly cheats or injures others (“consumers” or otherwise), it is a matter to be *proved* and punished in a criminal court. But the precedent which Mr. Kennedy is here attempting to establish is the legal hallmark of a dictatorship: *preventive law*—the concept that a man is guilty until he is proved innocent by the permissive rubber stamp of a commissar or a Gauleiter.

What protects us from any private citizen who may choose to turn criminal and injure or defraud us? *That*, precisely, is the proper duty of a government. But if the government assumes a totalitarian power and its officials are not subject to any law, then *who will protect us from our protectors?* What will be our recourse against the dishonesty, vindictiveness, cupidity or stupidity of a bureaucrat?

If matters such as *science* are to be placed into the unanswerable power of a single bureau, what will guarantee the superior wisdom, justice and integrity of the bureaucrats? Why, the vote of the people, a statist would answer—of the people who choose the ruler who then appoints the bureaucrats—of the same people whom Mr. Kennedy does not consider competent to choose electric toasters, credit contracts, face lotions, laxative tablets or canned vegetables.

Available at Your Bookstore in Mid-May

Who is Ayn Rand? by Nathaniel Branden

Content:

- ¶ The moral revolution of *ATLAS SHRUGGED*, and the relevance of Ayn Rand’s philosophy to the cultural and political crisis of our time.
- ¶ The application of Objectivism to basic problems of psychology.
- ¶ The esthetic principles underlying Ayn Rand’s novels, and her concept of man’s relationship to existence, which holds the key to her literary method.
- ¶ The title essay—contributed by Barbara Branden—is a biographical study, concerned primarily with Ayn Rand’s intellectual and artistic development.

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OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ Nathaniel Branden will address the Young Republican Club at C.C.N.Y. on May 3, 12:15 P.M., in Room 106, Wagner Hall, 133rd St. & St. Nicholas Terrace. His subject is “The Ethical Philosophy of *Atlas Shrugged*.” Open to the public; admission free.

■ Ayn Rand will participate in the Public Affairs Forum of Sarah Lawrence College on May 7. The subject of the Forum is “Which Way America?” Admission is restricted to Sarah Lawrence students.

■ Nathaniel Branden will deliver his address on “The Ethical Philosophy of *Atlas Shrugged*” to the Philosophy Club of the University of Delaware, on May 9, 8 P.M. Open to the public; admission free.

■ Ayn Rand will deliver a lecture on capitalism to the Economics Club of Hunter College at the Uptown (Bronx) Campus, on May 16, 12:15 P.M. Admission is restricted to Hunter College students.

■ NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE will offer a 10 lecture course on the “History of Ancient Philosophy,” to be given by Leonard Peikoff, starting May 24. Tracing the philosophic ideas and movements from ancient Greece to the Renaissance, Mr. Peikoff’s course is the first of a three-part series on the history of Western philosophy; his courses on “Modern Philosophy” and “Contemporary Philosophy” will be offered at a later date. Full details concerning the present course will be sent shortly to residents in the Greater New York area and in Philadelphia.

■ Ayn Rand addressed the New Enterprise Club of the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, on April 25, on the subject of capitalism.

■ NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE will offer a new 20 lecture course to be given by Mr. Branden this fall. Entitled “Basic Principles of Objectivist Psychology,” the course will present the first detailed, systematic exposition of Mr. Branden’s psychological theories.

■ Ayn Rand’s lecture on “The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Our Age” has been published by NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE and is available from THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER. Price: 50¢ (N.Y.C. residents add 2¢ sales tax).

Other activities: Phillip J. Smith, a student of NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE, informs us that the *Phillip J. Smith Acting Studio* will offer a production of Noel Coward’s *Hay Fever*. Several N.B.I. students will be in the cast. Time: May 11 and 12, 8:30 P.M. Place: Goddard-Riverside Center, 100 West 77th St. (Junior High School 44). Admission: \$1.25.

“The Objectivist Ethics” by Ayn Rand

The first non-fiction presentation of the fundamentals of the Objectivist moral philosophy. Originally delivered by Ayn Rand at a symposium on Ethics at the University of Wisconsin. Published by NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE. Available from THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER. Price \$1. (N.Y.C. residents add 3¢ sales tax.)

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Ayn Rand and Nathaniel Branden, Editors and Publishers

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Elayne Kalberman, Circulation Manager

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CHECK YOUR PREMISES

By AYN RAND

“The National Interest, *c’est moi*”

“He was looking at them with the anger of a man declaring that the country’s troubles were a personal affront to him. So many men seeking favors had been afraid of him that he now acted as if his anger were a solution to everything, as if his anger were omnipotent, as if all he had to do was to get angry.”

Any resemblance of this passage from *Atlas Shrugged*, published in 1957, to any political leader of today is purely coincidental—since it is blind chance that determines what particular individual rises to power in a society that abandons principles. But the philosophical, political and psychological principles behind that passage are *not* coincidental; principles, like laws of nature, continue to operate, whether men choose to recognize them or not—and those of you who have seen President Kennedy on television on April 11, have seen a concrete illustration, as eloquent as and much cruder than a work of fiction could offer you.

The President of the United States was denouncing the steel industry, with the trembling intensity and rage of a spoiled, petulant child stamping its foot at a universe that had disobeyed its whims. The same man who had repeatedly declared, in a manner of gravely courteous tolerance, that he would always be willing to negotiate with Khrushchev or any other foreign aggressor on any continent, was pouring violent abuse upon a group of American citizens. But since these citizens were *businessmen*, he felt, apparently, that it was safe to attack them. Who hasn’t?

The temper tantrums of any one man do not necessarily indict a culture; but what *does* indict it is the fact that most of the press accepted the meaning of that tantrum on *his* terms. “The ruler is *angry*!” was the leitmotif of the press comments, which proceeded to speculate on what Mr. Kennedy’s displeasure might do to the steel industry and to all business, as if such concepts as “rights” or “law” had never existed, as if we were a country where the emotional moods of the ruler are of paramount public significance, where his frown or smile determines one’s fate. “The Kennedys do not like to lose,” wrote the liberal James Reston in *The New York Times*. “They do not like to be crossed.” Change the name to read: “The Bourbons do not like to lose,” and ask yourself whether the spirit of that comment would be appropriate to the reign of Louis XV (or to the reign of the Hitlers or the Khrushchevs who “do not like to lose or to be crossed,” either).

What has brought a free country to this state?

There were two key statements made by the two antagonists in the steel crisis, which contain the essence of the whole issue and the clue to its cause.

On April 11, in his televised news conference, President Kennedy declared that “price and wage decisions in this country . . . are and ought to be freely and privately made,” then added: “But *the American people have a right to expect, in return for that freedom*, a higher sense of business responsibility for the welfare of their country . . .” (Italics mine.)

On April 12, in his televised news conference, Mr. Roger M. Blough, board chairman of United States Steel, was asked by a reporter whether the increase in steel prices “was designed to check expanded government influence in collective bargaining,” and answered: “*I know nothing about politics.*”

Though Mr. Blough’s statement did provoke some comments, Mr. Kennedy’s did not. It was neither noticed nor discussed nor protested. Yet that abstract statement is more disastrously important than inflation, foreign competition or any other concrete problem of the immediate moment by means of which men blind themselves to their future. I call it, therefore, to the attention of those who still understand the power of ideas and the importance of principles.

“The American people have a right to expect, *in return for that freedom . . .*” Here is an explicit declaration by the President of the United States that *freedom* is not an inalienable right of the individual, but a conditional favor or privilege granted to him by society (by “the people” or the collective)—a privilege which he has to purchase by performing some sort of duty *in return*. Should he fail in that duty, “the people” have the right to abrogate his freedom and return him to his natural condition of slavery. Rights, by this concept, are the property of the collective, not of the individual; the individual’s life, liberty and effort belong to “the people” who have “the right” to dispose of him and to dictate the terms of his existence in any way they please. *This* is the basic principle of collectivism and statism. A statement of that nature could not have been mere rhetorical carelessness on the part of Mr. Kennedy who prides himself on his knowledge of history.

Where were the “conservatives” on April 11, when Mr. Kennedy slapped the Declaration of Independence in its philosophical face? Where were those alleged defenders of the American way of life who claim “tradition,” if nothing better, as their chief loyalty? Where were the Republicans? According to the press reports, they were “not available for comment.” After all, what’s freedom, rights, or the American way of life, when compared to the embarrassment of having to defend the selfish profits of big business?

It is in the midst of such an intellectual atmosphere that the representative of the undefended victims—who, for one half hour, on April 12, had the chance to achieve a major cultural turning point and, by asserting his “selfish” rights in defiance of overbearing statism, to help save the rights of all of us—found nothing better to say than: “*I know nothing about politics.*”

In this day and age—when political issues are a matter of life or death, when the humblest longshoreman or sharecropper has no moral right to evade the responsibility of political judgment—the head of one of America’s largest industrial companies declared that politics does not concern him.

If Mr. Blough saw no threat to free enterprise in Mr. Kennedy’s policies, how can he expect his workers or the man in the street to see it? If he did not choose to uphold *his* property rights, how can he expect struggling young people to uphold theirs? If he did not care to fight for capitalism, whom does he expect to fight for it?

Those two television news conferences presented, in condensed form, the whole tragic history of the destruction of capitalism and its causes: while the representative of statism, the politician, was asserting his principles with arrogant self-righteousness—the representative of capitalism, the industrialist, was evading the existence of principles, abstractions, moral values, philosophy, and was attempting to fight in terms of a single, concrete, “practical” issue, thus sanctioning and supporting the philosophical premises of his adversary.

If you wish to know the futility of fighting without a philosophical base, and the impotence of the businessmen’s “con-

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"The National Interest, c'est moi" (from page 21)

servative" intellectual advisers—the steel crisis has given you a dramatic demonstration.

And if you are still inclined to doubt that capitalism is being destroyed by the altruist morality, observe that there was no way to fight Mr. Kennedy's policy without challenging its root, that undefined, undefinable, collectivist formula which strikes its victims like the knife of a sacrificial ritual: "The National Interest."

If you thought that that formula was to be invoked only against "selfish businessmen," you have now heard it invoked against labor unions as well.

On February 23, during the steel industry's contract negotiations, Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg announced, as a "definitive" statement of the Kennedy Administration's philosophy, that the government henceforth would "define and assert the national interest" in regard to collective bargaining. Declaring that labor-management relations should no longer be resolved "on the old testing ground of clash of selfish interest," he made it explicitly clear that from now on *three clashing interests* would be involved: the selfish interest of management, the selfish interest of labor and the (unselfish?) interest of "the nation," as represented by the government.

It is significant that labor leaders were the first to protest against this doctrine in no uncertain terms. The majority of labor leaders have always been much more acute philosophically, much more sensitive to the long-range implications of political principles than the leaders of industry. Labor leaders objected to Mr. Goldberg's manifesto promptly and forcefully. Said George Meany, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.: "When he says the role of the government is to assert the national interest, he is infringing on the rights of free people and free society, and I don't agree with him whatsoever."

By contrast, observe the statements of industrial leaders, which came a day later. The men who voiced the best objections to Mr. Goldberg's doctrine asked not to be identified by name. "From a broad philosophical standpoint," said one of them, "most businessmen feel that in a competitive system you serve the national interest in pursuing your private interest." This, of course, is the proper answer and touches on the core of the whole issue. But the man who said it had to remain anonymous. On the other hand, observe that those "middle-of-the-road" industrialists who *agreed* with Mr. Goldberg and supported his doctrine, did not hesitate to air their views openly, under their own names. Observe also that one of them was Joseph L. Block, chairman of Inland Steel.

But the truly disgraceful touch was provided by the statement of the National Association of Manufacturers, the alleged spokesman for industry. After a few cautious generalities, objecting to Mr. Goldberg, that statement declared: "The real remedy is to subject labor organizations to legal restrictions on the attainment and use of monopoly power."

At a time when the government is openly assuming a totalitarian-statist role, the spokesman for its chained victims is asking that the government be granted wider powers! Unable or unwilling to liberate the enslaved, their spokesman proposes, as a "remedy," to spread enslavement to the rest of society and thus silence the only powerful economic group which is still free to speak and to assert its rights.

Voluntary slavery is precisely the goal of Mr. Kennedy's policy and the means by which he intends to rule. Observe the hypocritical euphemism of such a phrase as the government's intention "to define and assert the national interest." Anybody can "define and assert" anything he pleases—so this is obviously not what the phrase is intended to mean. It means—and is so intended to be understood—that "the national interest" is whatever the government chooses to say it is and that any assertion of the government's wishes is a command, whether the law has given the government the power to issue such a command or not. It means that the government possesses enough undefined, arbitrary powers, granted to it by undefined, non-objective laws, to crack down on any dissenter and punish any disobedience in any manner it pleases. It means that law has become superfluous and that *fear* has taken its place.

What Mr. Kennedy was projecting in his televised tantrum was the spiteful anger of a man who had believed himself safe in feeling that "the national interest, c'est moi."

In the February issue of this newsletter, I wrote: "The Antitrust laws give the government the power to prosecute and convict any business concern in the country any time it chooses. The threat of sudden destruction, of unpredictable retaliation for unnamed offenses, is a much more potent means of enslavement than explicit dictatorial laws. It demands more than mere obedience; it leaves men no policy save one: to please the authorities; to please—blindly, uncritically, without standards or principles; to please—in any issue, matter or circumstance, for fear of an unknowable, unprovable vengeance."

You have now seen this in practice—in a cruder, more cynically obvious practice than I would have ventured to predict. Mr. Kennedy was threatening the steel companies with retaliation by means of: Antitrust prosecutions, grand jury investigation, Senate and House Committees investigations, Department of Justice investigation, Federal Trade Commission investigation, the "reconsidering" of tax legislation favorable to industry, etc., etc.—including, for full scare effect, the melodramatic touch of F.B.I. agents awakening newspaper reporters in the middle of the night to question them about the public statement of one of the steel industrialists. No, Mr. Kennedy was not afraid of creating in the public mind the connotations of a totalitarian state: he was *seeking* to create them.

So long as a government holds discretionary powers to dispense punishments or favors, who will ever be able to prove or to know what goes on behind the scenes of any clash between government and private citizens? On April 14, the day after the steel industry's surrender, *The New York Times* reported that the President and his advisers had been privately "bringing every form of *persuasion* to bear on the industry, trying to hold back the companies that had not yet raised prices and *induce* the others to roll back the price increase." (Italics mine.) *Time* magazine of April 20 wrote as follows: "Every New Frontiersman who had a friend, old college mate or former colleague in the steel industry was summoned to join in an all-out campaign to persuade the holdouts to keep on holding out. 'Everyone in the Administration who knew anyone called him,' said a White House aide." Who can tell what deals were made, what favors were granted, whose fate was determined, whose interests were sacrificed to whom—in those private conversations and by such methods?

Is this a government of laws and not of men?

No, Congress never passed any law giving Mr. Kennedy the power to dictate prices and wages. But it passed many non-objective laws which gave him the power to make legality obsolete. The German Reichstag voted itself out of existence. Our Congress seems to have achieved the same end piecemeal, gradually and cumulatively.

It is obvious that the goal of the Kennedy Administration is to achieve a statist dictatorship without ever calling it by that name, without any official declaration or identification, counting on demagogic slogans to extort people's subservience, with a minimum show of force and a maximum illusion of "voluntary" obedience. And the future of this country now depends on whether enough people will realize the grotesquely evil contradiction in the concept of "voluntary action at the point of a governmental gun."

"It's extremely important," said Dr. Ferris in *Atlas Shrugged*, "to get those patents turned over to us *voluntarily*. Even if we had a law permitting outright nationalization, it would be much better to get them as a gift. We want to leave to people the illusion that they're still preserving their private property rights. And most of them will play along. They'll sign the Gift Certificates. Just raise a lot of noise about its being a patriotic duty and that anyone who refuses is a prince of greed, and they'll sign."

As a novelist, I had always regarded myself as belonging to the literary school of Romanticism. I did not know that the Kennedy Administration would transform my work into that of a rank Naturalist.

INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION DEPARTMENT

[Subscribers are invited to send in the questions that they find themselves unable to answer in philosophical or political discussions. As many questions as space permits will be answered. No questions will be answered by mail.]

■ In a society of *laissez-faire* capitalism, what would prevent the formation of powerful monopolies able to gain control over the entire economy?

One of the worst fallacies in the field of economics—propagated by Karl Marx and accepted by almost everyone today, including many businessmen—is that the development of monopolies is an inescapable and intrinsic result of the operation of a free, unregulated economy. In fact, the exact opposite is true. It is a free market that makes monopolies impossible.

It is imperative that one be clear and specific in one's understanding of the meaning of "monopoly." When people speak, in an economic or political context, of the dangers and evils of monopoly, what they mean is a *coercive monopoly*—that is: exclusive control of a given field of production which is closed to and exempt from competition, so that those controlling the field are able to set arbitrary production policies and charge arbitrary prices, independent of the market, immune from the law of supply and demand. Such a monopoly, it is important to note, entails more than the *absence of competition*; it entails the *impossibility of competition*. That is a coercive monopoly's characteristic attribute—and is essential to any condemnation of such a monopoly.

In the whole history of capitalism, no one has been able to establish a coercive monopoly by means of competition on a free market. There is only one way to forbid entry into a given field of production: by law. Every single coercive monopoly that exists or ever has existed—in the United States, in Europe or anywhere else in the world—*was created and made possible only by an act of government*: by special franchises, licenses, subsidies, by legislative actions which granted special privileges (not obtainable on a free market) to a man or a group of men, and forbade all others to enter that particular field.

A coercive monopoly is not the result of *laissez faire*; it can result only from the *abrogation of laissez faire* and from the introduction of the *opposite principle*—the principle of *statism*.

In this country, a utility company is a coercive monopoly: the government grants it a franchise for an exclusive territory, and no one else is allowed to engage in that service in that territory; a would-be competitor, attempting to sell electric power, would be stopped by law. A telephone company is a coercive monopoly. As recently as World War II, the government ordered the two then existing telegraph companies, Western Union and Postal Telegraph, to merge into one monopoly.

One of the best illustrations of the fact that a coercive monopoly requires the abrogation of the principle of *laissez faire* is given by Ayn Rand in her "Notes on the History of American Free Enterprise." She writes:

"The Central Pacific—which was built by the 'Big Four' of California, on federal subsidies—was the railroad which was guilty of all the evils popularly held against railroads. For almost thirty years, the Central Pacific controlled California, held a monopoly and permitted no competitor to enter the state. It charged disastrous rates, changed them every year, and took the entire profit of any California farmer or shipper, who had no other railroad to turn to. How was this made possible? It was done through the power of the California legislature. The Big Four controlled the legislature and held the state closed to competitors by legal restrictions—such as, for instance, a legislative act which gave the Big Four exclusive control of the entire coast line of California and forbade any other railroad to enter any port. During these thirty years, many attempts were made by private interests to start competing railroads in California and break the monopoly of the

Central Pacific. These attempts were defeated—not by methods of free trade and free competition, but by *legislative action*.

"This thirty-year monopoly of the Big Four and the practices in which they engaged are always quoted as an example of the evils of big business and Free Enterprise. Yet the Big Four were not free enterprisers; they were not businessmen who had achieved power by means of unregulated trade. They were typical representatives of what is now called 'a mixed economy.' They achieved power by legislative interference into business; none of their abuses would have been possible in a free, unregulated economy."

In the comparatively free days of American capitalism, in the late-nineteenth-early-twentieth century, there were many attempts to "corner the market" on various commodities (such as cotton and wheat, to mention two famous examples)—then close the field to competition and gather huge profits by selling at exorbitant prices. All such attempts failed. The men who tried it were compelled to give up—or go bankrupt. They were defeated, not by legislative action—but by the action of the free market.

The question is often asked: What if a large, rich company kept buying out its smaller competitors or kept forcing them out of business by means of undercutting prices and selling at a loss—would it not be able to gain control of a given field and then start charging high prices and be free to stagnate with no fear of competition? The answer is: No, it would not be able to do it. If a company assumed heavy losses in order to drive out competitors, then began to charge high prices to regain what it had lost, this would serve as an incentive for new competitors to enter the field and take advantage of the high profitability, without any losses to recoup. The new competitors would force prices down to the market level. The large company would have either to abandon its attempt to establish monopoly prices—or else go bankrupt fighting off the competitors that its own policies would attract.

It is a matter of historical fact that no "price war" has ever succeeded in establishing a monopoly or in maintaining prices above the market level, outside the law of supply and demand. ("Price wars" have, however, acted as spurs to the economic efficiency of competing companies—and have thereby resulted in enormous benefits to the public, in terms of better products at lower prices.)

What is frequently forgotten by people, in considering an issue of this kind, is the crucial role of the capital market in a free economy. As Alan Greenspan observes in his article "Bad History" (*Barron's*, February 5, 1962): "If entry [into a given field of production] is not impeded by Government regulations, franchises or subsidies, the ultimate regulator of competition in a free economy is the capital market. So long as capital is free to flow, it will tend to seek those areas of maximum rate of return." Investors are constantly seeking the most profitable uses of their capital. If, therefore, some field of production is seen to be highly profitable (particularly when the profitability is due to high prices rather than to low costs), businessmen and investors necessarily will be attracted to that field; and, as the supply of the product in question is increased relative to the demand for it, prices fall accordingly. "The capital market," writes Mr. Greenspan, "acts as a regulator of prices, not necessarily of profits. It leaves any individual producer free to earn as much as he can by lowering his costs and by increasing his efficiency relative to others. Thus it constitutes the mechanism which generates greater incentives to increased productivity, thereby leading to a rising standard of living."

The free market does not permit inefficiency or stagnation—with economic impunity—in any field of production. Consider, for instance, a well-known incident in the history of the American automobile industry. There was a period when Henry Ford's Model-T held an enormous part of the automobile market. But when Ford's company attempted to stagnate and to resist stylistic changes—"You can have any color of the Model-T you want, so long as it's black"—General Motors, with its more attractively styled Chevrolet, cut into a major segment of Ford's market. And the Ford Company was com-

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Intellectual Ammunition (from page 23)

pelled to change its policies in order to compete. One will find examples of this principle in the history of virtually every industry.

Now if one considers the only kind of monopoly that can exist under capitalism, a *non-coercive* monopoly, one will perceive that its prices and production policies are not independent of the wider market in which it operates, but are fully bound by the law of supply and demand; that there is no particular reason for or value in retaining the designation of "monopoly" when one uses it in a non-coercive sense; and that there are no rational grounds on which to condemn such "monopolies."

For instance, if a small town has only one drug store, which is barely able to survive, the owner might be described as enjoying a "monopoly"—except that no one would think of using the term in this context. There is no economic need or market for a second drug store, there is not enough trade to support it. But if that town grew, its one drug store would have no way, no power, to prevent other drug stores from being opened.

It is often thought that the field of mining is particularly vulnerable to the establishment of monopolies, since the materials extracted from the earth exist in limited quantity and since, it is believed, some firm might gain control of all the sources of some raw material. Well, observe that International Nickel of Canada produces more than two-thirds of the world's nickel—yet it does *not* charge monopoly prices. It prices its product *as though* it had a great many competitors—and the truth is that it *does* have a great many competitors. Nickel (in the form of alloy and stainless steels) is competing with aluminum and a variety of other materials. The seldom recognized principle involved is this: no single product, commodity or material is or can be indispensable to an economy *regardless of price*. A commodity can be only *relatively* preferable to other commodities. For example, when the price of bituminous coal rose (which was due to John L. Lewis' forcing an economically unjustified wage raise), this was instrumental in bringing about a large-scale conversion to the use of oil and gas in many industries. The free market is its own protector.

Now if a company were able to gain and hold a non-coercive monopoly, if it were able to win all the customers in a given field, not by special government-granted privileges, but by sheer productive efficiency—by its ability to keep its costs low and/or to offer a better product than any competitor could—there would be no grounds on which to condemn such a monopoly. On the contrary, the company that achieved it would deserve the highest praise and esteem.

The history of the Aluminum Company of America prior to World War II is a case in point. Seeking constantly to expand its market, Alcoa kept its prices as low as possible; this policy required enormous productive efficiency and cost-cutting. Alcoa was the only producer of primary aluminum and, as such, was a monopoly; but it was not a coercive monopoly; nothing prevented other companies from attempting to compete with it, except the fact that they could not match its productive efficiency. The pricing policies of Alcoa were entirely subject to the law of supply and demand: aluminum had to compete with steel, with copper, with cement, and with many other construction materials; and had Alcoa attempted to raise its prices—this would have served as an engraved invitation to competitors to enter Alcoa's own field.

No one can morally claim the *right* to compete in a given field, if he cannot match the productive efficiency of those with whom he hopes to compete. There is no reason why people should buy inferior products at higher prices in order to maintain less efficient companies in business. Under capitalism, any man or company that can surpass competitors, is free to do so. It is in this manner that the free market rewards ability and works for the benefit of everyone—except those who seek the undeserved.

A bromide commonly cited in this connection by opponents of capitalism is that of the old corner grocer who is thrown

out of business by the big chain store. What is the clear implication of their protest? It is that the people who live in the neighborhood of the old grocer have to continue buying from him, even though a chain store could give them better service at lower prices and thereby let them save money. Thus both the owners of the chain store and the people in the neighborhood are to be penalized—in order to protect the stagnation of the old grocer. *By what right?* If that grocer is unable to compete with the chain store, then, properly, he has no choice but to move elsewhere or go into another line of business or seek employment from the chain store. Capitalism, by its nature, entails a constant process of motion, of growth, of progress; no one has a *vested right* to a position, if others can do better than he can.

When people denounce the free market as "cruel," the fact they are decrying is that the market is ruled by a single moral principle: *justice*. And that is the root of their hatred for capitalism.

There is only one kind of monopoly that men may rightfully condemn—the only kind for which the designation of "monopoly" is economically significant: a *coercive* monopoly. (Observe that in the *non-coercive* meaning of the term, *every* man may be described as a "monopolist"—since he is the exclusive owner of his own effort and product. But it is not *this* that is denounced as evil—except by socialists.)

In the issue of monopolies, as in so many other issues, capitalism is commonly blamed for the evils perpetrated by its destroyers: it is not free trade on a free market that creates coercive monopolies, but government legislation, government action, government controls. If men are concerned about the evils of monopolies, let them identify the actual villain in the picture and the actual cause of the evils: government intervention into the economy. Let them recognize that there is only one way to destroy monopolies: by the separation of State and Economics—that is, by instituting the principle that the government may not abridge the freedom of production and trade.

—NATHANIEL BRANDEN

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ On June 19, Professor John Hospers of the Philosophy Department of Brooklyn College will deliver a special guest lecture in NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE'S spring series on "Basic Principles of Objectivism." Professor Hospers is the author of: *Meaning and Truth in the Arts—An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis—Human Conduct: an introduction to the problems of ethics*. The subject of his lecture at the Institute is: Objectivism and its relation to other contemporary ethical systems. Place: Hotel Roosevelt, 45th St. and Madison Ave., New York City. Time: 7:30 P.M. Admission: \$3.50. (This is lecture #19 in the present series.)

■ In February of this year, New American Library issued the tenth printing of *Atlas Shrugged*—100,000 copies. In April, an *eleventh* printing was issued—95,000 copies.

■ On May-11, Ayn Rand conducted a seminar on capitalism for the Management Course, Postgraduate Unit, of the American Management Association.

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Doctors and the Police State

By LEONARD PEIKOFF

Having eroded the value of everyone's savings through decades of inflationary deficit spending, the statisticians have now decided to pose as champions of their own victims—specifically, of those over 65 years of age. The Kennedy Administration's King-Anderson bill proposes to finance hospital and nursing home care for the aged out of the tax money collected through the Federal Social Security system.

Nobody bothers much any more to deny that this is only a first step. There is no principle by which the State can claim to be responsible for the hospital expenses of the aged, but not for their doctors' bills—or for the costs of those under 65 with chronic diseases—or for the psychiatric expenses of those in mental institutions—or for the dental expenses of the unemployed—or, ultimately, for *everyone's* medical expenses. The leaders of the Canadian province of Saskatchewan name their purposes more openly: Premier Woodrow S. Lloyd has announced that, as of July 1 of this year, full-scale socialized medicine will be instituted throughout the province.

The statisticians in both countries seek to counter the protests of the medical profession by claiming that government-financed medicine is compatible with perfect freedom for the doctors. Said Secretary Ribicoff: "It should be absolutely no concern to a physician where a patient gets the money . . ."

The truth is, that it is a matter of life and death concern. He who pays the money for a service is *morally obligated* to see that he receives full value in return; he *must* set the terms, conditions and standards governing his expenditures. If he does not, he is an irresponsible wastrel. If it is the government that does the paying, then the government has to decide who is qualified to receive its money—how much a particular service is worth—under what conditions that service is necessary and under what conditions it is merely a squandering of State funds—whether a controversial new surgical technique, or a controversial drug, or a controversial method of psychotherapy, is a failure which should not be supported or a success which deserves the taxpayers' money.

In a free society, a man cannot force his terms on others; those who dissent are free to deal elsewhere. A patient who disapproves of a doctor's methods of treatment can seek out another doctor; a doctor who considers a patient's demands irrational is not compelled to give in to them. And, in the long run, it is the best and ablest doctors—those who achieve the cures and demonstrate their value—that rise to the top and set the example for the rest of the profession.

But when the government sets the terms, they are enforced by the police power of the State. The standards of the government become the laws of the country, and no others are legally permitted. Should any doctor object to the decrees of

the officials who staff the State Health Board—should he attempt to act on his own best judgment and make an unauthorized use of the drugs, the hospital beds, the operating rooms being paid for by the State—he becomes thereby a criminal, and he is legally subject to retribution: to loss of license, or fine, or jail-sentence. There is no one to whom he can turn: the government is his sole employer. He either submits—or he leaves medicine—or he escapes from the country.

The proposal to pay medical expenses with State funds has only one meaning: it is a proposal to enslave the doctors.

That there may be medical men on the State Health Board changes nothing. There are, undoubtedly, journalists in the bureau which controls the press in Soviet Russia; this does not make the editors of *Pravda* free men.

By what moral principle are the doctors to be deprived of their right to practice their profession as free men? By the principle of *altruism*: the principle that man is a sacrificial animal, that the only justification of his existence is the service he renders to others, and that any consideration or concern for the men who *provide* the services is irrelevant. "This is too important a matter," declared Premier Lloyd in explanation of his refusal to drop his plan, "to leave the decision to a relatively small group who have power because they have special skills." Thus, the men with invaluable skills are to have no say in the matter; they are to have no say *because* they are men with invaluable skills.

The doctors in both countries have been enormously generous; in protesting the enslavement of medicine, they have made it abundantly clear, in repeated statements, that they will continue *voluntarily* to treat the needy without charge in the future as they have in the past. The altruist-statists, however, are still not satisfied. They oppose the "means test." States Premier Lloyd: "Doctors have a fine tradition of providing services without charge to those who are unable to pay but many people feel uncomfortable in asking for and obtaining something for which they cannot pay." How will government medicine solve this problem? Since the State does all the paying, anyone who is upset at being a charity case does not have to think about or even to assert his need; he has only to pretend that the benefits are his by right, and evade the whole question of where the money is coming from. It is not the *needy* who are the objects of such solicitous concern in the present campaign; it is the *dishonest* needy. The man who demands something for nothing and, when he gets it, considers it an affront to have to say thank-you, is a parasite. It is in the name of the sensibilities of parasites that the doctors are to be enslaved.

When altruism reaches so corrupt a stage, its full meaning comes out into the open. The emphasis changes from love to obedience, from handouts to handcuffs, from the Welfare State to the Police State.

It is happening now in the United States. Some two hundred New Jersey doctors, led by Dr. J. Bruce Henriksen, signed a petition of protest against the King-Anderson bill. They declared that they would continue voluntarily to treat the indigent aged without charge, but that they would refuse to treat anyone whose medical care was financed under the government's plan. The meaning of their action was clear-cut; it cannot be evaded and it had nothing to do with the needy. It was the action free men have always taken to protest an advancing dictatorship: the statement that they will not sanction, help, or participate in the growth of slavery.

What was the response they received? "Greedy private doctors," charged Zalmen J. Lichtenstein, executive director of the Golden Ring Council of Senior Citizens. "A breach of ethics as bad as anything else I could imagine," declared New Jersey Governor Hughes. "A vicious scheme," cried Vincent J. Murphy, president of the New Jersey A.F.L.-C.I.O. "A disgrace to the country," announced Secretary Goldberg to a convention in Atlantic City.

"The attitude of these doctors in opposition to a basic national need is shocking," said Secretary Ribicoff. "In trying to blackmail the Congress and the American people by refusing to treat older people, they are violating the Hippocratic oath . . ." The relevant portion of this oath reads: "That

I will lead my life and practice my art in uprightness and honor." In Secretary Ribicoff's view, it is *blackmail* for a man to ask anything in exchange for his services, even if all he asks is that he be left free to provide them voluntarily. It is a betrayal of uprightness for a man to refuse to sanction conditions which he considers evil. It is a betrayal of honor for a man to fight for his professional integrity, for his right to use his own mind, make his own decisions, and act on his own independent judgment. Who, then, is the man of uprightness and honor? The man who abdicates his intellectual responsibility. What is the proof of his love for mankind? His willingness to submit unconditionally to the demands of the State.

Harry S. Truman summarized the humanitarian viewpoint in its most eloquent form. Asked what he thought of the doctors' revolt, he replied: "I think they ought to be hit over the head with a club."

The club was not long in coming. On May 7, the New Jersey State Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of a resolution condemning the protesting doctors. On the same day, six New Jersey Democrats, led by Assemblyman John J. Kijewski, introduced in the Assembly a bill to make the doctors' protest *illegal*; the penalties it proposed for any doctor who refuses services to anyone "solely because of the prospective or intended method for payment of such services" include: loss of license, up to \$100 fine, and/or *ninety days in jail*. Alfred E. Clark, reporting the proposed bill in the May 6 issue of *The New York Times*, commented: "Governor Hughes' statement left no doubt that the measure would have his backing."

Socialized medicine is a controversial, political issue. The controversy is over philosophical questions: over the right code of morality, the proper functions of government, the relation of the individual to society. The disagreement between the two sides is a matter of opposing *ideas*. The Kijewski bill proposed to make it a *matter of law* that no doctor is entitled to a viewpoint on this question if his ideas do not agree with those of the President. It proposed to define a new crime in the United States and to threaten a man with jail for committing it: *the crime of upholding political opinions opposed to those of the officials of the State*.

The bill was intended to come to a vote about a week after its introduction in the Legislature. For that week, it was an open question whether or not the New Jersey jail cells were soon to start admitting political prisoners. The doctors saw what was coming and named the issue. Dr. Ralph M. L. Buchanan, president of the New Jersey Medical Society, declared: "This bill violates and outrages the Constitution of the United States and imperils the basic rights of every citizen." Dr. Henriksen was even more succinct: "The fact that this bill was even thought of shows that we are nearer the police state than we thought."

At the end of that week, the news was released: at the request of the Governor, the bill had been withdrawn from the Assembly. Someone had discovered that they couldn't get away with it yet. It was a reprieve for the country—but only that. A decade ago, they would not have dared to contemplate such legislation. A decade from now—unless the trend is reversed—they will be able to pass it.

America has always been the haven which men throughout the world have sought in their flight from tyrannies at home. When socialized medicine swept through Britain and continental Europe, doctors moved here by the thousands in order to escape. Fifteen hundred doctors have come here from Cuba alone since Castro took over. The pattern is now repeating itself in Saskatchewan. The province's nine hundred doctors have informed the Premier and the public that they will not practice their profession under the socialist plan. Dr. J. C. Houston spoke for them all when he said about that plan: "It raises the vital question: 'Is the state created to serve the individual or is the individual created to serve the state?' If the latter viewpoint is accepted then professional freedom and indeed all freedom is destroyed. The light grows dim."

Mr. Peikoff is an Associate Lecturer of NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE; he has taught philosophy at Hunter College, Long Island University, and New York University; he is presently completing his doctoral dissertation in philosophy at New York University.

Throughout the province, in medical clinics and doctors' offices, cardboard signs have been appearing with the following message: "Unless agreement is reached between the present government and the medical profession, this office will close as of July 1." Winnipeg *Free Press* columnist Pat O'Dwyer reports on the doctors' intentions: "They will leave the province, especially the ablest young specialists, and those doctors who came here from the British Isles to get away from state medicine." What is their destination? Many of them are heading for the United States. This country, they think, is safe and free. If America collapses into slavery, there will be no haven to seek anywhere any longer.

What will happen to the caliber of medical practice in this country, if the socialists take over? Consider the reports coming out of England, Holland, Hungary, and all the rest of the countries which have embraced socialized or semi-socialized medicine. The degrees and details vary; the essence of the pattern remains the same: First, the government announces free medical care for everyone—then there is a sudden, insatiable, endless stampede, as malingerers, neurotics and the authentically sick all clamor, in one howling mass, for medical attention—then the doctors, crushed by impossible overloads, abandon, in despair, the attempt to treat each patient's problem thoroughly and conscientiously; increasingly, doctors turn into traffic directors, routing people out of their offices in three to five minute appointments per patient, making instantaneous diagnoses, dispensing routine prescriptions, and then calling for the next man; meanwhile the bureaucrats, dismayed by the endless flow of money pouring into the bottomless pit of patients, begin to clamp down more and more severely—the doctors who use expensive new techniques, or exceed their quota of drugs, are fined for wasting the "people's resources"—the restrictions and the forms in triplicate multiply—the doctors become part-time clerks—the bureaucrats and their friends multiply—the doctors begin to check a patient's political contacts before they prescribe—and, in the end, the patients who have no contacts but really need medical attention start running to non-socialized countries, if they can find any.

There is no conflict between the interests of patients and the interests of doctors. The enslavement of the medical profession does not benefit the patients; it merely deprives them of doctors: the most dedicated, able and independent quit the profession or never enter it. The words of Dr. Hendricks, a surgeon in *Atlas Shrugged* who has gone on strike against socialized medicine, are singularly appropriate here:

"That a man who's willing to work under compulsion is too dangerous a brute to entrust with a job in the stockyards—never occurred to those who proposed to help the sick by making life impossible for the healthy. I have often wondered at the smugness with which people assert their right to enslave me, to control my work, to force my will, to violate my conscience, to stifle my mind—yet what is it that they expect to depend on, when they lie on an operating table under my hands? . . . Let them discover the kind of doctors that their system will now produce. Let them discover, in their operating rooms and hospital wards, that it is not safe to place their lives in the hands of a man whose life they have throttled. It is not safe, if he is the sort of man who resents it—and still less safe, if he is the sort who doesn't."

It is not an easy task to convert a free country into a totalitarian dictatorship; those who attempt it know that they must move gradually, by a series of precedent-setting steps. The Kennedy Administration has been urging a national campaign of letters to newspapers and petitions to Congress in support of their medical plans. The American Medical Association has asked for a similar campaign in defense of the doctors. For anyone who sees the nature of the issue, the side to choose is clear—and the need for action, imperative. No one who values his life—or his freedom—should remain silent.

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Benevolence versus Altruism

By NATHANIEL BRANDEN

A disastrous confusion in the minds of most people concerning the nature of altruism is the belief that altruism represents or derives from the principle of benevolence, good will and kindness toward others. Advocates of altruism take great pains to encourage this belief—to establish a "package-deal," as it were—so as to conceal from their victims the actual meaning of the altruist morality.

Such a view of altruism is worse than mistaken: like the perversion entailed in the technique of the "Big Lie," it represents the exact *opposite* of the truth; altruism and benevolence are not merely different, they are *mutually inimical and contradictory*.

The literal philosophical meaning of altruism is: *placing others above self*. As an ethical principle, altruism holds that man must make the welfare of others his primary concern and must place their interests above his own; it holds that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the moral justification of his existence, that self-sacrifice is his foremost duty and highest virtue.

The essence of altruism is the concept of *self-sacrifice*. It is the *self* that altruism regards as evil: *selflessness* is its moral ideal. Thus, it is an *anti-self* ethics—and this means: anti-man, anti-personal happiness, anti-individual rights.

A morality that tells man that he is to regard himself as a sacrificial animal, is *not* an expression of benevolence or good will.

By the nature of the altruist ethics, it can engender only fear and hostility among men: it forces men to accept the role of victim or executioner, as objects of sacrifice or profiteers on human sacrifices—and leaves men no standard of justice, no way to know what they can demand and what they must surrender, what is theirs by right, what is theirs by favor, what is theirs by someone's sacrifice—thereby casting men into an amoral jungle. Contrary to the pretensions of altruism's advocates, it is human brotherhood and good will among men that altruism makes *impossible*.

Benevolence, good will and respect for the rights of others proceed from an *opposite* code of morality: from the principle that man the individual is not an object of sacrifice but an entity of *supreme value*; that each man exists for his own sake and is not a means to the ends of others; that *no one has the right to sacrifice anyone*.

Men of self-esteem, uncorrupted by the altruist morality, are the only men who can and do value human life—because they value their own life, because they are secure in the knowledge of their right to it, and because, to them, "*human being*" is a designation of honor. It is one's view of *oneself* that determines one's view of man and of human stature. The respect and good will that men of self-esteem feel toward

other human beings is profoundly egoistic; they feel, in effect: "Other men are of value because they are of the same species as myself." In revering living entities, they are revering their *own* life. This is the psychological base of any emotion of sympathy and any feeling of "species solidarity."

But this causal relation cannot be reversed: a man must *first* value himself; only then can he value others. If a man does not value himself, *nothing* can have value for him.

When the advocates of a morality of rational self-interest express opposition to the creed of self-sacrifice, altruists commonly reply with some such evasion as: "You mean that if you found an abandoned baby in the street, you wouldn't do anything to help?"—or: "If you saw a man run over by a car, you wouldn't call a doctor?" The evasion consists of equating any help to others with altruism—and any *motive* for helping others with the motive demanded by altruism.

If, in an issue where no self-sacrifice is involved, a rational man helps a fellow human being in an emergency, and does so, not as a moral obligation, but out of good will and regard for the value of a human life—it is worse than absurd to equate his action with the policy of a man who accepts the tenet that to serve others is the purpose of his existence, that he has no right to live on any other terms, that anyone's suffering, need or helplessness has first claim on him. The motives of the two men are opposite: whereas the rational man's policy toward help to others rests on the value of an individual life, the other man's policy rests on the premise that an individual life *has no value*, that it is an object of sacrifice. Altruism does not declare: Help others when no self-sacrifice is entailed—or: Help those in whom you see positive value. Altruism declares: Help others, *any* others, because such is your only moral function—otherwise, you are *nothing*—and do not presume to pass judgment on the worthiness of those who demand your help—theirs is the *right*, yours is the *duty*. But if the altruists' view of man is correct, if the individual is a *zero*—then why should anyone be concerned with helping him? It is only the rational man's view of the individual's value that can provide an incentive or reason to help anyone—but *his* view is incompatible with the creed of self-sacrifice.

If helping that baby or accident victim actually required self-sacrifice—that is, the sacrifice of some higher value of one's own (for example, if one's own child immediately and desperately needed one's attention)—then, no, one should not do it. But normally, when no such sacrifice is involved, one *would* render help, not as an altruistic duty, but out of loyalty to the value of living entities and to the human potential that the baby or the accident victim represents. One would properly refuse help only if one knew some major evil about the person in trouble: if, for example, one saw a Hitler or a Khrushchev drowning, one would be *immoral* if one jumped into the water to save him; if the motive that would prompt one to save a person from drowning is concern for the value of human life, one does not save a mass-murderer.

Altruists cannot claim that they *do* value an individual life, offering as evidence their concern for those who are in need. If concern for human life were their actual motive, they would not be so contemptuously indifferent to—nor so eagerly willing to sacrifice—those who are *able* to live. They would not advocate the enslavement of the healthy for the benefit of the diseased. *Life* is an attribute of individual organisms; no one who values human life would preach that man has no right to exist for his own sake.

It is worth stressing that the entire issue of helping others is a *marginal* one; it is only the ethics of altruism that has made it a crucial question; it is not the central focus of a *rational* code of morality nor the source of a man's virtue nor the justification of anyone's existence. Man does not live for the purpose of combating disaster.

More grotesque than the altruists' claim to be spokesmen for benevolence and good will among men, is their declaration that altruism is the base of *love*, that love is selfless, that the essence of love is self-sacrifice. Love is one of the most profound forms of *self-assertion*: to love, is to value—one falls

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BOOKS

*The Decline of American Liberalism**

by Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr.

Reviewed by R. HESSEN

How is it possible that one hundred and fifty years ago liberalism meant the advocacy of freedom and economic *laissez faire* and that today it means the creed of totalitarian statism? Many people are aware of this total reversal, but few, especially today's liberals, know, or care to know, how or why it came about.

In an engrossing book, distinguished for its scholarship, Professor Ekirch provides the evidence for understanding and explaining how two mutually antagonistic creeds share the name of liberalism and how one led to the other.

The Decline of American Liberalism surveys the rise and demise of liberal ideology and institutions in America. It charts the transition from the nineteenth-century liberalism of limited government, states' rights, strict interpretation of the Constitution, and economic *laissez faire*—the ideology of Jefferson and John Randolph—to the twentieth-century liberalism of omnipotent government, the usurpation and/or destruction of states' and individual rights, the unchecked rise of the Executive branch to discretionary power, the abdication of Congress to the status of a rubber stamp and the self-appointment of the Supreme Court as a lawmaking body—the legacy of Hamilton, Marshall, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

How was the shift from liberty to tyranny made possible? The definition of liberalism by Professor Ekirch provides a major clue to the answer. "Perhaps it is best therefore if we think of liberalism, not as a well-defined political or economic system, but as a collection of ideas or principles which go to make up an attitude or 'habit of mind.'"

It was the vagueness, gaps, contradictions and errors in its "collection of ideas" which proved the undoing of nineteenth-century liberalism. Although Professor Ekirch seems to share some of those errors, being a liberal himself, the facts he presents tell an eloquent story. Nineteenth-century liberal ideologists cherished the hope of the "automatic perfection" of mankind; they saw man as a creature "determined by environment" and they expected man to reach perfection by perfecting the environment through social reform. Again, men like Jefferson and Randolph mistakenly thought that freedom and culture required individual economic self-sufficiency and an agrarian society; they argued against extension of the powers of the federal government, primarily in order to prevent the use of its powers to create an industrial society. Thus the best of the classical liberals failed to appreciate capitalism and to conceive the possibility of industrialism spreading without government favors and handouts.

Ekirch shows that the death of nineteenth-century liberalism was keyed by the Civil War. Before the war, only Southerners blatantly defended totalitarianism—Henry Hughes, a sociologist, conceived of "perfection in terms of an authoritarian, socialist order." Now, Northern liberals acquiesced in Lincoln's abrogations of individual rights, because they saw ideological advantages to be derived from the war. During this period, one detects the birth of the distinguishing attribute of the modern liberal: the willingness (and sometimes eagerness) to condone or advocate the initiation of physical force to achieve his ideals. "Emerson, like Whitman, nevertheless hoped and believed that the conflict would free the nation from an excessive reliance on a crude materialism and infuse it with a new ethical and idealistic purpose"—a sentiment to

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be echoed by Wilson's ideologue, Herbert Croly, to justify World War I: "The American nation needs the tonic of a serious moral adventure."

Ekirch brilliantly portrays a crucial moment in liberalism's decline when he exposes the Populists and Theodore Roosevelt's Progressives as usurpers of the liberal mantle. He demonstrates that "... the progressives were essentially nationalists, moving to a state socialism along European lines and owing relatively little to the American tradition of liberal individualism." Yet they were the bridge to the domestic and foreign policies of Wilson—for the liberals willingly accepted the Progressives as ideological pacemakers. This led, in domestic policy, to "... the paradox that much of the regulatory legislation, which was passed with the idea of restoring free competition, had precisely the opposite effect. In other words, government legislation was the greatest single factor in the decline of the very liberal economy that it sought to preserve and protect." And in foreign policy, it led to Wilson using deceit to drag an unwilling nation into war.

In recommending this book, one must register dissent from some of Professor Ekirch's interpretations. He conceives of government as an instrument of positive good—not simply as a policeman, but as a source of public welfare. At times, he seems to ascribe America's economic progress to government intervention in the economy. Finally, he fails to distinguish between economic power and political power, between wealth *earned* and wealth *acquired* through political favors such as exclusive franchises, subsidies and tariffs. He "package-deals" the two types; he quotes a nineteenth-century solution offered by E. L. Godkin, but fails fully to appreciate its truth or relevance. "Godkin asserted that the answer to bribery and corruption was to end the power of members of Congress to bestow great privileges upon private individuals and business corporations. . . . 'It [the government] cannot touch them without breeding corruption.'"

Such flaws as one may find in this book are largely confined to the interpretation of economic history, but Professor Ekirch is primarily an historian of ideas—and it is in this realm that his book has great merit. Those who want evidence of the cause and effect relationship between ideas and institutions, will find *The Decline of American Liberalism* extremely valuable, as will all those who are alarmed by the erosion of individual rights and economic freedom. Today's headlines provide a grim epilogue and confirmation: liberalism is in its last stages of decline; America is galloping toward a fascist dictatorship, with a liberal, Kennedy, as jockey. This book will show you what kind of ideas brought us here—and give you a clue to the ideas needed to change our course.

Benevolence versus Altruism (from page 27)

in love with the person who embodies and reflects one's own deepest values. Love is the *opposite* of selfishness.

As proof, ask yourself what your reaction would be if the man or woman you loved were to tell you: "Don't imagine that I want to marry you out of any selfish expectation of pleasure. Don't imagine that I see anything to admire in you, or that I find your company interesting, or that I enjoy our relationship in any manner whatever. In fact, I find you boring and thoroughly unappealing. But I wouldn't be so *selfish* as to seek anything personally valuable from our marriage. Don't imagine that your thoughts or feelings are of any *actual* interest to me, or that I do any of the things I do for you because I *care* about your happiness—don't think there's anything in it for *me* whether you're happy or not. I'm not an egoist, after all. I'm marrying you out of pity, out of charity, as a *duty*, because I know that you *need* me. I'm marrying you out of compassion for your flaws, not admiration for your virtues—I'm doing it as an act of *self-sacrifice*."

No? You wouldn't feel romantically inspired? So much for the theory that love is selfless.

Altruism is the antithesis of love, just as it is the antithesis of any positive value in human relationships.

The choice is not: selfishness or good will among men. The choice is: altruism or good will, benevolence, kindness, love and human brotherhood.

INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION DEPARTMENT

[Subscribers are invited to send in the questions that they find themselves unable to answer in philosophical or political discussions. As many questions as space permits will be answered. No questions will be answered by mail.]

■ Doesn't life require compromise?

A compromise is an adjustment of conflicting claims by mutual concessions. This means that both parties to a compromise have some valid claim and some value to offer each other. And *this* means that both parties agree upon some fundamental principle which serves as a base for their deal.

It is only in regard to concretes or particulars, implementing a mutually accepted basic principle, that one may compromise. For instance, one may bargain with a buyer over the price one wants to receive for one's product, and agree on a sum somewhere between one's demand and his offer. The mutually accepted basic principle, in such case, is the principle of trade, namely: that the buyer must pay the seller for his product. But if one wanted to be paid and the alleged buyer wanted to obtain one's product for nothing, no compromise, agreement or discussion would be possible, only the total surrender of one or the other.

There can be no compromise between a property owner and a burglar; offering the burglar a single teaspoon of one's silverware would not be a compromise, but a total surrender—the recognition of his *right* to one's property. What value or concession did the burglar offer in return? And once the principle of unilateral concessions is accepted as the base of a relationship by both parties, it is only a matter of time before the burglar would seize the rest. As an example of this process, observe the present foreign policy of the United States.

There can be no compromise between freedom and government controls; to accept "just a few controls" is to surrender the principle of inalienable individual rights and to substitute for it the principle of the government's unlimited, arbitrary power, thus delivering oneself into gradual enslavement. As an example of this process, observe the present domestic policy of the United States.

There can be no compromise on basic principles or on fundamental issues. What would you regard as a "compromise" between life and death? Or between truth and falsehood? Or between reason and irrationality?

Today, however, when people speak of "compromise," what they mean is not a legitimate mutual concession or a trade, but precisely the betrayal of one's principles—the unilateral surrender to any groundless, irrational claim. The root of that doctrine is *ethical subjectivism*, which holds that a *desire* or a *whim* is an irreducible moral primary, that every man is entitled to any desire he might feel like asserting, that all desires have equal moral validity, and that the only way men can get along together is by giving in to anything and "compromising" with anyone. It is not hard to see who would profit and who would lose by such a doctrine.

The immorality of this doctrine—and the reason why the term "compromise" implies, in today's general usage, an act of moral treason—lies in the fact that it requires men to accept ethical subjectivism as the basic principle superseding all principles in human relationships and to sacrifice anything as a concession to one another's whims.

The question "Doesn't life require compromise?" is usually asked by those who fail to differentiate between a basic principle and some concrete, specific wish. Accepting a lesser job than one had wanted is *not* a "compromise." Taking orders from one's employer on how to do the work for which one is hired, is *not* a "compromise." Living within one's income, is *not* a "compromise." Failing to have a cake after one has eaten it, is *not* a "compromise."

Integrity does not consist of loyalty to one's subjective whims, but of loyalty to rational principles. A "compromise"

(in the unprincipled sense of that word) is not a breach of one's comfort, but a breach of one's convictions. A "compromise" does not consist of doing something one dislikes, but of doing something one knows to be evil. Accompanying one's husband or wife to a concert, when one does not care for music, is *not* a "compromise"; surrendering to his or her irrational demands for social conformity, for pretended religious observance or for generosity toward boorish in-laws, is. Working for an employer who does not share one's ideas, is *not* a "compromise"; pretending to share his ideas, is. Accepting a publisher's suggestions to make changes in one's manuscript, when one sees the rational validity of his suggestions, is *not* a "compromise"; making such changes in order to please him or to please "the public," against one's own judgment and standards, is.

The excuse, given in all such cases, is that the "compromise" is only temporary and that one will reclaim one's integrity at some indeterminate future date. But one cannot correct a husband's or wife's irrationality by giving in to it and encouraging it to grow. One cannot achieve the victory of one's ideas by helping to propagate their opposite. One cannot offer a literary masterpiece, "when one has become rich and famous," to a following one has acquired by writing trash. If one found it difficult to maintain one's loyalty to one's own convictions at the start, a succession of betrayals—which helped to augment the power of the evil one lacked the courage to fight—will not make it easier at a later date, but will make it virtually impossible.

There can be no compromise on moral principles. "In any compromise between food and poison, it is only death that can win. In any compromise between good and evil, it is only evil that can profit." (*Atlas Shrugged*) The next time you are tempted to ask: "Doesn't life require compromise?" translate that question into its actual meaning: "Doesn't life require the surrender of that which is true and good to that which is false and evil?" The answer is that *that* precisely is what life forbids—if one wishes to achieve anything but a stretch of tortured years spent in progressive self-destruction.

—AYN RAND

"Account Overdrawn"

By AYN RAND

The entire policy of the Kennedy Administration—with its opening of "New Frontiers" to the realm of the unearned, its handouts, its frantic search for new recipients who demand handouts, its ticker-tape parades for foreign recipients who nationalize the property of American businessmen—rests on a single hope: the "economic growth" of the United States.

You have heard that concept invoked by the Administration as a magic formula or a mystic prayer in every plan, project, budget or demand for power to spend wealth which is not yet in existence, but which is to be provided by our "economic growth." It is time to ask yourself concretely and specifically: just what is "economic growth?"

Economic growth is the rise of an economy's productivity. What causes that rise? "The most important factor," wrote *Time* (April 27, 1962), "is new machinery and equipment. Other factors enter in, including higher levels of education and skill among workers, more efficient means of transportation and communication, research that pays off in new products or new techniques."

What is the common denominator of all the items on this interesting list, presented by a magazine that could hardly be called a staunch advocate of capitalism? *Human ability*. The intelligence, the efficiency, the skill, the knowledge, the creative inventiveness of the men who take part in a country's economy. Who channels that ability into "new machinery and equipment, new products or new techniques?" *The businessmen*.

It is on the productive ability of the American businessmen—on the hope that that ability will continue to function—that the whole grandiose edifice of Mr. Kennedy's plans is built.

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"Account Overdrawn" (from page 29)

How does Mr. Kennedy treat these providers and benefactors who are indispensable to him according to his own reiterated pronouncements? "My father always told me," said Mr. Kennedy, "that all businessmen were sons-of-bitches, but I never believed it till now!"

On May 28, a great many people apparently came to believe it, too, and, giving up the aspiration to achieve the status of sons-of-bitches, decided to sell their shares of America's doghouses.

"Why, Mr. Kennedy," said the falling stock market, paraphrasing Francisco d'Anconia, "what's the matter? Why do you seem to be upset? Profits are the root of all evil—I just got tired of being evil."

Most of the commentators, in the press and in Washington, professed to be puzzled by the stock market drop. "There was no economic reason for it," they cried. "Our economy is sound!" While some government officials were beginning to express doubt, others went on declaring that "economic growth" is just around the corner.

In style, content and implication, one of the most curious comments was made by James Reston (*The New York Times*, June 3, 1962). In a gentle, swimmy mixture of pleas and threats, he wrote the following: "At least a moratorium on ugly charges of bad faith is indicated. . . . The psychological slump at the moment, therefore, is probably more important than the stock market slump—in fact, it is probably responsible for the stock market slump. . . . If you go on telling the Yankees they are a lousy ball team you can soon land them in the second division, and if you go on insisting that Kennedy is anti-business the darned thing could easily happen, to the detriment of everybody."

Believe it or not, it is the businessmen who are guilty, as usual; they are guilty of making "ugly charges of bad faith" against Mr. Kennedy, who is innocent of such tactics ("Kennedy is not anti-business now, but he is Irish," Mr. Reston explains.) The rest may be taken to mean, interchangeably, either: (a) that businessmen must not let their "psychological slump" affect Mr. Kennedy who'll crack down on them if they don't cheer up—or (b) that Mr. Kennedy is suffering from a "psychological slump" and needs sympathy, reassurance and encouragement from businessmen.

Well, let us take a look at some of the "darned things" which *did* happen—and then ask ourselves whose psychological endurance had borne too much for too long.

In February, 1962, the F.C.C. hearings featured Mr. Newton N. Minow's demand for dictatorial power over the radio and television industry, while he charged businessmen (industry executives and sponsors alike) with bad taste, incompetence, commercialism, greed for profits, and policies contrary to "the public interest."

In March, proposing "protection for consumers," Mr. Kennedy demanded the power to control the food and drug industries, declaring to the nation that businessmen, in their pursuit of profit, are not to be trusted to give people an honest measure of untainted food or an effective, lifesaving drug.

In April, Mr. Kennedy exploded against the steel industry, denouncing the "steel executives whose pursuit of private power and profit exceeds their sense of public responsibility . . .," damning them for disobeying the wishes he had no right to assert, and declaring, in effect, that the urgent needs of business (such as maintenance, modernization, fighting foreign competition, etc.) are to be left at the mercy of the government's whim in some indeterminate future—that prices are to conform, not to the demands of the market, but to the demands of *his* policies—that profits are the first item to be sacrificed to the "national interest"—and that the antitrust boys would work-over any dissenter.

How long did Mr. Kennedy expect to be able to damn profits and to demand sacrifices, before people would take him at his word? Well, they did: they sacrificed their hope of profits—in the stock market.

There was a grim justice in the stock market's fall. It was the only form in which people could still express a protest,

consciously or subconsciously, against the persecution and destruction of American business. And no amount of evasion on the part of the New Frontiersmen can hide the fact that the steel crisis was the immediate cause of that fall; logically and chronologically, the evidence was too dramatic to misinterpret. If, in the face of political outrages, you had wondered: "How can the American people stand for it?"—you have now seen a preview of the manner in which people declare that they can't.

On May 28, 1962, the United States economy suffered a heart attack. As of this writing, the attack was not fatal and the patient seemed to rally. But, as with all heart attacks, there is now no way to know whether the next one will strike in an hour, a day or a year. Only one thing is certain: it was a warning, not to be ignored. The catastrophe which the advocates of capitalism had been predicting theoretically for the past decades is now discernible in practical, factual reality.

There are two roads ahead of us, with no "middle."

When the blow strikes, the statists will declare that free enterprise—the enterprise of chained, hampered, paralyzed, terrorized, antitrust-gagged men—has had its chance and has failed, and that they, the statists, in selfless service to the "public interest," must impose on us an emergency system of totalitarian controls.

Or: when the blow strikes, all those who value America, freedom, civilization, individual rights and their own lives, will unite on a single political program—placing the blame where it belongs—a program which will declare that statist controls have had their chance and have failed, and that there is only one way to save a collapsing economy: *to start decontrolling.*

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ A weekly column by Ayn Rand now appears each Sunday in the *Los Angeles Times*. The column began on June 17.

■ NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE's fall course of lectures on "Basic Principles of Objectivism" is scheduled to begin in New York City on Tuesday, October 9, and in Philadelphia on Monday, October 15.

At present, the Tape Transcription Course on "Basic Principles of Objectivism" is scheduled for fourteen cities this fall: Boston; Washington; Indianapolis; Miami; Chicago; St. Louis; Kansas City, Kansas; Lincoln, Nebraska; Houston; Dallas; Los Angeles; San Diego; Toronto; Winnipeg.

The INSTITUTE invites requests for interviews from individuals who are potentially interested in handling this course, as business representatives, in other cities in the United States and Canada. Write for information to: NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE, Tape Transcription Division, 165 East 35th St., New York 16, N.Y.

■ Ayn Rand's lecture on "Conservatism: An Obituary" has been published by NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE and is available from THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER. Price: 50¢ (N.Y.C. residents add 2¢ sales tax).

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CHECK YOUR PREMISES

By AYN RAND

The "Conflicts" of Men's Interests

Some students of Objectivism find it difficult to grasp the Objectivist principle that "there are no conflicts of interests among rational men."

A typical question runs as follows: "Suppose two men apply for the same job. Only one of them can be hired. Isn't this an instance of a conflict of interests, and isn't the benefit of one man achieved at the price of the sacrifice of the other?"

There are four interrelated considerations which are involved in a rational man's view of his interests, but which are ignored or evaded in the above question and in all similar approaches to the issue. I shall designate these four as: (a) "Reality," (b) "Context," (c) "Responsibility," (d) "Effort."

(a) "Reality." The term "interests" is a wide abstraction that covers the entire field of ethics. It includes the issues of: man's values, his desires, his goals and their actual achievement in reality. A man's "interests" depend on the kind of goals he chooses to pursue, his choice of goals depends on his desires, his desires depend on his values—and, for a rational man, his values depend on the judgment of his mind.

Desires (or feelings or emotions or wishes or whims) are not tools of cognition; they are not a valid standard of value, nor a valid criterion of man's interests. The mere fact that a man desires something does not constitute a proof that the object of his desire is *good*, nor that its achievement is actually to his interest.

To claim that a man's interests are sacrificed whenever a desire of his is frustrated—is to hold a subjectivist view of man's values and interests. Which means: to believe that it is proper, moral and possible for man to achieve his goals, regardless of whether they contradict the facts of reality or not. Which means: to hold an irrational or mystical view of existence. Which means: to deserve no further consideration.

In choosing his goals (the specific values he seeks to gain and/or keep), a rational man is guided by his thinking (by a process of reason)—not by his feelings or desires. He does not regard desires as irreducible primaries, as the given, which he is destined irresistibly to pursue. He does not regard "because I want it" or "because I feel like it" as a sufficient cause and validation of his actions. He chooses and/or identifies his desires by a process of reason, and he does not act to achieve a desire until and unless he is able rationally to validate it in the full context of his knowledge and of his other values and goals. He does not act until he is able to say: "I want it because it is right."

The Law of Identity (A is A) is a rational man's paramount consideration in the process of determining his interests. He knows that the contradictory is the impossible,

that a contradiction cannot be achieved in reality and that the attempt to achieve it can lead only to disaster and destruction. Therefore, he does not permit himself to hold contradictory values, to pursue contradictory desires and goals, or to imagine that the pursuit of a contradiction can ever be to his interest.

Only an irrationalist (or mystic or subjectivist—in which category I place all those who regard faith, feelings or desires as man's standard of value) exists in a perpetual conflict of "interests." Nothing but conflicts of interests is possible to him. Not only do his alleged interests clash with those of other men, but they clash also with one another.

No one finds it difficult to dismiss from philosophical consideration the problem of a man who wails that life entraps him in an irreconcilable conflict because he cannot eat his cake and have it, too. That problem does not acquire intellectual validity by being expanded to involve more than cake—whether one expands it to the whole universe, as in the doctrines of Existentialism, or only to a few random whims and sundry evasions, as in most people's views of their own interests.

When a person reaches the stage of claiming that *man's interests conflict with reality*, the concept "interests" ceases to be meaningful—and his problem ceases to be philosophical and becomes psychological.

(b) "Context." Just as a rational man does not hold any conviction out of context—that is: without relating it to the rest of his knowledge and resolving any possible contradictions—so he does not hold or pursue any desire out of context. And he does not judge what is or is not to his interest out of context, on the range of any given moment.

Context-dropping is one of the chief psychological tools of evasion. In regard to one's desires, there are two major ways of context-dropping: the issue of *range* and the issue of *means*.

A rational man sees his interests in terms of a lifetime and selects his goals accordingly. This does not mean that he has to be omniscient, infallible or clairvoyant. It means that he does not live his life short-range and does not drift like a bum pushed by the spur of the moment. It means that he does not regard any moment as cut off from the context of the rest of his life, and that he allows no conflicts or contradictions between his short-range and long-range interests. He never loses sight of the fact that his life has to be an integrated whole—and he does not become his own destroyer by pursuing a desire today which wipes out all his values tomorrow.

A rational man does not indulge in wistful longings for ends divorced from means. He does not hold a desire without knowing (or learning) and considering the means by which it is to be achieved. Since he knows that nature does not provide man with the automatic satisfaction of his desires, that a man's goals or values have to be achieved by his own effort, that the lives and efforts of other men are not his property and are not there to serve his wishes—a rational man never holds a desire or pursues a goal, which cannot be achieved directly or indirectly by his own effort.

It is with a proper understanding of this "indirectly" that the crucial social issue begins.

Living in a society, instead of on a desert island, does not relieve a man of the responsibility of supporting his own life. The only difference is that he supports his life by *trading* his products or services for the products or services of others. And, in this process of trade, a rational man does not seek or desire any more or any less than his own effort can earn. What determines his earnings? The free market, that is: the voluntary choice and judgment of the men who are willing to trade him their effort in return.

When a man trades with others, he is counting—explicitly or implicitly—on their rationality, that is: on their ability to recognize the objective value of his work. (A trade based on any other premise is a con game or a fraud.) Thus, when a rational man pursues a goal in a free society, he does not place himself at the mercy of the whims, the favors or the prejudices of others; he depends on nothing but his own

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The "Conflicts" of Men's Interests (from page 31)

effort: *directly*, by doing objectively valuable work—*indirectly*, through the objective evaluation of his work by others.

It is in this sense that a rational man never holds a desire or pursues a goal which cannot be achieved by his own effort. He trades value for value. He never seeks or desires the *unearned*. If he undertakes to achieve a goal that requires the cooperation of many people, he never counts on anything but his own ability to persuade them and their voluntary agreement.

Needless to say, a rational man never distorts or corrupts his own standards and judgment in order to appeal to the irrationality, stupidity or dishonesty of others. He knows that such a course is suicidal. He knows that one's only practical chance to achieve any degree of success or anything humanly desirable lies in dealing with those who are rational, whether there are many of them or few. If, in any given set of circumstances, any victory is possible at all, it is only reason that can win it. And, in a free society, no matter how hard the struggle might be, it is reason that ultimately wins.

Since he never drops the context of the issues he deals with, a rational man accepts that struggle as *to his interest*—because he knows that freedom is to his interest. He knows that the struggle to achieve his values includes the possibility of defeat. He knows also that there is no alternative and no automatic guarantee of success for man's effort, neither in dealing with nature nor with other men. So he does not judge his interests by any particular defeat nor by the range of any particular moment. He lives and judges long-range. And he assumes the full responsibility of knowing what conditions are *necessary* for the achievement of his goals.

(c) "Responsibility." This last is the particular form of intellectual responsibility that most people evade. That evasion is the major cause of their frustrations and defeats.

Most people hold their desires without any context whatever, as ends hanging in a foggy vacuum, the fog hiding any concept of means. They rouse themselves mentally only long enough to utter an "I wish," and stop there, and wait, as if the rest were up to some unknown power.

What they evade is the *responsibility of judging the social world*. They take the world as the given. "A world I never made" is the deepest essence of their attitude—and they seek only to adjust themselves uncritically to the incomprehensible requirements of those unknowable others who did make the world, whoever those might be.

But humility and presumptuousness are two sides of the same psychological medal. In the willingness to throw oneself blindly on the mercy of others there is the implicit privilege of making blind demands on one's masters.

There are countless ways in which this sort of "metaphysical humility" reveals itself. For instance, there is the man who wishes to be rich, but never thinks of discovering what means, actions and conditions are required to achieve wealth. Who is he to judge? He never made the world—and "nobody gave him a break."

There is the girl who wishes to be loved, but never thinks of discovering what love is, what values it requires, and whether she possesses any virtues to be loved for. Who is she to judge? Love, she feels, is an inexplicable favor—so she merely longs for it, feeling that somebody has deprived her of her share in the distribution of favors.

There are the parents who suffer deeply and genuinely, because their son (or daughter) does not love them, and who, simultaneously, ignore, oppose or attempt to destroy everything they know of their son's convictions, values and goals, never thinking of the connection between these two facts, never making an attempt to understand their son. The world they never made and dare not challenge, has told them that children love parents automatically.

There is the man who wants a job, but never thinks of discovering what qualifications the job requires or what constitutes doing one's work well. Who is he to judge? He never made the world. Somebody owes him a living. How? *Somehow*.

A European architect of my acquaintance was talking, one day, of his trip to Puerto Rico. He described—with great indignation at the universe at large—the squalor of the Puerto Ricans' living conditions. Then he described what wonders modern housing could do for them, which he had daydreamed in detail, including electric refrigerators and tiled bathrooms. I asked: "Who would pay for it?" He answered, in a faintly offended, almost huffy tone of voice: "Oh, that's not for me to worry about! An architect's task is only to project what *should* be done. Let somebody else think about the money."

That is the psychology from which all "social reforms" or "welfare states" or "noble experiments" or the destruction of the world have come.

In dropping the responsibility for one's own interests and life, one drops the responsibility of ever having to consider the interests and lives of others—of those others who are, somehow, to provide the satisfaction of one's desires.

Whoever allows a "somehow" into his view of the means by which his desires are to be achieved, is guilty of that "metaphysical humility" which, psychologically, is the premise of a parasite. As Nathaniel Branden pointed out in a lecture, "somehow" always means "somebody."

(d) "Effort." Since a rational man knows that man must achieve his goals by his own effort, he knows that neither wealth nor jobs nor any human values exist in a given, limited, static quantity, waiting to be divided. He knows that all benefits have to be produced, that the gain of one man does not represent the loss of another, that a man's achievement is not earned at the expense of those who have not achieved it.

Therefore, he never imagines that he has any sort of unearned, unilateral claim on any human being—and he never leaves his interests at the mercy of any one person or single, specific concrete. He may need clients, but not any one particular client—he may need customers, but not any one particular customer—he may need a job, but not any one particular job.

If he encounters competition, he either meets it or chooses another line of work. There is no job so low that a better, more skillful performance of it would pass unnoticed and unappreciated; not in a *free* society. Ask any office manager.

It is only the passive, parasitical representatives of the "humility metaphysics" school who regard any competitor as a threat, because the thought of earning one's position by personal merit is not part of their view of life. They regard themselves as interchangeable mediocrities who have nothing to offer and who fight, in a "static" universe, for someone's causeless favor.

A rational man knows that one does not live by means of "luck," "breaks" or favors, that there is no such thing as an "only chance" or a single opportunity, and that this is guaranteed precisely by the existence of competition. He does not regard any concrete, specific goal or value as irreplaceable. He knows that only persons are irreplaceable—only those one loves.

He knows also that there are no conflicts of interests among rational men even in the issue of love. Like any other value, love is not a static quantity to be divided, but an unlimited response to be earned. The love for one friend is not a threat to the love for another, and neither is the love for the various members of one's family, assuming they have earned it. The most exclusive form—romantic love—is not an issue of competition. If two men are in love with the same woman, what she feels for either of them is not determined by what she feels for the other and is not taken away from him. If she chooses one of them, the "loser" could not have had what the "winner" has earned.

It is only among the irrational, emotion-motivated persons, whose love is divorced from any standards of value, that chance rivalries, accidental conflicts and blind choices prevail. But then, whoever wins, does not win much. Among the emotion-driven, neither love nor any other emotion has any meaning.

Such, in brief essence, are the four major considerations involved in a rational man's view of his interests.

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INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION DEPARTMENT

[Subscribers are invited to send in the questions that they find themselves unable to answer in philosophical or political discussions. As many questions as space permits will be answered. No questions will be answered by mail.]

■ Are periodic depressions inevitable in a system of laissez-faire capitalism?

It is characteristic of the enemies of capitalism that they denounce it for evils that are, in fact, the result not of capitalism but of statism: evils that result from and are made possible only by government intervention in the economy.

In the June issue of THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER, I discussed a flagrant example of this policy: the charge that capitalism leads to the establishment of coercive monopolies. The most notorious instance of this policy is the claim that capitalism, by its nature, inevitably leads to periodic depressions.

Statists repeatedly assert that depressions (the phenomenon of the so-called business cycle, of "boom and bust") are inherent in *laissez faire*, and that the great crash of 1929 was the final proof of the failure of an unregulated, free-market economy. What is the truth of the matter?

A depression is a large-scale decline in production and trade; it is characterized by a sharp drop in productive output, in investment, in employment and in the value of capital assets (plants, machinery, etc.). Normal business fluctuations, or a temporary decline in the rate of industrial expansion, do not constitute a depression; a depression is a nation-wide contraction of business activity—and a general decline in the value of capital assets—of major proportions.

There is nothing in the nature of a free-market economy to cause such an event. The popular explanations of depression as caused by "over-production," "under-consumption," monopolies, labor-saving devices, maldistribution, excessive accumulations of wealth, etc., have been exploded as fallacies many times. (See, in this connection, Carl Snyder, *Capitalism the Creator*, Macmillan, 1940.)

Readjustments of economic activity, shifts of capital and labor from one industry to another, due to changing conditions, occur constantly under capitalism. This is entailed in the process of motion, growth and progress that characterizes capitalism. But there always exists the possibility of profitable endeavor in one field or another, there is always the need and demand for goods, and all that can change is what kind of goods it becomes most profitable to produce.

In any one industry, it is possible for supply to exceed demand, in the context of all the other existing demands. In such a case, there is a drop in prices, in profitability, in investment and in employment in that particular industry; capital and labor tend to flow elsewhere, seeking more rewarding uses. Such an industry undergoes a period of stagnation, as a result of unjustified, that is, uneconomic, unprofitable, unproductive investment.

In a free economy that functions on a gold standard, such unproductive investment is severely limited; unjustified speculation does not rise, unchecked, until it engulfs an entire nation. In a free economy, the supply of money and credit needed to finance business ventures is determined by *objective* economic factors. It is the banking system that is the guardian of economic stability. The principles governing money supply operate to forbid large-scale unjustified investment.

Most businesses finance at least part of their undertakings by means of bank loans. Banks function as an investment clearing house, investing the savings of their customers in those enterprises which promise to be most successful. Banks do not have unlimited funds to loan; they are limited in the credit they can extend by the amount of their gold reserves. In order for banks to remain successful, to make profits and thus attract the savings of investors, they must make their loans judiciously: they must seek out those ventures which

they judge to be most sound and potentially profitable. Banks fail in their judgment too consistently, their loans not repaid and they go bankrupt.

If, in a period of increasing speculation, banks are confronted with an inordinate number of requests for loans, their response to the shrinking availability of money, they raise their interest rates and (b) scrutinize more severely ventures for which loans are requested, setting more exact standards of what constitutes a justifiable investment. As a consequence, funds are more difficult to obtain, and there is a temporary curtailment and contraction of business investment. Businessmen are often unable to borrow the funds they desire and have to reduce plans for expansion. The purchase of common stocks, which reflects investors' estimates of future earnings of companies, is similarly curtailed; overvalued stocks fall in price. Businesses engaged in uneconomic ventures, now unable to obtain additional credit, go bankrupt; a further waste of productive factors is stopped; economic errors are liquidated.

At worst, the economy may experience a mild recession—that is, a general slight decline in investment and production. In an unregulated economy, readjustments occur quite swiftly and then production and investment again begin to climb. The temporary recession is not harmful but beneficial; it is the state of an economic system in the process of curtailment and returning to health.

The impact of such a recession may be significantly felt in a few industries, but it does not wreck an entire economy. A nation-wide depression, such as occurred in the United States in the thirties, would not have been possible in a free society. It was made possible only by government intervention in the economy—more specifically, by government manipulation of the money supply.

The government's policy consisted, in essence, of antithetizing the regulators, inherent in a free banking system that prevent runaway speculation and consequent economic collapse.

All government intervention in the economy is based on the belief that economic laws need not operate, that principles of cause and effect can be suspended, that everything in existence is "flexible" and "malleable," except a bureaucrat's whim, which is omnipotent. Reality, logic and economics must not be allowed to get in the way.

This was the implicit premise that led to the establishment in 1913, of the Federal Reserve System—a government bank with control (through complex and often indirect means) over the individual banks throughout the country. The Federal Reserve undertook to free individual banks from the "limitations" imposed on them by the amount of their own individual reserves, to free them from the laws of the market and to arrogate to government officials the right to decide how much credit they wished to make available at what time.

A "cheap money" policy was the guiding idea and goal of these officials. Banks were no longer to be limited in making loans by the amount of their gold reserves. Interest rates were no longer to rise in response to increasing speculation and increasing demands for funds. Credit was to remain readily available—until and unless the Federal Reserve decided otherwise. (For a discussion of the means by which the Federal Reserve controls credit availability, see Snyder; see also Benjamin M. Anderson, *Economics and the Public Welfare*, Van Nostrand, 1949—the best financial and economic history of the United States from 1914 through 1946.)

The government argued that by taking control of money and credit out of the hands of private bankers, and by contracting or expanding credit at will, guided by considerations other than those influencing the "selfish" bankers, it could, in conjunction with other interventionist policies—so contrary to investment as to guarantee a state of virtually constant prosperity. Many bureaucrats believed that the government could keep the economy in a state of unending boom.

To borrow an invaluable metaphor from Alan Greenspan

(continued on page 3)

if, under *laissez faire*, the banking system and the principles controlling the availability of funds act as a fuse that prevents a blowout in the economy—then the government, through the Federal Reserve System, put a penny in the fuse-box. The result was the explosion known as the Crash of 1929.

Throughout most of the 1920's, the government compelled banks to keep interest rates artificially and uneconomically low. As a consequence, money was poured into every sort of speculative venture. By 1928, the warning signals of danger were clearly apparent: unjustified investment was rampant and stocks were increasingly over-valued. The government chose to ignore these danger signals. A free banking system would have been compelled, by economic necessity, to put the brakes on this process of runaway speculation; credit and investment, in such a case, would be drastically curtailed; the banks which made unprofitable investments, the enterprises which proved unproductive, and those who dealt with them, would suffer—but that would be all; the country as a whole would not be dragged down. However, the "anarchy" of a free banking system had been abandoned—in favor of "enlightened" government planning.

The boom and the wild speculation—which had preceded every major depression—were allowed to rise unchecked, involving, in a widening network of malinvestments and miscalculations, the entire economic structure of the nation. People were investing in virtually everything and making fortunes overnight—on paper. Profits were calculated on hysterically exaggerated appraisals of the future earnings of companies. Credit was extended with promiscuous abandon, on the premise that somehow the goods would be there to back it up—it was like the policy of a man who passes out rubber checks, counting on the hope that he will somehow find a way to obtain the necessary money and to deposit it in the bank before anyone presents his checks for collection.

But A is A—and reality is not infinitely elastic. In 1929, the country's economic and financial structure had become impossibly precarious. By the time the government finally and frantically raised the interest rates, it was too late. It is doubtful whether anyone can state with certainty what events first set off the panic—and it does not matter: the crash had become inevitable; any number of events could have pulled the trigger. But when the news of the first bank and commercial failures began to spread, uncertainty swept across the country in widening waves of terror. People began to sell their stocks, hoping to get out of the market with their gains, or to obtain the money they suddenly needed to pay bank loans that were being called in—and other people, seeing this, apprehensively began to sell their stocks—and, virtually overnight, an avalanche hurled the stock market downward, prices collapsed, securities became worthless, loans were called in, many of which could not be paid, the value of capital assets plummeted sickeningly, fortunes were wiped out, and, by 1932, business activity had come almost to a halt. The law of causality had avenged itself.

Such, in essence, was the nature and cause of the 1929 depression.

It provides one of the most eloquent illustrations of the disastrous consequences of a "planned" economy. In a free economy, when an individual businessman makes an error of economic judgment, he (and perhaps those who immediately deal with him) suffers the consequences; in a controlled economy, when a central planner makes an error of economic judgment, the whole country suffers the consequences.

It was not the Federal Reserve, it was not government intervention that took the blame for the 1929 depression—it was capitalism. Freedom—cried statistics of every breed and sect—had had its chance and had failed. The voices of the few thinkers who pointed to the real cause of the evil were drowned out in the denunciations of businessmen, of the profit motive, of capitalism.

Had men chosen to understand the cause of the crash, the country would have been spared much of the agony that fol-

lowed. The depression was prolonged for tragically unnecessary years by the same evil that had caused it: government controls and regulations.

Contrary to popular misconception, controls and regulations began long before the New Deal; in the 1920's, the "mixed economy" was already an established fact of American life. But the trend toward statism began to move faster under the Hoover Administration—and, with the advent of Roosevelt's New Deal, it accelerated at an unprecedented rate. The economic adjustments needed to bring the depression to an end were prevented from taking place—by the imposition of strangling controls, increased taxes and labor legislation. This last had the effect of forcing wage rates to unjustifiably high levels, thus raising the businessman's costs at precisely the time when costs needed to be lowered, if investment and production were to revive.

The National Industrial Recovery Act, the Wagner Act, and the abandonment of the gold standard (with the government's subsequent plunge into inflation and an orgy of deficit spending) were only three of the many disastrous measures enacted by the New Deal for the avowed purpose of pulling the country out of the depression; all had the opposite effect. (For a study of the many regulations and policies which prevented business recovery, see Snyder; Anderson; and Hans F. Sennholz, *How Can Europe Survive?*, Van Nostrand, 1955.)

As Alan Greenspan points out in "Stock Prices and Capital Evaluation,"* the obstacle to business recovery did not consist exclusively of the specific New Deal legislation passed; more harmful still was the general atmosphere of uncertainty engendered by the Administration. One had no way to know what law or regulation would descend on one's head at any moment, one had no way to know what sudden shifts of direction government policy might take, one had no way to plan long-range.

To act and produce, businessmen require knowledge, the possibility of rational calculation, not "faith" and "hope"—above all, not "faith" and "hope" concerning the unpredictable twistings within a bureaucrat's head.

Such advances as business was able to achieve under the New Deal collapsed in 1937—as a result of an intensification of uncertainty regarding what the government might choose to do next. Unemployment rose to more than ten million and business activity fell almost to the low point of 1932, the worst year of the depression.

It is part of the official New Deal mythology that Roosevelt "got us out of the depression." How was the problem of the depression finally "solved"? By the favorite expedient of all statist in times of emergency: a war.

The depression precipitated by the stock market crash of 1929 was not the first in American history—though it was incomparably more severe than any that had preceded it. If one studies the earlier depressions, the same basic cause and common denominator will be found: in one form or another, by one means or another, government manipulation of the money supply. It is typical of the manner in which interventionism grows that the Federal Reserve System was instituted as a proposed antidote against those earlier depressions—which were themselves products of monetary manipulation by the government.

The financial mechanism of an economy is the sensitive center, the living heart, of business activity. In no other area can government intervention produce quite such disastrous consequences. (For a general discussion of the business cycle and its relation to government manipulation of the money supply, see Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action*, Yale University Press, 1949.)

One of the most striking facts of history is men's failure to learn from it. For further details, see the policies of the present Administration.

—NATHANIEL BRANDEN

*A paper delivered before a joint session of the American Statistical Association and the American Finance Association in 1959.

The "Conflicts" of Men's Interests (from page 32)

Now let us return to the question originally asked—about the two men applying for the same job—and observe in what manner it ignores or opposes these four considerations.

(a) "Reality." The mere fact that two men desire the same job does not constitute proof that either of them is entitled to it or deserves it, and that his interests are damaged if he does not obtain it.

(b) "Context." Both men should know that if they desire a job, their goal is made possible only by the existence of a business concern able to provide employment—that that business concern requires the availability of more than one applicant for any job—that if only one applicant existed, he would not obtain the job, because the business concern would have to close its doors—and that their competition for the job is in their interest, even though one of them will lose in that particular encounter.

(c) "Responsibility." Neither man has the moral right to declare that he doesn't want to consider all those things, he just wants a job. He is not entitled to any desire or to any "interest" without knowledge of what is required to make its fulfillment possible.

(d) "Effort." Whoever gets the job, has earned it (assuming that the employer's choice is rational). This benefit is due to his own merit—not to the "sacrifice" of the other man who never had any vested right to that job. The failure to give to a man what had never belonged to him can hardly be described as "sacrificing his interests."

All of the above discussion applies only to the relationships among rational men and only to a free society. In a free society, one does not have to deal with those who are irrational. One is free to avoid them.

In a non-free society, no pursuit of any interests is possible to anyone; nothing is possible but gradual and general destruction.

Introducing Objectivism*

By AYN RAND

[This is the first column by Ayn Rand, which appeared in the Los Angeles Times, on June 17, 1962.]

At a sales conference at Random House, preceding the publication of *Atlas Shrugged*, one of the book salesmen asked me whether I could present the essence of my philosophy while standing on one foot. I did, as follows:

1. *Metaphysics*: Objective Reality
2. *Epistemology*: Reason
3. *Ethics*: Self-interest
4. *Politics*: Capitalism

If you want this translated into simple language, it would read: 1. "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed" or "Wishing won't make it so." 2. "You can't eat your cake and have it, too." 3. "Man is an end in himself." 4. "Give me liberty or give me death."

If you held these concepts with total consistency, as the basis of your convictions, you would have a full philosophical system to guide the course of your life. But to hold them with total consistency—to understand, to define, to prove and to apply them—requires volumes of thought. Which is why philosophy cannot be discussed while standing on one foot—nor while standing on two feet on both sides of every fence. This last is the predominant philosophical position today, particularly in the field of politics.

In the space of a column, I can give only the briefest summary of my position, as a frame-of-reference for all my future columns. My philosophy, Objectivism, holds that:

1. Reality exists as an objective absolute—facts are facts, independent of man's feelings, wishes, hopes or fears.
2. Reason (the faculty which identifies and integrates the material provided by man's senses) is man's only means of

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perceiving reality, his only source of knowledge, his only guide to action, and his basic means of survival.

3. Man—every man—is an end in himself, not the means to the ends of others. He must exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself. The pursuit of his own rational self-interest and of his own happiness is the highest moral purpose of his life.

4. The ideal political-economic system is *laissez-faire* capitalism. It is a system where men deal with one another, not as victims and executioners, nor as masters and slaves, but as *traders*, by free, voluntary exchange to mutual benefit. It is a system where no man may obtain any values from others by resorting to physical force, and no man may initiate the use of physical force against others. The government acts only as a policeman that protects man's rights; it uses physical force only in retaliation and only against those who initiate its use, such as criminals or foreign invaders. In a system of full capitalism, there should be (but, historically, has not yet been) a complete separation of state and economics, in the same way and for the same reasons as the separation of state and church.

Capitalism was the system originated in the United States. Its success, its progress, its achievements are unprecedented in human history. America's political philosophy was based on man's right to his own life, to his own liberty, to the pursuit of his own happiness, which means: on man's right to exist for his own sake. That was America's *implicit* moral code, but it had not been formulated explicitly. This was the flaw in her intellectual armor, which is now destroying her. America and capitalism are perishing for lack of a moral base.

The destroyer is the morality of altruism.

Altruism holds that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the only moral justification of his existence, and that self-sacrifice is his highest moral duty. The political expression of altruism is collectivism or *statism*, which holds that man's life and work belong to the state—to society, to the group, the gang, the race, the nation—and that the state may dispose of him in any way it pleases for the sake of whatever it deems to be its own tribal, collective good.

"From her start, America was torn by the clash of her political system with the altruist morality. Capitalism and altruism are incompatible; they cannot co-exist in the same man or in the same society. Today, the conflict has reached its ultimate climax; the choice is clear-cut: either a new morality of rational self-interest, with its consequences of freedom, justice, progress and man's happiness on earth—or the primordial morality of altruism, with its consequences of slavery, brute force, stagnant terror and sacrificial furnaces." (For the New Intellectual)

You may observe the practical results of altruism and statism all around us in today's world—such as the slave-labor camps of Soviet Russia, where twenty-one million political prisoners work on the construction of government projects and die of *planned* malnutrition, human life being cheaper than food—or the gas chambers and mass slaughter of Nazi Germany—or the terror and starvation of Red China—or the hysteria of Cuba where the government offers men for sale—or the wall of East Berlin where human beings leap from roofs or crawl through sewers in order to escape, while guards shoot at fleeing children.

Observe these atrocities, then ask yourself whether any of it would be possible if men had not accepted the idea that man is a sacrificial animal to be immolated for the sake of the "public good." Read the speeches of those countries' political leaders and ask yourself what arguments would be left to them if the word "sacrifice" were regarded not as a moral ideal, but as the anti-human evil which it is.

And then, listen to the speeches of our present Administration—and ask yourself the same question.

[If you would like the Ayn Rand column to appear in your city, write the editors of your local newspapers.]

The New Enemies of "The Untouchables"*

By AYN RAND

[This is the fourth column, which appeared in the Los Angeles Times, on July 8, 1962.]

When a culture is dominated by an irrational philosophy, a major symptom of its decadence is the inversion of all values. This can always be seen clearly in the field of art, the best barometer of a culture. In today's flood of criticism and abuse, unleashed against the television industry, it is the best program that has been singled out for the most persistent denunciations. That program is "The Untouchables."

The moral meaning and psychological motives of those denunciations are of much deeper significance than the superficiality of the attackers might indicate.

The attacks are spearheaded by the statists inside and outside the F.C.C., who propose to place television and radio under total government control, to establish censorship-by-license-revoking, and to dictate the content of programs by bureaucratic edict, which means: by force. Simultaneously and as a justification for it, they clamor that the television industry is corrupting the public taste by presenting too many shows that feature force and violence.

Crime stories and Westerns are the main target of the statists' attack, in alliance with sundry busybodies of all political denominations, who are always to be found in any pro-censorship movement of the left or the right.

The truth of the matter is the exact opposite of their allegations: the appeal of crime stories and Westerns does not lie in the element of violence, but in the element of moral conflict and moral purpose.

Crime stories and Westerns are the last remnant of romanticism on our airwaves. No matter how primitive their terms, they deal with the most realistic issue of man's life: the battle of good and evil. They present man as a purposeful being who is able to choose his goals, to fight for his values, to resist disaster, to struggle and to win. The best of such stories offer the invaluable elements of a purposeful plot structure, of ingenuity and suspense, of the daring, the unusual, the exciting.

Compare this with what passes for serious drama on today's television screens: slack-faced, loose-lipped characters with unseeing eyes and unfocused minds, who utter self-consciously ungrammatical lines and jerk hysterically through a sprawling mess of pointless happenings, purporting to show man's helplessness or loneliness or essential depravity—all of it adding up to a scream of "I couldn't help it!"—or to a maudlin, mawkish whine of sympathy for some subhuman object who doesn't know why he murders people, he just does—with, occasionally, some stale corn to the effect that life is a rat race.

There are "sophisticated" crime stories, produced by the same modern mentality, which present both the criminals and the detectives as cynical, larcenous, indistinguishable barroom buddies, with brutal fist fights as a substitute for plot—and there are those queer mongrels: the "psychological" Westerns that present a hostility-sublimating sheriff and a cattle rustler with an Oedipus complex. These may indeed appeal to the lowest element of the public's taste. But they come up and perish, unnoticed, every season. It is not by means of fist fights, chases or gun duels that the successful, popular shows hold audiences glued to TV sets year after year.

"The Untouchables" is one of the most successful programs and fully deserves its success. It is a profoundly moral show. In writing, acting and direction, it is a masterpiece of stylized characterization. It captures the essence of the gangster psychology: the irrationality, the hysteria, the chronic terror, the panic. These gangsters are neither glamorized strongmen nor innocent "victims of society"; they are scared rats. They are presented as loathsome, but not frightening, because not powerful; they are presented as contemptible. No child or adult could ever feel inspired to emulate a Frank Nitti.

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But Robert Stack's superlative portrayal of Eliot Ness is the most inspiring image on today's screen, the only image of a real hero.

By the austere, unsmiling grimness of his manner, the total self-confidence even in moments of temporary defeat, so total that it can afford to be unstressed, the controlled intensity, the quietly absolute dedication to the moral justice of his task, Stack conveys the integrity of a truly untouchable man—a man whom evil cannot tempt, because it has nothing to offer him. By the faint, occasional hints of a bitterly patient weariness, he projects that fighting evil is not a lark or a glamorous adventure, but a grim job and a deadly battle. And the constantly intense perceptiveness of his attitude—the attitude of a man fully in control and a mind fully in focus—projects the nature of that battle: man's intellect versus brute force.

Compare "The Untouchables" to the militant mindlessness of today's "serious" dramas and ask yourself which is more likely to give men hope, courage and an hour's refueling for the battle against the sordid ugliness of today's headlines. And, if moral influence on children is your concern, ask yourself which will help to shape a child's moral character: the conviction that justice, values, struggles and victories are possible, and that there are heroes he can live up to—or the conviction that nothing is possible and anything is permissible, that the good he desperately longs for is an illusion, but the evil that tempts him will bring him loving sympathy, that nobody can help what he does and there is no way out of the incomprehensible terror with which life seems to confront him. Which will shape his soul? Which made you, perhaps, renounce yours?

In view of the virtues of "The Untouchables," what is it that the "touchables" resent and denounce? Precisely its virtues. Not its criminals, but the triumph over criminals. Not the violence, but the moral absolutism.

It is part of today's profound revolt against man, against the intellect, against human efficacy and, above all, against moral values.

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ Due to the unprecedented volume of orders for reprints of the June Special Supplement: *Doctors and the Police State*, by Leonard Peikoff, we are able to offer a special reprint rate: single copy, 25¢; 10-99 copies, 15¢ each plus postage (for first-class delivery add 1¢ per copy, for third-class delivery add ½¢ per copy); 100-999 copies, 10¢ each plus postage; 1,000 or more, 7¢ each plus postage; 10,000 and over, 4¢ each plus postage.

■ This summer, NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE offers a ten lecture course on "Principles of Efficient Thinking," given by Barbara Branden in Philadelphia (began July 2) and New York City (began July 10).

■ On August 25, the Bobbs-Merrill Co. will publish a new soft-cover, quality edition of *The Fountainhead*, priced at \$2.95, as part of their new line of Charter Books. This will make *The Fountainhead* available simultaneously in hard-cover, quality paperback and regular paperback editions.

Other activities: In response to *The Executive's Coloring Book* and *The JFK Coloring Book*, two students of NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE, Francesca Knight and Lois Roberts, have prepared *The Bureaucrat's Coloring Book*. Published by Athene Press, it is available from The Bookmailer, 232 East 35th St., New York 16, N. Y. Price: \$2.00.

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CHECK YOUR PREMISES

By AYN RAND

The Pull Peddlers

America's foreign policy is so grotesquely irrational that most people believe there must be some sensible purpose behind it. The extent of the irrationality acts as its own protection: like the technique of the "Big Lie," it makes people assume that so blatant an evil could not possibly be as evil as it appears to them and, therefore, that *somebody* must understand its meaning, even though they themselves do not.

The sickening generalities and contradictions cited in justification of the foreign aid program fall roughly into two categories which are offered to us simultaneously: the "idealistic" and the "practical," or mush and fear.

The "idealistic" arguments consist of appeals to altruism and swim out of focus in a fog of floating abstractions about our duty to support the "underdeveloped" nations of the entire globe, who are starving and will perish without our selfless help.

The "practical" arguments consist of appeals to fear and emit a different sort of fog, to the effect that our own selfish interest requires that we go bankrupt buying the favor of the "underdeveloped" nations, who, otherwise, will become a dangerous threat to us.

It is useless to point out to the advocates of our foreign policy that it's either-or: either the "underdeveloped" nations are so weak that they are doomed without our help, in which case they cannot become a threat to us—or they are so strong that with some other assistance they can develop to the point of endangering us, in which case we should not drain our economic power to help the growth of potential enemies who are that powerful.

It is useless to discuss the contradiction between these two assertions, because neither of them is true. Their proponents are impervious to facts, to logic and to the mounting evidence that after two decades of global altruism, our foreign policy is achieving the exact opposite of its alleged goals: it is wrecking our economy—it is reducing us internationally to the position of an impotent failure who has nothing but a series of compromises, retreats, defeats and betrayals on his record—and, instead of bringing progress to the world, it is bringing the bloody chaos of tribal warfare and delivering one helpless nation after another into the power of communism.

When a society insists on pursuing a suicidal course, one may be sure that the alleged reasons and proclaimed slogans are mere rationalizations. The question is only: what is it that these rationalizations are hiding?

Observe that there is no consistent pattern in the erratic

chaos of our foreign aid. And although in the long run it leads to the benefit of Soviet Russia, Russia is not its direct, immediate beneficiary. There is no consistent winner, only a consistent loser: the United States.

In the face of such a spectacle, some people give up the attempt to understand; others imagine that some omnipotent conspiracy is destroying America, that the rationalizations are hiding some malevolent, fantastically powerful giant.

The truth is worse than that: the truth is that the rationalizations are hiding nothing—that there is nothing at the bottom of the fog but a nest of scurrying cockroaches.

I submit in evidence an article in the editorial section of *The New York Times*, of July 15, 1962, entitled: "Role of Foreign Lobbies."

"A 'non-diplomatic corps' of foreign agents," states the article, "has bloomed in recent years [in Washington] . . .

"Lobbying in Congress to obtain—or prevent—the passage of legislation of interest to their foreign clients, seeking to pressure the Administration into adopting certain political or economic policies, or attempting to mold public opinion through a myriad of methods and techniques, this legion of special agents has become an elusive shadow for operating in Washington and the width and the length of the land."

"Lobbying" is the activity of attempting to influence legislation by privately influencing the legislators. It is the result and creation of a "mixed economy"—of government by pressure groups. Its methods range from mere social courtesies and cocktail-party or luncheon "friendships" to favors, threats, bribes, blackmail.

All lobbyists, whether serving foreign or domestic interests, are required—by laws passed in the last three decades—to register with the government. The registrations have been growing at such a rate—with the foreign lobbyists outnumbering the domestic ones—that legislators are beginning to be alarmed. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has announced that it is preparing an investigation of these foreign agents' activities.

The *N. Y. Times* article describes foreign lobbying as follows: "The theory behind this whole enterprise is that for a fee or a retainer and often for hundreds of thousands of dollars in advertising, publicity and expense money, a foreign Government or a foreign economic or political interest can purchase a favorable legislation in the United States Congress, a friendly policy of the Administration or a positive image in the eyes of the American public opinion, leading in turn to profitable political or economic advantage." (Italics mine.)

Who are these lobbyists? Men with political pull—with "access" to influential Washington figures—American men hired by foreign interests. The article mentions that most of these men are "Washington lawyers" or "New York public relations firms."

Russia is one of these foreign interests and is served by registered lobbyists in Washington; but she is merely cashing in on the situation, like the others. The success of her conspiracy in this country is the result, not the cause, of our self-destruction; she is winning by default. The cause is much deeper than that.

The issue of lobbies has attracted attention recently through the struggle of foreign lobbyists to obtain sugar quotas from the American government. "Their efforts," states the article, "were centered on Representative Harold D. Cooley, Democrat of North Carolina, chairman of the House Committee on Agriculture, who at least until this year held almost the complete power in the distribution of quotas. It has never been too clear what criteria Mr. Cooley used in allocating these quotas, and, by the same token, it is impossible to determine what was the actual effect of the lobbyists' entreaties on him."

"But in offering their services to foreign governments or sugar growers' associations, these representatives were, in effect, offering for sale their real or alleged friendship with Mr. Cooley."

This is the core and essence of the issue of lobbying—and of our foreign aid—and of a "mixed economy."

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BOOKS

*Planning for Freedom** by Ludwig von Mises

Reviewed by NATHANIEL BRANDEN

The economic essays of Ludwig von Mises are always a pleasure to read. They combine elegant simplicity with patient and devastating logical rigor. A collection of his essays and addresses, in a new, enlarged edition, has recently been published by the Libertarian Press. It is entitled *Planning for Freedom*. We recommend it enthusiastically to our readers.

The essays cover a wide range of subjects: Nazism or fascism as a variety of socialism; minimum wage rates as a cause of mass unemployment; Keynesianism as a resurrection of the theories of nineteenth-century "money cranks"; the fallacy of the belief that labor unions can raise the general standard of living; the nature of profit and loss; the dominance of collectivist teachings in our universities—to mention only a few.

In one of the most interesting essays of the book, "Profit and Loss," Mises writes:

"It is not the capital employed that creates profits and losses. Capital does not 'beget profit' as Marx thought. The capital goods as such are dead things that in themselves do not accomplish anything. If they are utilized according to a good idea, profit results. If they are utilized according to a mistaken idea, no profit, or losses, result. It is the entrepreneurial decision that creates either profit or loss. It is mental acts, the mind of the entrepreneur, from which profits ultimately originate. Profit is a product of the mind, of success in anticipating the future state of the market. It is a spiritual and intellectual phenomenon."

Elsewhere in the same essay, Mises writes:

"The average wage earner thinks that nothing else is needed to keep the social apparatus of production running and to improve and to increase output than the comparatively simple routine work assigned to him. He does not realize that the mere toil and trouble of the routinist is not sufficient. Sedulousness and skill are spent in vain if they are not directed . . . by the entrepreneur's foresight and are not aided by the capital accumulated by capitalists. The American worker is badly mistaken when he believes that his high standard of living is due to his own excellence. He is neither more industrious nor more skillful than the workers of Western Europe. He owes his superior income to the fact that his country clung to 'rugged individualism' much longer than Europe. It was his luck that the United States turned to an anti-capitalistic policy as much as forty or fifty years later than Germany. His wages are higher than those of the workers of the rest of the world because the capital equipment per head of the employee is highest in America and because the American entrepreneur was not so much restricted by crippling regimentation as his colleagues in other areas. The comparatively greater prosperity of the United States is an outcome of the fact that the New Deal did not come in 1900 or 1910, but only in 1933."

Advocates of government intervention in the economy take great pains to evade acknowledging the dictatorial nature of their proposals. But Mises never permits this issue to be forgotten. In an essay entitled "Laissez Faire or Dictatorship," he writes:

"Professor Harold Laski, the former chairman of the British Labor Party, determined the objective of planned direction of investment as 'the use of the investor's savings will be in housing rather than in cinemas.' It does not matter whether or not one agrees with the professor's personal view that better houses are more important than moving pictures. The fact is that consumers, by spending part of their money for admission to the movies, have made another choice. If the masses of Great Britain, the same people whose votes swept the Labor Party into power, were to stop patronizing the moving pictures and to spend more for comfortable homes and apartments, profit-

seeking business would be forced to invest more in building homes and apartment houses, and less in the production of swanky pictures. What Professor Laski aimed at is to defy the wishes of the consumers and to substitute his own will for theirs. He wanted to do away with the democracy of the market and to establish the absolute rule of a production czar. He might pretend that he is right from a 'higher' point of view, and that as a superman he is called upon to impose his own set of values on the masses of inferior men. But then he should have been frank enough to say so plainly."

In "Economic Teaching at the Universities," originally published in 1952, Mises recounts an incident that is strikingly timely today:

"A few years ago a House of Representatives Subcommittee on Publicity and Propaganda in the Executive Departments, under the chairmanship of Representative Forest A. Harness, investigated Federal propaganda operations. On one occasion the Committee had as a witness a government-employed doctor. When asked if his public speeches throughout the country presented both sides of the discussion touching compulsory national health insurance, this witness answered: 'I don't know what you mean by both sides.'"

Planning for Freedom is chiefly concerned with exposing the disastrous effects of government intervention in economics. As an introduction to the issues involved in capitalism versus the "mixed economy," it is an ideal companion piece to Mises' *Planned Chaos* and Henry Hazlitt's *Economics in One Lesson*.

The Pull Peddlers (from page 37)

The trouble is not that "it has never been too clear what criteria Mr. Cooley used in allocating these quotas"—but that it has never been and never can be too clear what criteria he was expected to use by the legislation that granted him these powers. No criteria can ever be defined in this context; such is the nature of non-objective law and of all economic legislation.

So long as a concept such as "the public interest" (or the "social" or "national" or "international" interest) is regarded as a valid principle to guide legislation—lobbies and pressure groups will necessarily continue to exist. Since there is no such entity as "the public," since the public is merely a number of individuals, the idea that "the public interest" supersedes private interests and rights, can have but one meaning: that the interests and rights of some individuals take precedence over the interests and rights of others.

If so, then all men and all private groups have to fight to the death for the privilege of being regarded as "the public." The government's policy has to swing like an erratic pendulum from group to group, hitting some and favoring others, at the whim of any given moment—and so grotesque a profession as lobbying (selling "influence") becomes a full-time job. If parasitism, favoritism, corruption and greed for the unearned did not exist, a "mixed economy" would bring them into existence.

Since there is no rational justification for the sacrifice of some men to others, there is no objective criterion by which such a sacrifice can be guided in practice. All "public interest" legislation (and any distribution of money taken by force from some men for the unearned benefit of others) comes down ultimately to the grant of an undefined, undefinable, non-objective, arbitrary power to some government officials.

The worst aspect of it is not that such a power can be used dishonestly, but that it cannot be used honestly. The wisest man in the world, with the purest integrity, cannot find a criterion for the just, equitable, rational application of an unjust, inequitable, irrational principle. The best that an honest official can do is to accept no material bribe for his arbitrary decision; but this does not make his decision and its consequences more just or less calamitous.

A man of clear-cut convictions is impervious to anyone's influence. But when clear-cut convictions are impossible, per-

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INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION DEPARTMENT

[Subscribers are invited to send in the questions that they find themselves unable to answer in philosophical or political discussions. As many questions as space permits will be answered. No questions will be answered by mail.]

■ Isn't everyone selfish?

Some variety of this question is often raised as an objection to those who advocate an ethics of rational self-interest. For example, it is sometimes claimed: "Everyone does what he really wants to do—otherwise, he wouldn't do it." Or: "No one ever really sacrifices himself. Since every purposeful action is motivated by some value or goal that the actor desires, one always acts selfishly, whether one knows it or not."

To untangle the intellectual confusion involved in this viewpoint, let us consider what facts of reality give rise to such an issue as selfishness versus self-sacrifice, or egoism versus altruism, and what the concept of "selfishness" means and entails.

The issue of selfishness versus self-sacrifice arises in an ethical context. Ethics is a code of values to guide man's choices and actions—the choices and actions that determine the purpose and course of his life. In choosing his actions and goals, man faces constant alternatives. In order to choose, he requires a standard of value—a purpose which his actions are to serve or at which they are to aim. "Value" presupposes an answer to the question: of value to whom and for what? What is to be the goal or purpose of a man's actions? Who is to be the intended beneficiary of his actions? Is he to hold, as his primary moral purpose, the achievement of his own life and happiness—or should his primary moral purpose be to serve the wishes and needs of others?

The clash between egoism and altruism lies in their conflicting answers to these questions. Egoism holds that man is an end in himself; altruism holds that man is a means to the ends of others. Egoism holds that, morally, the beneficiary of an action should be the person who acts; altruism holds that, morally, the beneficiary of an action should be someone other than the person who acts.

To be selfish is to be motivated by concern for one's self-interest. This requires that one consider what constitutes one's self-interest and how to achieve it—what values and goals to pursue, what principles and policies to adopt. If a man were not concerned with this question, he could not be said objectively to be concerned with or to desire his self-interest; one cannot be concerned with or desire that of which one has no knowledge.

Selfishness entails: (a) a hierarchy of values set by the standard of one's self-interest, and (b) the refusal to sacrifice a higher value to a lower one or to a non-value.

A genuinely selfish man knows that only reason can determine what is, in fact, to his self-interest, that to pursue contradictions or attempt to act in defiance of the facts of reality is self-destructive—and self-destruction is not to his self-interest. "To think, is to man's self-interest; to suspend his consciousness, is not. To choose his goals in the full context of his knowledge, his values and his life, is to man's self-interest; to act on the impulse of the moment, without regard for his long-range context, is not. To exist as a productive being, is to man's self-interest; to attempt to exist as a parasite, is not. To seek the life proper to his nature, is to man's self-interest; to seek to live as an animal, is not." (*Who is Ayn Rand?*)

Because a genuinely selfish man chooses his goals by the guidance of reason—and because the interests of rational men do not clash—other men may often benefit from his actions. But the benefit of other men is not his primary purpose or goal; his own benefit is his primary purpose and the conscious goal directing his actions.

To make this principle fully clear, let us consider an extreme example of an action which, in fact, is selfish, but which con-

ventionally might be called self-sacrificial: a man's willingness to die to save the life of the woman he loves. In what way would such a man be the beneficiary of his action?

The answer is given in *Atlas Shrugged*—in the scene when Galt, knowing he is about to be arrested, tells Dagny: "If they get the slightest suspicion of what we are to each other, they will have you on a torture rack—I mean, physical torture—before my eyes, in less than a week. I am not going to wait for that. At the first mention of a threat to you, I will kill myself and stop them right there. . . . I don't have to tell you that if I do it, it won't be an act of self-sacrifice. I do not care to live on their terms, I do not care to obey them and I do not care to see you enduring a drawn-out murder. There will be no values for me to seek after that—and I do not care to exist without values." If a man loves a woman so much that he does not wish to survive her death, if life can have nothing more to offer him at that price, then his dying to save her is not a sacrifice.

The same principle applies to a man, caught in a dictatorship, who willingly risks death to achieve freedom. To call his act a "self-sacrifice," one would have to assume that he preferred to live as a slave. The selfishness of a man who is willing to die, if necessary, fighting for his freedom, lies in the fact that he is unwilling to go on living in a world where he is no longer able to act on his own judgment—that is, a world where human conditions of existence are no longer possible to him.

The selfishness or unselfishness of an action is to be determined objectively: it is not determined by the feelings of the person who acts. Just as feelings are not a tool of cognition, so they are not a criterion in ethics.

Obviously, in order to act, one has to be moved by some personal motive; one has to "want," in some sense, to perform the action. The issue of an action's selfishness or unselfishness depends, not on whether or not one wants to perform it, but on why one wants to perform it. By what standard was the action chosen? To achieve what goal?

If a man proclaimed that he felt he would best benefit others by robbing and murdering them, men would not be willing to grant that his actions were altruistic. By the same logic and for the same reasons, if a man pursues a course of blind self-destruction, his feeling that he has something to gain by it does not establish his actions as selfish.

If, motivated solely by a sense of charity, compassion, duty or altruism, a person renounces a value, desire or goal in favor of the pleasure, wishes or needs of another person whom he values less than the thing he renounced—that is an act of self-sacrifice. The fact that a person may feel that he "wants" to do it, does not make his action selfish or establish objectively that he is its beneficiary.

Suppose, for example, that a son chooses the career he wants by rational standards, but then renounces it in order to please his mother who prefers that he pursue a different career, one that will have more prestige in the eyes of the neighbors. The boy accedes to his mother's wish because he has accepted that such is his moral duty: he believes that his duty as a son consists of placing his mother's happiness above his own, even if he knows that his mother's demand is irrational and even if he knows that he is sentencing himself to a life of misery and frustration. It is absurd for the advocates of the "everyone is selfish" doctrine to assert that since the boy is motivated by the desire to be "virtuous" or to avoid guilt, no self-sacrifice is involved and his action is really selfish. What is evaded is the question of why the boy feels and desires as he does. Emotions and desires are not causeless, irreducible primaries: they are the product of the premises one has accepted. The boy "wants" to renounce his career only because he has accepted the ethics of altruism; he believes that it is immoral to act for his self-interest. That is the principle directing his actions.

Advocates of the "everyone is selfish" doctrine do not deny that, under the pressure of the altruist ethics, men can knowingly act against their own long-range happiness. They merely assert that in some higher, undefinable sense such men are

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sonal influences take over. When a man's mind is trapped in the foggy labyrinth of the non-objective, that has no exits and no solutions, he will welcome any quasi-persuasive, semi-plausible argument. Lacking certainty, he will follow anyone's facsimile thereof. He is the natural prey of social "manipulators," of propaganda-salesmen, of lobbyists.

When any argument is as inconclusive as any other, the subjective, emotional or "human" element becomes decisive. A harried legislator may conclude, consciously or subconsciously, that the friendly man who smiled at him at the cocktail party last week was a good person who would not deceive him and whose opinion can be trusted safely. It is by considerations such as these that officials may dispose of your money, your effort and your future.

Although cases of actual corruption do undoubtedly exist among legislators and government officials, they are not a major motivating factor in today's situation. It is significant that in such cases as have been publicly exposed, the bribes were almost pathetically small. Men who held the power to dispose of millions of dollars, sold their favors for a thousand-dollar rug or a fur coat or a refrigerator.

The truth, most likely, is that they did not regard it as bribery or as a betrayal of their public trust; they did not think that their particular decision could matter one way or another, in the kind of causeless choices they had to make, in the absence of any criteria, in the midst of the general orgy of tossing away an apparently ownerless wealth. Men who would not sell out their country for a million dollars, are selling it out for somebody's smile and a vacation trip to Florida. "It is of such pennies and smiles that the destruction of your country is made."

The general public is helplessly bewildered. The "intellectuals" do not care to look at our foreign policy too closely. They feel guilt; they sense that their own worn-out ideologies, which they dare not challenge, are the cause of the consequences which they dare not face. The more they evade, the greater their eagerness to grasp at any fashionable straw or rationalization and to uphold it with glassy-eyed aggressiveness. The threadbare cloak of altruism serves to cover it up and to sanction the evasions by a fading aura of moral righteousness. The exhausted cynicism of a bankrupt culture, of a society without values, principles, convictions or intellectual standards, does the rest: it leaves a vacuum, for anyone to take over and use.

The motive power behind the suicidal bleeding of the greatest country in the world is not an altruistic fervor or a collectivist crusade any longer, but the manipulations of little lawyers and public relations men pulling the mental strings of lifeless automatons.

These—the lobbyists in the pay of foreign interests, the men who could not hope to get, in any other circumstances, the money they are getting now—are the real and only profiteers on the global sacrifice, as their ilk has always been at the close of every altruistic movement in history. It is not the "underdeveloped" nations nor the "underprivileged" masses nor the starving children of jungle villages who benefit from America's self-immolation—it is only the men who are too small to start such movements and small enough to cash in at the end.

It is not any "lofty ideal" that the altruism-collectivism doctrine accomplishes or can ever accomplish. Its end-of-trail is as follows: "A local railroad had gone bankrupt in North Dakota, abandoning the region to the fate of a blighted area, the local banker had committed suicide, first killing his wife and children—a freight train had been taken off the schedule in Tennessee, leaving a local factory without transportation at a day's notice, the factory owner's son had quit college and was now in jail, awaiting execution for a murder committed with a gang of raiders—a way station had been closed in Kansas, and the station agent, who had wanted to be a scientist, had given up his studies and become a dishwasher—that he, James Taggart, might sit in a private barroom and pay for

the alcohol pouring down Orren Boyle's throat, for the waiter who sponged Boyle's garments when he spilled his drink over his chest, for the carpet burned by the cigarettes of an ex-pimp from Chile who did not want to take the trouble of reaching for an ashtray across a distance of three feet." (*Atlas Shrugged*)

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still acting "selfishly." A definition of "selfishness" that includes or permits the possibility of knowingly acting against one's long-range happiness, is a contradiction in terms.

It is only the legacy of mysticism that permits men to imagine that they are still speaking meaningfully when they declare that one can seek one's happiness in the renunciation of one's happiness.

The basic fallacy in the "everyone is selfish" argument consists of an extraordinarily crude equivocation. It is a psychological truism—a tautology—that all purposeful behavior is motivated. But to equate "motivated behavior" with "selfish behavior" is to blank out the distinction between an elementary fact of human psychology and the phenomenon of *ethical choice*. It is to evade the central *problem* of ethics, namely: by what is man to be motivated?

A genuine selfishness—that is: a genuine concern with discovering what is to one's self-interest, an acceptance of the responsibility of achieving it, a refusal ever to betray it by acting on the blind whim, mood, impulse or feeling of the moment, an uncompromising loyalty to one's judgment, convictions and values—represents a profound moral achievement. Those who assert that "everyone is selfish" commonly intend their statement as an expression of cynicism and contempt. But the truth is that their statement pays mankind a compliment it does not deserve.

(The doctrine that man is selfish by nature is called "psychological egoism." For an interesting critique of this doctrine, treating aspects somewhat different from those discussed above, see John Hospers, *Human Conduct: an Introduction to the Problems of Ethics*, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1961, pp. 141-155.)

—NATHANIEL BRANDEN

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ Early in September, Bantam Books will publish, in paperback, a new translation of Victor Hugo's great novel *Ninety-Three*, with an introduction by Ayn Rand. The introduction deals with the issue of Romanticism in literature, and offers a philosophical evaluation of Hugo's novels.

■ NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE's fall course of lectures on "Basic Principles of Objectivism" is scheduled to begin in New York City on Tuesday, October 9, and in Philadelphia on Monday, October 15.

NBI's Tape Transcription Division has now scheduled the following starting dates for "Basic Principles of Objectivism" in other cities: Kansas City, Kansas, October 2; San Francisco, October 2; San Diego, October 4; Los Angeles, October 5; Boston, October 15; Chicago, November 2; Toronto, November 5; Washington, November 18. Mr. Branden will deliver the opening night's lecture in person in San Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles, Chicago, Toronto and Washington. Additional starting dates will be listed here next month.

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CHECK YOUR PREMISES

By AYN RAND

"To Young Scientists"

In March of this year, I gave a lecture on "The Objectivist Ethics" at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with a special introduction which I wrote for the students who are to be America's future scientists. Now, at the beginning of a new school year, I want to repeat that message, addressing it to all those who are starting out on their careers in science.

We are living in an age when every social group is struggling frantically to destroy itself—and doing it faster than any of its rivals or enemies could hope for—when every man is his own most dangerous enemy, and the whole of mankind is rolling, at supersonic speed, back to the Dark Ages, with a nuclear bomb in one hand and a rabbit's foot in the other.

The most terrible paradox of our age is the fact that the destruction of man's mind, of reason, of logic, of knowledge, of civilization, is being accomplished in the name and with the sanction of *science*.

It took centuries and volumes of writing to bring our culture to its present state of bankruptcy—and volumes would have to be written to expose, counteract and avert the disaster of a total intellectual collapse. But of all the deadly theories by means of which you are now being destroyed, I would like to warn you about one of the deadliest and most crucial: the alleged dichotomy of science and ethics.

You have heard that theory so often and from so many authorities that most of you now take it for granted, as an axiom, as the one absolute taught to you by those who proclaim that there are no absolutes. It is the doctrine that man's science and ethics—or his knowledge and values, or his body and soul—are two separate, antagonistic aspects of his existence, and that man is caught between them, as a precarious, permanent traitor to their conflicting demands.

Science, they tell you, is the province of reason—but ethics, they say, is the province of a higher power, which man's impotent, fallible intellect must not be so presumptuous as to challenge. What power? Why, *feelings*.

Before you accept that doctrine, identify concretely and specifically what it means. (Remember that ethics is a code of values to guide man's choices and actions, the choices and actions that determine the purpose and course of his life.) It means that *you*, as scientists, are competent to discover new knowledge—but not competent to judge for what purpose that knowledge is to be used. *Your* judgment is to be disqualified, if, when and *because* it is rational—while human purposes are to be determined by the representatives of non-reason. *You* are to create the means—but *they* are to choose the ends. *You* are to work and think and strain all the power, energy and ingenuity of your mind to its utmost logical best, and produce great achievements—but those "superior" others

will dispose of your achievements, by the grace and guidance of their *feelings*. Your *mind* is to be the tool and servant of their *whims*. You are to create the H-bomb—but a blustering Russian anthropoid will decide when he *feels* like dropping it and on whom. Yours is not to reason why—yours is just to do and provide the ammunition for others to die.

From Plato's *Republic* onward, all statist-collectivists have looked longingly up at an ant hill as at a social ideal to be reached. An ant hill is a society of interdependent insects, where each particular kind or class is physiologically able to perform only one specific function: some are milch cows, some are toilers, a few are rulers. Collectivist planners have dreamed for a long time of creating an ideal society by means of eugenics—by breeding men into various castes physiologically able to perform only one specific function. *Your* place, in such a society, would be that of toiling milch-brains, of human computers who would produce anything on demand and would be biologically incapable of questioning the orders of the anthropoid who'd throw them their food rations.

Does your self-esteem accept such a prospect?

No, I am not saying that that dream will ever be achieved physiologically. But I am saying that it has already been achieved politically and intellectually: politically, among your so-called colleagues in Soviet Russia—intellectually, in the mind of any man who accepts the science-ethics dichotomy.

I believe that many of you were attracted to the field of science precisely by reason of that dichotomy: in order to escape from the hysterical mystic-subjectivist-emotionalist shambles to which philosophers have reduced the field of ethics—and in order to find a clean, intelligible, rational, *objective* realm of activity.

You have not found it—not because it doesn't exist, but because it cannot be found without the help of a clean, intelligible, rational, *objective* philosophy, part of which is ethics. It cannot be found until you realize that man cannot exist as half-scientist, half-brute—that *all* the aspects of his existence are, can be and *should* be subject to the study and the judgment of his intellect—and that of all human disciplines, it is *ethics*, the discipline which sets his goals, that should be elevated into a science.

No man and no class of men can live without a code of ethics. But if there are degrees of urgency, I would say that it is *you*, the scientists, who need it most urgently. The nature of your power and of your *responsibility* is too obvious to need restatement. You can read it in every newspaper headline. It is obvious why you should know—before you start out—to what purpose and service you choose to devote the power of your mind.

If you do not care to know—well, I would like to say that there is a character in *Atlas Shrugged* who was dedicated to *you* as a warning, with the sincere hope that it would not be necessary. His name is Dr. Robert Stadler.

Many things have happened since March of this year to demonstrate the ultimate consequences of the science-ethics dichotomy.

If a professional soldier were to accept a job with Murder, Inc. and claim that he is merely practicing his trade, that it is not his responsibility to know who is using his services or for what purpose—he would be greeted by a storm of indignation and regarded as a moral psychopath. Yet at his bloodiest worst, he could not perpetrate a fraction of the horrors achieved by any haughty ascetic of science who merely places a slip of paper with some mathematical computations into the hands of Khrushchev or Mao Tse-tung or any of their imitators in America, and, having read no newspapers since 1914, declares himself to be "above the battle."

It is thus that the world reached the nightmare spectacle which surpasses any horror story of science fiction: two Soviet capsules circling in "outer space," as the alleged triumph of an advanced science—while here on earth, a young boy lies bleeding to death and screaming for help, at the foot of the wall in East Berlin, shot for attempting to escape and left there by the prehistorical monsters from 20-thousand centuries deep: the Soviet rulers.

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BOOKS

*Ninety-Three** by Victor Hugo

Reviewed by AYN RAND

[Reprinted from the Los Angeles Times of September 16.]

"Then, without haste, slowly, proudly, he stepped over the window sill, and, not turning, standing straight, his back against the rungs of the ladder, with the flames behind him and the abyss ahead, he began to descend the ladder in silence with the majesty of a phantom. . . . With each step he made toward the men whose eyes, aghast, stared at him through the darkness, he seemed to grow taller. . . .

"When he came down, when he had reached the last rung of the ladder and placed his foot on the ground, a hand fell on his shoulder. He turned.

"I arrest you," said—

"You are right." . . .

I heard this scene when I was seven years old, lying awake in the darkness, listening intently to a voice reading aloud behind the closed door of the nursery. It was my mother reading a French novel to my grandmother in the living room, and all I could hear was a few snatches. But they gave me the sense of some tremendous drama resolving events of unimaginable importance.

When people look back at their childhood or youth, their wistfulness comes from the memory, not of what their lives had been in those years, but of what life had then promised to be. The expectation of some undefinable splendor, of the unusual, the exciting, the great, is an attribute of youth—and the process of aging is the process of that expectation's gradual extinction.

One does not have to let it happen. But that fire dies for lack of fuel, under the gray weight of disappointments, when one discovers that the adults do not know what they are doing, nor care—that a person one respected is an abject coward—that a public figure one admired is a posturing mediocrity—that a literary classic one had looked forward to reading is a minute analysis of people one would not want to look at twice, like a study in depth of a mud puddle.

But there are exceptions.

I did not ask what book that scene came from, since I was not supposed to be listening. It remained in my mind as a brilliant flash; I did not expect to find it again nor to learn the mystery of such questions as who was arrested and why.

I was thirteen when I found it, with a sudden shock of recognition, in the closing chapters of a magnificent novel. It was *Ninety-Three* by Victor Hugo.

That scene was not as good as I had thought—it was better. It was incomparably better than anything I could have imagined. It was the climax of so enormous a drama, the resolution of such profound moral conflicts, that it left one stunned by the experience of what great literature is really like; after which, one does not settle for any lesser values, neither in books nor in life.

Now, some forty years later, I was asked to write an introduction for a new translation of *Ninety-Three*. It has just been published, in paperback, by Bantam Books. I almost envy the readers who can discover Hugo for the first time.

I quote from my introduction: "The distance between his world and ours is astonishingly short—he died in 1885—but the distance between his universe and ours has to be measured in esthetic light-years. . . . He is as invisible to the neo-barbarians of our age as the art of Rome was to their spiritual ancestors, and for the same reasons. Yet Victor Hugo is the greatest novelist in world literature."

The background of *Ninety-Three* is the French Revolution. The title refers to 1793, the year of the terror. The theme is that which is most signally lacking in today's culture: man's loyalty to values.

Three figures dominate the violence of a ruthless civil war: an intransigent aristocrat, who leads a royalist rebellion against the revolution—his nephew and heir, a young revolutionary who commands the republican army sent to crush the re-

bellion—an ex-priest, now a dedicated leader of the revolution, who is sent to watch the political loyalty of the young commander, his former pupil, the only man he ever loved.

Their story is told, not by the sloppy stream of an unfocused consciousness, but by the purposeful drive of a focused mind, which means: by the mounting suspense of a brilliantly integrated plot-structure.

You may read any number of more "realistic" accounts of the French Revolution, but Hugo's is the one you will remember. He is not a reporter of the momentary, but an artist who projects the essential and fundamental. He is not a statistician of gutter trivia, but a Romanticist who presents life "as it might be and ought to be." He is the worshiper and the superlative portrayer of man's greatness.

If you are struggling to hold your vision of man above the gray ashes of our century, Hugo is the fuel you need.

One cannot preserve that vision or achieve it without some knowledge of what is greatness and some image to concretize it. Every morning, when you read today's headlines, you shrink a little in human stature and hope. Then, if you turn to modern literature for a nobler view of man, you are confronted by those cases of arrested development—the juvenile delinquents aged 30 to 60—who still think that depravity is daring or shocking, and whose writing belongs, not on paper, but on fences.

If you feel, as I do, that there's nothing as boring as depravity, if you seek a glimpse of human grandeur—turn to a novel by Victor Hugo.

*The Girl Hunters** by Mickey Spillane

Reviewed by AYN RAND

[Reprinted from the Los Angeles Times of September 2.]

Mickey Spillane is one of the best writers of our time. He has won an enormous popular following—but no acknowledgment. He stands as a measure of the gulf between the public and its alleged intellectual leaders.

Being the most popular, he has suffered the most vicious injustice on the part of the "intellectuals"—which is a clue to their psychology and to the state of our culture. Like "The Untouchables," like any outstanding exponent of the Romantic school of art, he has been subjected to a sustained campaign of smears, attacks and denunciations—not for errors, but for achievements, not for flaws, but for his artistic virtues.

Most of today's "intellectuals"—the statist-collectivists, the worshippers of "the masses," the servants of "the people"—are savagely antagonistic to the people's standards and to every authentic, popular value in art.

They feel hatred for any projection of man as a clean, self-confident, efficacious being. They extol depravity; they relish the sight of man spitting in his own face. The object of their deepest hatred (and fear) is moral values. Their view of life is best symbolized by a middle-aged professor who seduces a twelve-year old girl—and whose story is treated humorously.

It is absurd that the same aesthetes, who acclaim the above obscenity as "adult" and "artistic," should voice concern over the "immoral" influence of Mickey Spillane.

They allege that "sex and violence" are the cause of his popular appeal. What they hate him for is the fact that Mickey Spillane is an intransigent moral crusader.

Detective fiction presents, in simple, primitive essentials, the conflict of good and evil; that is the root of its appeal. Mickey Spillane is a moral absolutist. His characterizations are excellent and drawn in black-and-whites; there are no slippery half-tones, no cowardly evasions, no cynicism—and no forgiveness; there are no doubts about the evil of evil.

Spillane's view of life has a strong element of tragic bitterness: he projects the belief that evil is powerful (a view with which I do not agree), but that man has the capacity to fight

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* Published by E. P. Dutton & Co., \$3.50.

Both books are available from NBL BOOK SERVICE, INC., 165 East 35th St., New York 16, N. Y., for a combined discount price of \$3.75. Separately, *The Girl Hunters* is \$3.15. *Ninety-Three* is \$1.00 (includes postage and handling). N. Y. C. residents add 3% sales tax.

INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION DEPARTMENT

[Subscribers are invited to send in the questions that they find themselves unable to answer in philosophical or political discussions. As many questions as space permits will be answered. No questions will be answered by mail.]

■ Does man possess instincts?

The function which the concept of "demon" served for the primitive savage and the concept of "God" serves for the theologian, is served for many psychologists by the concept of "instinct"—a term denoting nothing scientifically intelligible, while creating the illusion of causal understanding. What a savage could not comprehend, he "explained" by postulating a demon; what a theologian cannot comprehend, he "explains" by postulating a God; what many psychologists cannot comprehend, they "explain" by postulating an instinct.

Instinct theory enjoyed an enormous vogue in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and in the early years of the twentieth. Although its influence has been declining for the past several decades, it is still a major pillar of the Freudian school of psychoanalysis.

Observing certain types of behavior which they believed to be characteristic of the human species, instinct theorists decided that the cause of such behavior is innate, unchosen and unlearned tendencies which drive man to act as he does. Thus, they spoke of a survival instinct, a parental instinct, an acquisitive instinct, a pugnacity instinct, and so forth. They seldom attempted to define precisely what they understood an instinct to be; still less did they trouble to explain how it functioned; predominantly, they vied with one another in compiling lists of the instincts their particular theory presumed man to possess, promising to account thereby for the ultimate sources of all human action.

That mysterious force, "instinct," is not a thought or an action or an emotion or a need. The attempt, on the part of some theorists, to identify an instinct as a "compound reflex" has been recognized as unsupportable and has collapsed. A reflex is a specific, definable neuro-physiological phenomenon, the existence of which is empirically demonstrable; it is not a dumping-ground for un-understood behavior. Today, the concept of "instinct" remains as obscure as when it was first introduced into psychology.

To account for man's actions in terms of undefinable "instincts" is to contribute nothing to human knowledge: it is only to confess that one does not know why man acts as he does. To observe that men engage in sexual activities and to conclude that man has a "sex instinct"—to observe that men pursue food when they are hungry and to conclude that man has a "hunger instinct"—to observe that some men act destructively and to conclude that man has a "destructive instinct"—to observe that men usually seek out one another's company and to conclude that man has a "gregarious instinct"—is to explain nothing. It is merely to place oneself in the same psycho-epistemological category as the physician in the anecdote who "explains" to a distraught mother that the reason why her child will not drink milk is that "the child is just not a milk-drinker."

The history of instinct theory, in the past fifty years, is the history of intense efforts, on the part of its supporters, to twist the meaning of their formulations, of language and of the facts of reality, in order to protect their doctrines from science's growing recognition that traits and activities alleged to be "instinctive" are either: (a) not universal to the species, but are the product of particular men's acquired attitudes or beliefs, as in the case of pugnacity; or (b) the product of simple reflexes, such as a baby's sucking reflex; and/or (c) the product of learning, such as sexual behavior. (The sexual need, of course, is innate; but a need is not an "instinct.")

The concept of "instinct" was first used to account for complex patterns of animal behavior, such as migratory, mating and maternal behavior, that appeared inexplicable. But

the concept is no less misleading when applied to animals. "Instincts" explain nothing. An excellent example of the type of analysis, in this sphere, that is replacing "explanation via instincts" may be found in Morgan and Stellar's *Physiological Psychology* (McGraw-Hill, 1950, pp. 402-417). Discussing the migratory behavior of salmon, the authors write:

"Their place of birth and early growth is far up in the headwaters of streams. In their second year they migrate downstream to the ocean and there spend two or three years. After that they reenter the river, usually the one from which they came, and proceed up the river and its tributaries to its headwaters. There they spawn and die. . . . The question is how they do it.

"The first phase of migration is controlled by light. The salmon has some photosensitive receptors deep in its skin. . . . In the young salmon these receptors are first covered by a layer of pigment, but gradually the pigment is lost. Then, of course, the photosensitive receptors are stimulated and the fish reacts negatively, i.e., avoids light. Since the upper streams are shallow, this light-avoidance reaction eventually takes the salmon downstream to the deep ocean, where it gets away from a lot of light. Because the waters of the river emptying into the ocean are somewhat colder, contain somewhat more oxygen, and are less salty, the salmon tends to stay in the general region of the ocean into which the river runs.

"Eventually the salmon matures sexually and its gonads put out more sex hormones. These raise its activity and probably its general metabolism, which in turn leads it to choose the colder and more oxygenated water at the mouth of the river. Once the salmon gets back into the river it has a strong tendency to swim against the current, a reaction known as a *rheotropism*. As the fish swims upstream and comes to each branch of the river, it chooses the one that is colder. . . . The salmon arrives eventually at one of the headwaters of the stream, usually the one that is coldest. There it lays its eggs and dies, thus closing one cycle and beginning another. Because of the factor of temperature in the route of migration upstream, it turns out that salmon tend to return to the same places in which they were born. Thus what may seem to be a mysterious instinct or a phenomenal memory for their places of birth is really a matter of reaction to particular stimuli in their environment."

Now consider the nature of human behavior.

Man is born with needs, but he is not born with a knowledge of those needs or a knowledge of how to satisfy them. The needs of man as an organism are those things required by his nature for his survival and well-being. Man is born with a need for food, shelter and clothing, for instance—but until his mind has recognized these needs, until it has chosen food, shelter and clothing as values and learned how they can be obtained, his body will not proceed to obtain them. His body does not act "by instinct." It does not have the power to pursue goals of its own volition, independent of man's consciousness, knowledge and values.

All purposeful action aims at the achievement of a value. If a man performs the action of plowing a field, it is because he considers the plowed field a value; if he conducts a scientific experiment, it is because he considers the experiment a value; if he purchases an automobile, it is because he considers the automobile a value; if he takes a walk for the sheer pleasure of bodily motion, it is because he considers the pleasure of bodily motion a value; if he writes a treatise, it is because he has a value to gain: the objectification of his ideas and their communication to other minds. *Value* and *action* imply and necessitate each other; it is in the nature of a value that action is required to achieve and/or maintain it; it is in the nature of a consciously initiated action that its motive and purpose is the achievement and/or maintenance of a value.

But values are not innate. Man does not possess them at birth. At birth, man's mind is *tabula rasa*. Having no innate knowledge of what is true or false, man can have no innate knowledge of what is good for him or evil. Just as his knowledge must be acquired, so his values must be chosen.

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* Published by Bantam Books, 75¢.

If such a thing as an "instinct" could exist, it could be only some sort of innate, automatic knowledge, some sort of "frozen intelligence" inscribed in the nervous system at birth. Instinct theory thus amounts to a resurrection of the doctrine of innate ideas, which has been thoroughly discredited by both philosophy and biology, as a legacy of mysticism.

Unsatisfied, unfilled needs can set up a state of tension or disquietude or pain in man, thus prompting him to seek biologically appropriate activity, such as protecting himself against the elements. But the necessity of learning what is the appropriate activity cannot be by-passed.

Man must discover that the pain in his stomach is his body's reaction to lack of nourishment, he must discover that food will provide that nourishment, he must discover that food may be obtained by hunting or planting seed; he possesses no "hunger instinct" to provide him with this knowledge automatically and to send him in pursuit of that which he does not yet know he needs.

His body provides him only with signals of pain or pleasure; but it does not tell him their causes, it does not tell him how to alleviate one or achieve the other. That must be learned by his mind.

Man must discover the actions his life requires; he has no "instinct of self-preservation." It was not an "instinct" that taught man to make fire, to build bridges, to perform surgery, to design a telescope: it was his capacity to think. And if a man chooses not to think—if he chooses to risk his life in senseless dangers, to close his eyes rather than open his mind at the sight of any problem, to seek escape from consciousness in alcohol or drugs, to act in willfully stubborn defiance of his own objective self-interest—he has no "instinct" that will force his mind to function, no "instinct" that will compel him to value his life sufficiently to perform the one act that can protect and maintain it: the act of reasoning.

Man possesses a nature: as a living organism of a specific kind, he has specific needs and capacities. But how well his needs will be satisfied and to what extent his capacities will be used in the service of his life, depends, not on his "instincts," but on his knowledge, his premises and his rationality.

As members of the same species, confronted with the same reality, men perform many actions that appear to be virtually universal. But the universality of an action is not proof that it represents an unlearned, unchosen "innate tendency"—whatever this might mean.

The concept of "instinct" is disastrous to scientific theory, because—by offering a *pseudo*-explanation—it halts further inquiry and thus stands as an obstacle to a genuine understanding of the causes of human behavior.

But its practical consequences for psychology—particularly in the field of psychotherapy—are still more tragic.

Orthodox psychoanalysis, the chief stronghold of instinct theory today, has—in its interpretation of neurosis via "instincts and their vicissitudes"—virtually resurrected the doctrine of Original Sin. Psychoanalysis teaches that the source of man's suffering lies, not in Adam, but in one's "instincts"—that one is born with a racially-inherited sewer of irrational impulses and immoral drives, that mental illness is the result of one's inability to escape (through successful repression and sublimation) one's innate desires for murder, rape and incest, and that mental health begins with the admission that such desires are inherent in one's nature as man.

Persons suffering from a neurosis—from anxiety, compulsions, masochism, homosexuality—commonly experience the desperately hopeless sense that their problems are insoluble, that their neurosis is an intrinsic part of them, that there is no escape from it. The theory of an "id," or any equivalent view of human motivation in terms of inherited "instincts," is scarcely calculated to discourage such a feeling. Yet to combat that feeling is the first task of successful psychotherapy.

Patients caught in the bewildering and frightening grip of emotions and desires whose cause they cannot understand, need to learn that the cause lies in their conscious or sub-

conscious premises; that those premises were acquired, not innate; and that irrational or mistaken premises can be corrected and changed.

Instinct theory is incompatible with a scientific system of psychology. A scientific psychology must discard it as the last, dying convulsion of medieval demonology.

—NATHANIEL BRANDEN

War and Peace

By AYN RAND

[Reprinted from the Los Angeles Times of June 24.]

One of the ugliest characteristics of today's world is the mixture of frantic war preparations with hysterical peace propaganda, and the fact that *both come from the same source*—from the same political philosophy. If mankind is ever to achieve peace, the first step will be made when people realize that today's peace movements are *not* advocates of peace.

Professing love and concern for the survival of mankind, these movements keep screaming that nuclear weapons have made war too horrible to contemplate, that armed force and violence should be abolished as a means of settling disputes among nations, and that war should be outlawed in the name of humanity. Yet these same peace movements do not oppose dictatorships; the political views of their members range through all shades of the statist spectrum, from "welfare statism" to socialism to communism. This means that these movements are opposed to the use of coercion by one nation against another, but not by the government of a nation against its own citizens; it means that they are opposed to the use of force and violence against *armed* adversaries, but not against the *disarmed*.

Under any political system, in any organized society, the government holds a legal monopoly on the use of physical force. That is the crucial difference between a government and any private organization. Private individuals or groups deal with one another peacefully, by means of trade, persuasion, discussion and voluntary agreements; they cannot resort to force; those who do, are criminals—and it is the proper duty of the government to restrain them.

In a free, civilized society, the use of physical force is outlawed by the recognition of men's inalienable, individual rights. The power of the government is limited by law to the role of a policeman that protects men's rights and uses force only against those who initiate its use. This is the basic political principle of the only social system that banishes force from human relationships: *laissez-faire* capitalism.

But a statist system—whether of a communist, fascist, Nazi, socialist or "welfare" type—is based on the opposite principle: on the government's unlimited power, which means: on the rule of brute force. The differences among statist systems are only a matter of time and degree; the principle is the same. Under statism, the government is not a policeman, but a legalized criminal that holds the power to use physical force in any manner and for any purpose it pleases against legally disarmed, defenseless victims.

Nothing can ever justify so monstrously evil a theory. Nothing can justify the horror, the brutality, the plunder, the destruction, the starvation, the slave-labor camps, the torture chambers, the wholesale slaughter of statist dictatorships. Yet *this* is what today's alleged peace-lovers are willing to advocate or tolerate—in the name of love for humanity.

Statism is a system of institutionalized violence and perpetual civil war, that leaves men no choice but to fight to seize power over one another. In a full dictatorship, that civil war takes the form of bloody purges, as in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. In a "mixed economy," it takes the form of "pressure group" warfare, each group fighting for legislation to extort its own advantages by force from all other groups.

Statism is nothing more than gang rule. A statist dictatorship is a gang devoted to looting the effort of the productive

citizens of its own country. When statist rulers exhaust their own country's economy and run out of loot, they attack their neighbors. All the major wars of history were started by the more controlled economies of the time against the freer ones. For instance, World War I was started by monarchist Germany and Czarist Russia, which were "mixed economies" of a predominantly statist kind. World War II was started by the alliance of Nazi Germany with Soviet Russia and their joint attack on Poland.

Observe that in World War II, Germany and Russia dismantled entire factories in conquered countries, to ship them home—while the freest one of the "mixed economies," the semi-capitalistic United States, sent billions worth of lend-lease equipment, including entire factories, to its allies. Germany and Russia needed war; the United States did not and gained nothing. Yet it is capitalism that today's peace-lovers oppose and statism that they advocate—in the name of peace.

There is no moral justification for the vicious doctrine that some men have the right to rule others by force. But so long as men continue to believe that some sort of alleged "noble purpose" can justify it—violence, bloodshed and wars will continue.

It is true that nuclear weapons have made wars too horrible to contemplate. But it makes no difference to a man whether he is killed by a nuclear bomb or is led to a Nazi gas chamber or a Soviet firing squad, with no voices raised to defend him. Will such a man feel any love or concern for the survival of mankind? Or will he be more justified in feeling that a cannibalistic mankind, which tolerates dictatorships, does not deserve to survive?

Let those who are seriously concerned with peace, those who do love *man* and do care about his survival, realize that war cannot be outlawed by lawless statist thugs and that it is not war but *force* that has to be outlawed.

"Through Your Most Grievous Fault"

By AYN RAND

[Reprinted from the Los Angeles Times of August 19.]

The death of Marilyn Monroe shocked people, with an impact different from their reaction to the death of any other movie star or public figure. All over the world, people felt a peculiar sense of personal involvement and of protest, like a universal cry of "Oh, no!"

They felt that her death had some special significance, almost like a warning which they could not decipher—and they felt a nameless apprehension, the sense that something terribly wrong was involved.

They were right to feel it.

Marilyn Monroe, on the screen, was an image of pure, innocent, childlike joy in living. She projected the sense of a person born and reared in some radiant Utopia, untouched by suffering, unable to conceive of ugliness or evil, facing life with the confidence, the benevolence and the joyous self-flaunting of a child or a kitten who is happy to display its own attractiveness as the best gift it can offer the world, and who expects to be admired for it, not hurt.

In real life, Marilyn Monroe's probable suicide—or worse: a death that might have been an accident, suggesting that, to her, the difference did not matter—was a declaration that we live in a world which made it impossible for her kind of spirit, and for the things she represented, to survive.

If there ever was a victim of society, Marilyn Monroe was that victim—of a society that professes dedication to the relief of the suffering, but kills the joyous.

None of the objects of the humanitarians' tender solicitude, the juvenile delinquents, could have had so sordid and horrifying a childhood as did Marilyn Monroe.

To survive it and to preserve the kind of spirit she projected on the screen—the radiantly benevolent sense of life, which cannot be faked—was an almost inconceivable psychological achievement that required a heroism of the highest

order. Whatever scars her past had left were insignificant by comparison.

She preserved her vision of life through a nightmare struggle, fighting her way to the top. What broke her was the discovery, at the top, of as sordid an evil as the one she had left behind—worse, perhaps, because incomprehensible. She had expected to reach the sunlight; she found, instead, a limitless swamp of malice.

It was a malice of a very special kind. If you want to see her groping struggle to understand it, read the magnificent article in a recent issue of *Life* magazine. It is not actually an article, it is a verbatim transcript of her own words—and the most tragically revealing document published in many years. It is a cry for help, which came too late to be answered.

"When you're famous, you kind of run into human nature in a raw kind of way," she said. "It stirs up envy, fame does. People you run into feel that, well, who is she—who does she think she is, Marilyn Monroe? They feel fame gives them some kind of privilege to walk up to you and say anything to you, you know, of any kind of nature—and it won't hurt your feelings—like it's happening to your clothing. . . . I don't understand why people aren't a little more generous with each other. I don't like to say this, but I'm afraid there is a lot of envy in this business."

"Envy" is the only name she could find for the monstrous thing she faced, but it was much worse than envy: it was the profound hatred of life, of success and of all human values, felt by a certain kind of mediocrity—the kind who feels pleasure on hearing about a stranger's misfortune. It was hatred of the good for being the good—hatred of ability, of beauty, of honesty, of earnestness, of achievement and, above all, of human joy.

Read the *Life* article to see how it worked and what it did to her:

An eager child, who was rebuked for her eagerness—"Sometimes the [foster] families used to worry because I used to laugh so loud and so gay; I guess they felt it was hysterical."

A spectacularly successful star, whose employers kept repeating: "Remember you're not a star," in a determined effort, apparently, not to let her discover her own importance.

A brilliantly talented actress, who was told by the alleged authorities, by Hollywood, by the press, that she could not act.

An actress, dedicated to her art with passionate earnestness—"When I was 5—I think that's when I started wanting to be an actress—I loved to play. I didn't like the world around me because it was kind of grim—but I loved to play house and it was like you could make your own boundaries"—who went through hell to make her own boundaries, to offer people the sunlit universe of her own vision—"It's almost having certain kinds of secrets for yourself that you'll let the whole world in on only for a moment, when you're acting"—but who was ridiculed for her desire to play serious parts.

A woman, the only one, who was able to project the glowingly innocent sexuality of a being from some planet uncorrupted by guilt—who found herself regarded and ballyhooed as a vulgar symbol of obscenity—and who still had the courage to declare: "We are all born sexual creatures, thank God, but it's a pity so many people despise and crush this natural gift."

A happy child who was offering her achievement to the world, with the pride of an authentic greatness and of a kitten depositing a hunting trophy at your feet—who found herself answered by concerted efforts to negate, to degrade, to ridicule, to insult, to destroy her achievement—who was unable to conceive that it was her best she was punished for, not her worst—who could only sense, in helpless terror, that she was facing some unspeakable kind of evil.

How long do you think a human being could stand it?

That hatred of values has always existed in some people, in any age or culture. But a hundred years ago, they would have been expected to hide it. Today, it is all around us; it is the style and fashion of our century.

Where would a sinking spirit find relief from it?

The evil of a cultural atmosphere is made by all those who share it. Anyone who has ever felt resentment against the good for being the good and has given voice to it, is the murderer of Marilyn Monroe.

"To Young Scientists" (from page 41)

No, this is not the worst evil on today's earth; there is one still worse: the conscience of those Western scientists who are still willing to associate on civilized terms with those colleagues of theirs who champion unilateral disarmament.

If you are now starting on a career in science, you do not have to share the guilt of those men, but you do have to reclaim the field and the honor of science.

There is only one way to do it: by accepting the moral principle that one does not surrender one's mind into blind servitude to thugs, and one does not accept the job of munitions-maker for Attila's conquest of the world; not for any Attila, actual or potential, foreign or domestic.

There is only one way to implement that principle. Throughout history, with only a few exceptions, governments have claimed the "right" to rule men by means of physical force, that is: by terror and destruction. When the potential of terror and destruction reaches today's scale, it should convince every human being that if mankind is to survive, Attila's concept of government must be discarded, along with the alleged "right" of any men to impose their ideas or wishes on others by initiating the use of physical force. This means that men must establish a free, noncoercive society, where the government is only a policeman protecting individual rights, where force is used only in retaliation and self-defense, where no gang can seize the legalized power to unleash a reign of terror. Such a society does not have to be invented: it has existed, though not fully. Its name is capitalism.

Needless to say, capitalism does not force individuals or nations into the collectivist slave pen of a world government. The so-called One World is merely "one neck ready for one leash." Capitalism leaves men free for self-defense, but gives no one the political means to initiate force or war.

This—not physical, but political disarmament, the renunciation of legalized brute force as a way of life—is the only means of saving the world from nuclear destruction.

The Girl Hunters (from page 42)

it and that no allowances, concessions or compromises are morally conceivable or possible (with which I do agree). His hero, Mike Hammer, is a moral avenger, passionately dedicated to justice, to the defense of the wronged and to the destruction of evil.

That bitter, but intensely moralistic view of life is the key to the secret of Mickey Spillane's unparalleled popularity throughout the world. He is the true voice of the people, in the twentieth century. Men everywhere feel trapped by the spread of an uncontested, incomprehensible evil. They have borne so much injustice, seen so many cynically indifferent faces and stored so much frustrated indignation, that the image of Mike Hammer becomes their embodied dream, like an answer to the cry for help they are too inarticulate to utter.

As a writer, Mickey Spillane has a brilliant literary talent. Few modern writers can approach his originality, his imagination, his sense of drama, the ingenuity of his plot-structures. His style is uneven, not yet fully disciplined; but his best passages are literarily superior to the work of most of today's so-called "serious" writers.

All these values can be enjoyed again in *The Girl Hunters*—a new novel by Mickey Spillane, which brings Mike Hammer back after an absence of ten years. It will be published on September 27.

One expects the unexpected from Mickey Spillane—and one gets it. The story opens with Mike Hammer as a drunken bum who has gone to pieces under the pressure of self-reproach for a tragic disaster. What caused it and what brings him back, you will have to find out for yourself.

Though beautifully written and extremely dramatic, Mike Hammer as a bum is somewhat out of character—and here is one admirer of Mike's who objects to it—but, fortunately, his recovery is fairly speedy. It is also somewhat out of character for Mickey Spillane to keep reminding Mike that he's not what he used to be—because he is. Both of them are. The old vitality, the energy, the pace, the excitement come breaking through, almost in spite of the author's intention.

I almost wish Mike would tell Mickey that it would take a much worse man than he, Mickey, is, to keep Mike Hammer down.

The Girl Hunters is not fully up to the standard of Spillane's best novels, *The Long Wait* and *One Lonely Night*. It is marred by an oddly inconclusive ending, after a brilliantly sustained suspense. The mystery is solved, but the story is not fully consummated dramatically; it seems to demand a sequel—and if this was the author's intention, then he fully succeeded in arousing the readers' interest.

There is a certain air of maturity about this novel, which is both a virtue and a flaw. It is a virtue in respect to Spillane's style, which has become more polished and more controlled. It is a flaw in respect to a certain stress of bitterness: a faint overconcern with the psychology of hatred, a faint dimming of adventurous enjoyment.

"Maturity" is a slightly disturbing concept when applied to Spillane. Maturity of technique is always a value. But maturity of spirit can have many meanings, some of them undesirable. And in spirit—in the sense of life they have created, in their exuberant energy, in the spontaneous enthusiasm they project and evoke—both Mike Hammer and Mickey Spillane should remain timeless young.

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ Ayn Rand's column for the *Los Angeles Times* will be syndicated nationally by the Times-Mirror Co. The general release date will be announced shortly. If you would like the column to appear in your city, write the editors of your local newspapers.

■ On October 2, Ayn Rand will begin a new weekly half-hour radio program for the Columbia University station WKCR (89.9 on your FM dial). Entitled "Ayn Rand on Campus," the program will be heard every Tuesday, at 8:30 P.M. It will present talks by Miss Rand and discussions with guest speakers. The program will be syndicated and will be available to radio stations at a nominal charge. If you would like to hear it in your city, ask your local stations to contact WKCR, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y.

■ In addition to the cities listed here last month, NBI's Tape Transcription Division has scheduled the following cities and starting dates for "Basic Principles of Objectivism": Winnipeg, October 4; St. Louis, October 7; Newark, Delaware, October 16; Buffalo, November 13.

■ On October 11, Nathaniel Branden will address the Ayn Rand Literary Club of New York University. His lecture will be based on several of his articles which have appeared in THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER. Time: 3 P.M. Place: Washington Square Room, Loeb Student Center, New York University at Washington Square. Public invited, admission free.

■ A reminder to New York students of NBI: "Basic Principles of Objectivism" begins October 9, 7:30 P.M., at the Hotel Roosevelt; "Basic Principles of Objectivist Psychology" begins October 18, 7:30 P.M., at the Biltmore Hotel.

■ On October 26, Ayn Rand will address the annual meeting of The American Society for Aesthetics. The three-day meeting will be held in Boston and Cambridge, Thursday, October 25 through Saturday, October 27. Miss Rand will speak on Friday, 8 P.M., in the Fogg Museum Auditorium of Harvard University. Her topic: "Art as Sense of Life." Prof. John Hoppers will comment on her paper. Public invited, admission free.

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Social Metaphysics

By NATHANIEL BRANDEN

There is an invisible killer loose in the world. It has claimed more victims than any other disease in history. Yet most of its symptoms are commonly regarded as normal. That is the secret of its deadliness.

These symptoms may be observed all around one: in the lives of all those who are dominated by an obsessive concern with gaining the approval and avoiding the disapproval of their fellow men; who lack a self-generated sense of personal identity and who feel themselves to be metaphysical outcasts, cut off from reality; whose first impulse, when confronted with an issue or called upon to pass a judgment, is to ask not "What is true?" but "What do others say is true?"; who have no firm, unyielding concept of existence, reality, facts, as apart from the judgments, beliefs, opinions, feelings of others.

When one understands the nature and causes of this phenomenon, one will understand why, for instance, the typical fate of an innovator is to be attacked, opposed and denounced by the society of his time; or why men are willing to follow blindly teachings and precepts that lead them to destruction; or why the line of poetry that best captures the inner sense of life of most men is "a stranger and afraid in a world I never made."

To understand this phenomenon, one must begin by considering three basic facts about human nature:

(1) *Man is a rational being.* Man's defining characteristic, which distinguishes him from all other living species, is his ability to think—to extend the range of his awareness beyond the perceptual concretes immediately confronting him—to rise to the conceptual level of consciousness—to abstract, to integrate, to grasp principles—to plan and act long-range.

(2) *Reason is man's basic means of survival.* At birth, man's mind is *tabula rasa*. Man has no innate knowledge of what is true or false, good or evil, conducive or inimical to his welfare, no innate knowledge of what values to select and what goals to pursue. He needs such knowledge in order to deal with reality successfully, in order to live—and only reason can provide it.

(3) *Man is a being of volitional consciousness.* Man's sensory-perceptual mechanism functions automatically; his conceptual faculty does not. Man must initiate, sustain and direct the process of reasoning—by volitional, self-generated effort.

These facts impose a solemn responsibility on man. Since his rational faculty does not function automatically, man must choose to initiate a reasoning process, he must choose to check and test his conclusions by constant observation and by a rigorous process of logic, and he must choose to be guided by his rational judgment. Since his consciousness is not infallible, he can make an error at any step of the way; if he leaves the error uncorrected and acts on it, he will be acting against reality—and suffering and self-destruction will be the result.

There are two ways, in essence, that a man can respond to these facts and to the responsibility they entail: he can accept

and welcome them—or he can resent and dread them. The first response can lead to the achievement of self-esteem; the second—to neurosis.

Self-esteem is confidence in one's ability to deal with reality. If a man takes pleasure in the act of thinking, of developing the efficacy of his consciousness, of expanding the range of his knowledge, of choosing rational values and working for their achievement—that is: if he lives and acts as his nature requires—self-esteem will be the psychological result.

If a man seeks escape from this responsibility, if he evades the effort of thought, prefers a state of mental fog and drifts at the mercy of his blind feelings, he defaults on the process of proper human growth, sabotages his intellectual development and the efficacy of his consciousness—and sentences himself to the mounting terror of feeling that he is inadequate to and unfit for existence.

This state is not reached in a day, a week or a month; it is the cumulative result of a long succession of defaults, evasions and irrationalities—a long succession of failures to use one's mind properly.

Confronted with the choice to initiate the mental effort needed to pursue knowledge, to focus his mind, to think—or not to bother—the irrationalist characteristically chooses not to bother, particularly if crucial issues are at stake.

Confronted with the choice to stand by the judgment of his mind or to act on a wish he knows to be irrational, he characteristically sticks by his wish and defies his mind, invalidating its judgment.

Confronted with the choice between his own understanding and the assertions of others, he characteristically abandons his own understanding, finding it "safer" to pass the responsibility of judgment to others.

In all such cases, the basic choice involved is the same: to think or not to think.

There is no escape from the facts of reality, no escape from man's nature or the manner of survival his nature requires. Every living species that possesses awareness can survive only by the guidance of its consciousness; that is the role and function of consciousness in a living organism: to gain the knowledge needed to live. If a man rejects his distinctive form of consciousness, if he decides that thinking is too much effort, that choosing the values needed to guide his actions is too frightening a responsibility—then, if he wants to survive, he can do so only by means of the consciousness of others: by means of their perceptions, their judgments, their values.

He knows that he does not know what to do and that knowledge is required to make decisions in the face of the countless alternatives that confront him every day of his life. But others seem to know how to live, others have survived and are surviving around him, so the only way to survive, he feels, is to follow their lead and live by their knowledge; they know—they will spare him the risk and the effort; they know—somehow, they possess control of that mysterious unknowable: reality. He does not have to perceive the world as it is, and assume the responsibility of judgment; instead, he can look at people, watch what they do, guess what they see, get attuned to their manner of thinking and develop a skill for a special sight: *the world as perceived by others*.

Thus he is led to shape his soul in the image of a parasite inconceivable in other living species: not a parasite of body, but of consciousness.

What he seeks is not material support—some men of this type are financial moochers, but they are comparatively a minority, and the state of being a material parasite is only the consequence of a deeper, mental cause. He seeks a consciousness other than his own to replace the mind he has chosen to discard, he is begging humanity at large to take care of him on a level deeper than financial: to tell him how to live. This means: to set his goals, to choose his values, to prescribe his actions—never to leave him alone, at the mercy of his own unreliable mind. He may be willing to work, to obey and even to think (within a limited square), if others will assume responsibility for his ultimate direction.

A man of self-esteem and sovereign consciousness deals with reality, with nature, with an objective universe of facts; he holds his mind as his tool of survival and develops his

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In 1920, after three years of Bolshevik rule, Russia was in chaos and the enslaved population was starving. Facing the economic havoc wrought by his government, Lenin declared: "Our program was right in theory, but impracticable."

In 1962, after 45 years of Bolshevik rule, Russia is widely believed to be a scientific and industrial rival of the United States and a military threat to the free world. Bolshevik theory, it is alleged, has somehow been made "practicable."

How?

In *East Minus West = Zero*, German historian Werner Keller gives the answer: by communist parasitism on the very capitalist system declared to be its mortal enemy, a parasitism which was—and still is—aided and abetted by the capitalists themselves.

The first architects of communist economic development, as this richly documented industrial-scientific history of Russia reveals, were businessmen. In 1921, Lenin launched a "New Economic Policy" and offered Westerners generous "concessions" in exchange for the rapid industrialization of Russia. English, German, Italian, Swedish, Danish and American firms "took the bait," as Mr. Keller puts it, and rushed to provide the new communist nation with airfields and railroads, with gold, copper and iron-mining installations, with ship, textile and aircraft factories, with oil refineries.

The most ambitious contributions to the "noble experiment" came from America. Replicas of complex American production centers were assembled, shipped and installed, like gigantic do-it-yourself-kits, in the heart of the primitive Russian wasteland. The Cleveland firm of Arthur G. Mackee provided the equipment for huge steel plants at Magnitogorsk; John K. Calder of Detroit equipped and installed the material for tractor plants at Chelyabinsk; Henry Ford and the Austin Company provided all the elements for a major automobile works at Gorki; Col. Hugh Cooper, creator of the Muscle Shoals dam, planned and built the giant hydroelectric installation of Dnieprostroi. The grandiose "Bolshevik achievements" of the 1930's—which glorified communism throughout the world—were all achievements of American capitalism.

Despite this artificial force-feeding, Russia remained industrially impotent, its peasant populace unable to understand, maintain or operate the complex transplants of capitalism. "We smashed a great deal of machinery," a grinning Khrushchev was to tell the world many years later.

Before the decade was up, the "Bolshevik colossus" was twice invaded by Finland, and, by 1941, Russia was desperately begging the West for aid against Hitler's armies. Again, capitalists rushed to save the collapsing communist dictatorship.

Under Lend-Lease, writes Mr. Keller, "the immense industrial potential of the United States was put freely at the disposal of the Soviet Union." Between 1941 and 1945, a vast flood of goods was flown and shipped to Russia: raw materials, machinery, tools, complete industrial plants, spare parts, textiles, clothing, tinned meat, sugar, flour and fats, as well as purely military supplies such as arms, trucks, tanks, aircraft and gasoline.

Lend-Lease was granted in the form of an interest-free loan, but not one cent has ever been repaid. It turned out to be an involuntary "gift" from capitalism to communism—a "gift" estimated at the incredible sum of \$10,800,000,000.

While the communists were buying the fruits of capitalism, and begging them, they were also stealing them. Mr. Keller provides an extensive review of Russia's record during the 1920's and 30's: expropriation of foreign companies, ruthless breaking of contracts, stealing of patents, industrial espionage.

* Published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, \$6.95. Available from NBL BOOK SERVICE, INC., 165 East 35th St., New York 16, N. Y., for \$5.75 (N.Y.C. residents add 3% sales tax; outside the U. S., add 15¢).

Edith Efron is a journalist whose articles have appeared in such publications as Life, Look, and The New York Times Magazine.

But the most important sections of this book are those that provide documentation on the policy of world-wide stealing and looting which has been carried out systematically by the Russian government since the 1940's.

Throughout the war, writes Mr. Keller, America was "a veritable Eldorado for spies." Under the complaisant eye of the Roosevelt Administration, Russian Lend-Lease agents stole materials in astronomical quantities: classified documents, technical blueprints, military inventions, machinery and materials such as uranium and heavy water. They packed them into mammoth crates marked "diplomatic mail" and flew them to Russia by airlift.

"Nothing was done to stop the spies," writes Mr. Keller. "The government watched the activities of the Soviet agents with incredible tolerance. . . . The Americans themselves provided the transportation in which the Russians carried away the fruits of the most spectacular campaign of robbery ever undertaken."

The most calamitous theft of the period was Russia's rifling of the secrets of the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb from American and British laboratories, with the aid of such spies as Fuchs, May, the Rosenbergs and Greenglass.

After the war, the communist dictatorship, protected by private agreements between Roosevelt and Stalin, plundered the bodies of the conquered nations with the rapacity of Attila. Russia collected "loot, loot on an unprecedented scale, loot from Europe and from the Far East"; from Manchuria: almost all the Japanese heavy industry, valued at \$858,000,000; from the satellite states: minerals, machinery, petroleum and foodstuffs "in such quantities as to bring them to the verge of bankruptcy"; from Germany: iron and steel works, chemical works, shipyards, motor car factories, electric power stations, railway networks, armaments factories and the huge, underground V-2 works. Forty-one percent of Germany's industrial equipment was dismantled, packed and transported to Russia. Officially, Russia was awarded war damages totaling \$10,000,000,000, which Germany paid. The property stolen in addition, says Mr. Keller, was worth four times that amount.

And the worst was yet to come. To exploit this fantastic accumulation of stolen equipment and scientific knowledge, labor was needed—and human beings, too, were looted. One million Poles, 380,000 Germans, and hundreds of thousands of Eastern Europeans (about 15 percent of the population of the Baltic States) were seized, like physical objects, and sent to Russian slave labor camps to work for "Bolshevik development." And—perhaps the most grotesque crime of all—on Tuesday, October 22, 1946, the Red Army moved to trap its ultimate prey: *human minds*. Six thousand German scientists were netted in a gigantic raid and were forcibly deported to Russia to work in the looted German aircraft and rocketry factories.

A few years later, the country which could not boast of one seminal thinker in the field of physics—and which had officially rejected Einstein's theory of relativity because it clashed with Marxist ideology—was producing atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, intercontinental rockets, Sputniks, Luniks and manned satellites.

Thus was Bolshevik theory made "practicable."

The efficacy of the communist state is touted, today, by those who are eager to believe that a modern industrial system can be created by theft and maintained by force. Mr. Keller's book—particularly his analysis of the state of science, technology and industry under the communist dictatorship—demolishes this belief.

Scientific traditions existed in Czarist Russia, Mr. Keller points out in the introductory historical section of his book, but they were Western imports, artificial grafts on a primitive culture. Since the communist revolution of 1917, the alien legacy of free scientific inquiry has been under relentless attack. He describes the "human degradation and intellectual tyranny in the treatment of [Russia's] scientists" and the catastrophic effects of this tyranny on their work and on the material life of the nation. Official Lysenkoism has destroyed biology, genetics and agronomy; official Pavlovianism has retarded the theory and practice of medicine; biochemistry,

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The Esthetic Vacuum of Our Age

By AYN RAND

(Excerpts from a lecture delivered at the Creative Arts Festival of the University of Michigan.)

Prior to the nineteenth century, literature presented man as a helpless being whose life and actions were determined by forces beyond his control: either by fate and the gods, as in the Greek tragedies, or by an innate weakness, "a tragic flaw," as in the plays of Shakespeare. Writers regarded man as metaphysically impotent, incapable of achieving his goals or of directing the course of his life; their basic premise was *determinism*. On that premise, one could not project what might happen to men; one could only record what *did* happen—and chronicles were the appropriate literary form of such recording.

Man as a being of free will did not appear in literature until the nineteenth century. The *novel* was his proper literary form—and Romanticism was the great new movement in art. Romanticism saw man as a being able to choose his values, to achieve his goals, to control his own existence. The Romantic writers did not regard man as a plaything of unknowable forces; they regarded him as a product of his own value-choices. They did not record the events that *had* happened, but projected the events that *should* happen; they did not record the choices men *had* made, but projected the choices men *ought* to make.

The Romantic novel was the product of two factors, of *reason* and of *capitalism*: of the Aristotelian influence which, in the nineteenth century, gave man the confident power to choose his own goals—and of the politico-economic system that left him free to achieve them. With the resurgence of mysticism and collectivism, in the later part of the nineteenth century, the Romantic novel and the Romantic movement vanished gradually from the cultural scene.

Man's new enemy, in art, was Naturalism. Naturalism rejected the concept of free will and went back to a view of man as a helpless creature determined by forces beyond his control; only now the new ruler of man's destiny was held to be *society*. The Naturalists proclaimed that values have no power and no place, neither in human life nor in literature, that writers must present men "as they are," which meant: must record whatever they happen to see around them—that they must not pronounce value-judgments nor project abstractions, but must content themselves with a faithful transcription, a carbon copy, of any existing concretes.

This was a return to the literary principle of the chronicle—but since a novel was to be an *invented* chronicle, the novelist was faced with the problem of what to use as his standard of selection. When values are declared to be impossible, how is one to know what to record, what to regard as important or significant? Naturalism solved the problem by substituting *statistics* for a standard of value. That which could be claimed to be typical of a large number of men, in any given geographical area or period of time, was regarded as metaphysically significant and worthy of being recorded. That which was rare, unusual, exceptional, was regarded as unimportant and *unreal*.

Just as the new schools of philosophy became progressively dedicated to the negation of philosophy, so Naturalism was dedicated to the negation of art. Instead of presenting a *metaphysical* view of man and of existence, the Naturalists presented a *journalistic* view. In answer to the question: "What is man?"—they said: "This is what the village grocers are, in the south of France, in the year 1887," or: "This is what the inhabitants of the slums are, in New York, in 1921," or: "These are the folks next door."

Art—the integrator of metaphysics, the concretizer of man's widest abstractions—was shrinking to the level of a plodding, concrete-bound dolt who has never looked past the block he lives on or beyond the range of the moment.

It did not take long for the philosophical roots of Naturalism to come out into the open. At first, by the standard that substituted the *collective* for the *objective*, the Naturalists consigned the exceptional man to unreality and presented only the men who could be taken as typical of some group or an-

other, high or low. Then, since they saw more misery than prosperity on earth, they began to regard prosperity as unreal and to present only misery, poverty, the slums, the lower classes. Then, since they saw more mediocrity than greatness around them, they began to regard greatness as unreal, and to present only the mediocre, the average, the common, the undistinguished. Since they saw more failure than success, they took success to be unreal and presented only human failure, frustration, defeat. Since they saw more suffering than happiness, they took happiness to be unreal and presented only suffering. Since they saw more ugliness than beauty, they took beauty to be unreal and presented only ugliness. Since they saw more vice than virtue, they took virtue to be unreal and presented only vice, crime, corruption, perversion, depravity.

Now, take a look at modern literature.

Man—the nature of man, the metaphysically significant, important, essential about man—is now represented by dipsomaniacs, drug addicts, sexual pervers, homicidal maniacs and psychotics. The subjects of modern literature are such themes as: the hopeless love of a bearded lady for a mongoloid pin-head in a circus side show—or: the problem of a married couple whose child was born with six fingers on her left hand—or: the tragedy of a gentle young man who just can't help murdering strangers in the park, for kicks.

All this is still presented to us under the Naturalistic heading of "a slice of life" or "real life"—but the old slogans have worn thin. The obvious question, to which the heirs of statistical Naturalism have no answer, is: if heroes and geniuses are not to be regarded as representative of mankind, by reason of their numerical rarity, why are freaks and monsters to be regarded as representative? Why are the problems of a bearded lady of greater universal significance than the problems of a genius? Why is the soul of a murderer worth studying, but not the soul of a hero?

The answer, of course, lies in the basic metaphysical premise of Naturalism, whether its practitioners ever chose it consciously or not: as an outgrowth of modern philosophy, that basic premise is anti-man, anti-mind, anti-life; and, as an outgrowth of the altruist morality, Naturalism is a frantic escape from moral judgment—a long, wailing plea for pity, for tolerance, for the forgiveness of anything.

The literary cycle has swung all the way around. What you read today is not Naturalism any longer: it is Symbolism; it is the presentation of a *metaphysical* view of man, as opposed to a journalistic or statistical view. But it is the Symbolism of the jungle. According to this modern view, *depravity* represents man's real, essential, metaphysical nature, while virtue does not; virtue is only an accident, an exception or an illusion; therefore, a *monster* is a consistent projection of man's essence, but a *hero* is not.

The Romanticists did not present a hero as a statistical average, but as an abstraction of man's best and highest potentiality, applicable to and achievable by all men, in various degrees, according to their individual choices. For the same reasons, in the same manner, but on an opposite metaphysical premise, today's writers do not present a monster as a statistical average, but as an abstraction of man's worst and lowest potentiality, which they regard as applicable to and essential in all men—not, however, as a potentiality, but as a hidden actuality. The Romanticists presented heroes as "*larger than life*"; now, monsters are presented as "*larger than life*"—or, rather, *man* is presented as "*smaller than life*."

If men hold a rational philosophy, including the conviction that they possess free will, the image of a hero guides and inspires them. If men hold an irrational philosophy, including the conviction that they are helpless automatons, the image of a monster serves to reassure them; they feel, in effect: "I am not *that* bad."

The philosophical meaning or the vested interest of presenting man as a loathsome monstrosity is the hope and the demand for a moral blank check.

Now consider a curious paradox: the same estheticians and intellectuals who advocate collectivism, with the subordination of all values and of everyone's life to the rule of "the masses," with art as the voice of "the people"—these same men are resolutely antagonistic toward all popular values in art. They

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engage in virulent denunciations of the mass media, of the so-called "commercial" producers or publishers who happen to attract large audiences and to please the public. They demand government subsidies for the artistic ventures which "the people" do not enjoy and do not choose to support voluntarily. They feel that any financially successful, that is, popular, work of art is automatically worthless, while any unpopular failure is automatically great—provided it is unintelligible. Anything that can be understood, they feel, is vulgar and primitive; only inarticulate language, smears of paint and the noise of radio static are civilized, sophisticated and profound.

The popularity or unpopularity, the box-office success or failure, of a work of art is not, of course, a criterion of esthetic merit. No value—esthetic, philosophical or moral—can be established by counting noses; fifty million Frenchmen can be as wrong as one. But while a crude "philistine," who takes financial success as proof of artistic merit, can be regarded merely as a mindless parasite on art—what is one to think of the standards, motives and intentions of those who take financial failure as the proof of artistic merit? If the snobbery of mere financial success is reprehensible, what is the meaning of a snobbery of failure? Draw your own conclusions.

If you wonder what is the ultimate destination toward which modern philosophy and modern art are leading you, you may observe its advance symptoms all around us. Observe that literature is returning to the art form of the pre-industrial ages, to the *chronicle*—that fictionalized biographies of "real" people, of politicians, baseball-players or Chicago gangsters, are given preference over works of imaginative fiction, in the theater, in the movies, in television—and that a favored literary form is the *documentary*. Observe that in painting, sculpture and music the current vogue, fashion and inspirational model is the primitive art of the jungle.

If you rebel against reason, if you succumb to the old bromides of the Witch Doctors, such as: "Reason is the enemy of the artist" or "The cold hand of reason dissects and destroys the joyous spontaneity of man's soul, his creative imagination, his *élan vital*"—I suggest that you take note of the following fact: by rejecting reason and surrendering to the unhampered sway of their unleashed emotions (and whims), the apostles of irrationality, the Existentialists, the Zen Buddhists, the non-objective artists, have not achieved a free, joyous, triumphant sense of life, but a sense of doom, nausea and screaming, cosmic terror. Then read the stories of O. Henry or listen to the music of Viennese operettas and remember that these were the products of the spirit of the nineteenth century—a century ruled by the cold, dissecting hand of reason. And then ask yourself: which psycho-epistemology is appropriate to man, which is consonant with the facts of reality and with man's nature?

Just as a man's esthetic preferences are the sum of his metaphysical values and the barometer of his soul, so art is the sum and the barometer of a culture. Modern art is the most eloquent demonstration of the cultural bankruptcy of our age.

Social Metaphysics (from page 47)

ability to think. But the man who has abandoned his mind lives, not in a universe of facts, but in a *universe of people*; people, not facts, are his reality; people, not reason, are his tool of survival. It is with *them* that he has to deal, it is on *them* that his consciousness must focus, it is they whom he must understand or please or placate or deceive or maneuver or manipulate or obey.

It is his success at this task that becomes his gauge of his fitness to exist—of his competence to live.

Having alienated himself from objective reality, he has no other standard of truth, rightness or personal worth. To grasp and successfully to satisfy the expectations, conditions, demands, terms, *values* of others, is experienced by him as his deepest, most urgent need. The *approval* of others is his only form of assurance that he is right, that he is doing well. The temporary diminution of his anxiety that their approval offers him, is his substitute for self-esteem.

This form of neurosis can exist in men in various degrees of intensity and destructiveness. It exists in the majority of people. The name I have given it is: *Social Metaphysics*.

This designation is literal. "Metaphysics" is one's view of the nature of reality. To the man I am describing, reality is *people*: in his mind, in his thinking, in the automatic connections of his consciousness, *people* occupy the place which, in the mind of a rational man, is occupied by *reality*.

Just as a rational man bases his self-esteem on his ability to deal with objective reality—so this man bases his self-value on his ability to deal with people.

"Social Metaphysics," then, may be defined and summarized as follows: *the psychological syndrome that characterizes an individual who holds the consciousnesses of other men, not objective reality, as his ultimate psycho-epistemological frame-of-reference.*

Not every social metaphysician begins by resenting the effort and responsibility of thought. Many begin by enjoying the process of thought, but too frequently blank out their minds in order to indulge some irrational wish or irrational fear—and soon they find that the areas of reality about which it is "safe" to think are progressively shrinking, and they proceed to evade more and more, reserving their thinking for matters that have little or no connection to their behavior and life. But however it was arrived at, what all social metaphysicians have in common is a fundamental breach between their consciousness and reality. This breach is what leads to social metaphysics, and subsequently is worsened by it, thus setting up a pattern of reciprocal reinforcement.

The popular image of a conventional "conformist" is merely the crudest and most obvious type of social metaphysician. There are many others.

There is the man who seeks power—who hates people for his own fear of them, and, despairing of ever winning a conventional social-metaphysical form of success within the "system," knows no other concept of "security" save that of being able to *force* the consciousnesses he dreads, to *compel* obedience, approval, "love."

There is the "rebellious" social metaphysician who proudly, scornfully and loudly denounces and rejects the traditional value-system of his Babbitt background—and runs in abject surrender to the unshaven value-system of Greenwich Village (or its equivalent), instead.

There is the "independent" social metaphysician, the "counterfeit individualist" who is opposed to *all* values, whose only notion of self-expression is his *whims*—who, having no concept of objective reality, sees existence as a clash between his whims and the whims of *others*—and who is so terrified at the prospect of being disliked that he feels obliged to insult people in advance.

Then, at the other end of the social metaphysical continuum, there is the man who uses his own judgment and holds independent, rational convictions in many isolated aspects of his life, particularly in his professional work—but who is aware of an obsessive fear of others, particularly in the area of fundamental value-judgments, without ever understanding the cause of his fear—who fights and resists it by repression or will power, at the cost of enormous emotional suffering, never identifying the nature of the treason that has put him in bondage, and thus never breaking through to freedom and full sovereignty.

Perhaps the worst form of self-degradation and the worst punishment that all social metaphysicians endure, is their contempt for their own judgment. A man of sovereign consciousness places nothing higher than reality, and no judgment of reality higher than his own; he does not accept an idea as true or valid unless he recognizes it to be so by his own rational understanding. If a social metaphysician judges an idea to be true, the fact that he used his own judgment tends to *invalidate* the idea. Any conviction he forms, lacks conviction for him *because* it is his own. Any idea advanced by others, tends to be extra-convincing because it is *not* his. He feels that others have a wisdom superior to his own, granted to them by the fact that they are "*non-himself*." He may not always give in to them, but his emotions will always pull him secretly to acknowledge their superiority. His own mind, to him, is not

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Women and the Industrial Revolution

By R. HESSEN

To condemn capitalism one must first misrepresent its history. The notion that industrial capitalism led to nothing but misery and degradation for women is an article of faith among critics of capitalism. It is as prevalent as the view that children were victimized and exploited by the Industrial Revolution—and it is as false.*

Let us examine the source of this view. To appreciate the benefits that capitalism brought to women, one must compare their status under capitalism with their condition in the preceding centuries. But the nineteenth-century critics of capitalism did not do this; instead, they distorted and falsified history, glamorizing the past and disparaging everything modern by contrast.

For instance, Richard Oastler, the most fanatical nineteenth-century enemy of capitalism, claimed that everyone was better off spiritually and materially in the Middle Ages than in the early nineteenth century. Describing medieval England, Oastler rhapsodized about the lost golden age: "Oh, what a beautiful ship was England once! She was well built, well manned, well provisioned, well rigged! All were then merry, cheerful and happy on board."

This was said of centuries in which "the bulk of the population were peasants in a servile condition, bound by status, not free to change their mode of life or to move from their birthplace" (M. C. Buer)—when people had only the promise of happiness in the life beyond the grave to succor them against decimating plagues, recurring famines and at best half-filled stomachs—when people lived in homes so infested with dirt and vermin that one historian's verdict about these cottages is: "From a health point of view the only thing to be said in their favor was that they burnt down very easily!" (Mabel C. Buer, *Health, Wealth and Population in the Early Days of the Industrial Revolution, 1760-1815*; London, 1926, pp. 250, 88.)

Oastler represented the viewpoint of the medievalists. The socialists, who agreed with them, were equally inaccurate historians.

For example, describing the conditions of the masses in the pre-industrial seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Friedrich Engels alleged: "The workers vegetated throughout a passably comfortable existence, leading a righteous and peaceful life in all piety and probity; and their material position was far better off than their successors."

This was written of an age characterized by staggeringly high mortality rates, especially among children—crowded towns and villages untouched by sanitation—infamously high gin consumption. The working class diet consisted mainly of oatmeal, milk, cheese and beer; while bread, potatoes, coffee, tea, sugar and meat were still expensive luxuries. Bathing was infrequent and laundering a rarity because soap was so costly, and clothing—which had to last a decade or generation—would not last if washed too often.

The most rapid change wrought by the Industrial Revolution was the shifting of textile production out of the home and into the factory. Under the previous system, called "domestic industry," the spinning and weaving was done in the worker's own home with the aid of his wife and children. When technological advances caused the shifting of textile production into factories, this led, says one critic of capitalism, "to the breakup of the home as a social unit." (Wanda Neff, *Victorian Working Women*; N. Y., 1920, p. 51.)

Mrs. Neff writes approvingly that "under the system of domestic industry the parents and the children had worked together, the father the autocratic head, pocketing the family earnings and directing their expenditure." Her tone turns to condemnation when she recounts: "But under the factory system the members of the family all had their own earnings,

* See my article, "Child Labor and the Industrial Revolution" in THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER, April, 1962.

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they worked in separate departments of the mill, coming home only for food and sleep. The home was little but a shelter."

The factories were held responsible for every social problem of that age, including promiscuity, infidelity and prostitution. Implicit in the condemnation of women working in the factories was the notion that a woman's place is in the home and that her only proper role is to keep house for her husband and to rear his children. The factories were blamed simultaneously for removing girls from the watchful restraints of their parents and for encouraging early marriages; and later for fostering maternal negligence and incompetent housekeeping, as well as for encouraging lack of female subordination and the desire for luxuries.

It is a damning indictment of the pre-factory system to consider what kind of "luxuries" the Industrial Revolution brought within reach of the working class budget. Women sought luxuries like shoes instead of clogs, hats instead of shawls, "delicacies" (like coffee, tea and sugar) instead of "plain food."

Critics denounced the increasing habit of wearing ready-made clothes, and they viewed the replacement of wools and linens by inexpensive cottons as a sign of growing poverty. Women were condemned for not making by hand that which they could buy more cheaply, thanks to the revolution in textile production. Dresses no longer had to last a decade—women no longer had to wear coarse petticoats until they disintegrated from dirt and age; cheap cotton dresses and undergarments were a revolution in personal hygiene.

The two most prevalent nineteenth-century explanations of why women worked in the factories were: (a) that their "husbands preferred to remain home idle, supported by their wives" and (b) that the factory system "displaced adult men and imposed on women 'the duty and burden of supporting their husbands and families.'" These charges are examined in *Victorian Wives and Mothers*, (London, 1957) a monumental study by Dr. Margaret Hewitt of the University of Exeter. Her conclusion is: "Neither of these assumptions proves to have any statistical foundation whatsoever." (p. 190)

In fact, women worked in the factories for far more conventional reasons; Dr. Hewitt enumerates them: many women worked because "their husbands' wages were insufficient to keep the home going"; others were widowed or deserted; others were barren, or had grown-up children; some had husbands who were unemployed, or employed in seasonal jobs; and a few chose to work in order to earn money for extra comforts in the home, although their husbands' wages were sufficient to cover necessities. (pp. 192, 194)

What the factory system offered these women was—*not* misery and degradation—but a means of survival, of economic independence, of rising above the barest subsistence. Harsh as nineteenth-century factory conditions were, compared to twentieth-century conditions, women increasingly preferred work in the factories to any other alternatives open to them, such as domestic service, or back-breaking work in agricultural gangs, or working as haulers and pullers in the mines; moreover, if a woman could support herself, she was not driven into early marriage.

Even Professor Trevelyan, who persistently disparaged the factories and extolled "the good old days," admitted: "... the women who went to work in the factories though they lost some of the best things in life [Trevelyan does not explain what he means], gained independence. ... The money they earned was their own. The factory hand acquired an economic position personal to herself, which in the course of time other women came to envy."

And Trevelyan concluded: "The working class home often became more comfortable, quiet and sanitary by ceasing to be a miniature factory." (G. M. Trevelyan, *English Social History*; London, 1942, p. 487.)

Critics of the factory system still try to argue that the domestic spinners or weavers could have a creator's pride in their work, which they lost by becoming mere cogs in a huge industrial complex. Dr. Dorothy George easily demolishes this thesis: "It seems unlikely that the average weaver, toiling hour after hour throwing the shuttle backwards and forwards

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an instrument of certainty, but of self-doubt and mistrust. He feels: "Who am I to know?"—"Who am I to judge?"—"How can I tell?" His attitude amounts to: "How can I live my life by the guidance of nothing but so precarious, so puny, so feeble, so uncertain, so unreliable a thing as *my mind*?"

If one discusses the importance of reason with a social metaphysician, he frequently will ask: "Whose reason?"—and will proceed to complain that experts disagree in every field, so how can one tell what is reasonable? It will never occur to a man of sovereign consciousness to ask such a question as "Whose reason?"—and it never occurs to a social metaphysician that the answer is "One's own."

It is not difficult to understand the appeal that certain currently prevalent ideas have for the social metaphysician.

If he hears a contemporary school of philosophy declare that certainty is impossible to man—his emotions leap to agree; his chronic inner state, he learns, is not a sign of neurosis but of superior intellectual sophistication.

If he hears another contemporary school declare that the purpose of philosophy is to study and analyze, not the facts of reality, but other philosophers' *statements* about reality—he feels himself to be in familiar psychological territory; he understands the point of view.

If he hears a psychologist declare that "love is the only sane and satisfactory answer to the problem of human existence"—if he hears an advocate of altruism declare that men must seek self-esteem through their relationships with others—if he hears an advocate of collectivism declare that everyone should be guaranteed "minimum sustenance," that one's survival should not have to depend on one's own effort—he can truthfully answer that that is just what, with all his heart, he has always believed.

At the root of all the twists, complexities, evasions and neurotic devices of social metaphysics, is the desire to escape from the responsibility of a *volitional* consciousness and an *objective* reality—the desire to escape from reason and man's nature. And in the world of today, many dominant cultural voices will encourage the social metaphysician in his quest.

But it is a quest that cannot succeed. No escape is possible. And the social metaphysician knows it. He knows it, not as firm, conceptualized knowledge, but as an emotion of terror. The terror is his form of awareness that, when he rejects the task of becoming man, nothing else is left to him but the agonizing stillness of non-identity. He knows it, whether he has failed to gain anyone's approval or has succeeded in gaining immense popularity. The social metaphysician at the bottom envies the social metaphysician at the top—because he cannot hear the latter's silent screams for help. But the social metaphysician at the top, *he* hears them.

East Minus West = Zero (from page 48)

biophysics and pharmacology are stumbling far behind the level reached by these sciences in the free nations.

The Russians, states Mr. Keller, are competent, today, in physics and chemistry, but not as creative thinkers—"their best work is second-hand." Their technology, too, is "second-hand"; communist inventions are almost invariably blatant copies of Western inventions, with patent rights ignored.

As for Russia's alleged rate of economic growth, Mr. Keller makes it abundantly clear that even with the stolen intelligence, labor and machinery of three continents at its disposal, the Soviet economy is developing at a throttled pace; its growth rate, by generous estimate, is only half that of the United States.

Russia is, in fact, an insanely crippled economy; Mr. Keller calls it "a deformed cretin." Thanks to captive foreign scientists, Russia has produced Sputniks; thanks to her own, she cannot produce bread.

"Bolshevik-planned industry feeds on the industrial freedom of the rest of the world," declares Mr. Keller at the close of this remarkable book. "It would long ago have died a natural death, had it not been for the repeated injections of fresh life-blood which are still being pumped into it."

For 45 years, the U.S.S.R. has been pirating the *effects* of capitalist productiveness while systematically destroying the *cause* of this productiveness: man's free mind. But men cannot work under compulsion: the chained mind is neither inventive nor productive. Were the communist dictatorship to be deprived, today, of all capitalist supports, it would collapse once again under the weight of its own lethal contradiction.

For those Americans who are intent on fighting the suicidal idea that a dictatorship is more efficacious than a free economy—that Statism is "practicable"—Mr. Keller's book provides potent political ammunition. Clearly written, militantly factual, it is one of the most important documents on Russia to be published in our generation. It cannot be too strongly recommended.

Women and the Industrial Revolution (from page 51)

on work which was monotonous and exhausting, had the reactions which would satisfy a modern enthusiast for peasant arts." (*England in Transition*; London, 1947, p. 139.)

Finally, it was charged that factory work made women too concerned with material comforts at the expense of spiritual considerations.

The misery in which women lived before capitalism, might have made them cherish the New Testament injunction: "Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world." But the productive splendor of capitalism vanquished that view. Today, the foremost champions of that viewpoint are Professor Galbraith and the austerity-preachers behind the Iron Curtain.

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ Alan Greenspan's article, "Antitrust," a revised and expanded version of a paper delivered at the Antitrust Seminar of the National Association of Business Economists at Cleveland, Ohio, on September 25, 1961, has been published by NATHANIEL BRANDEN INSTITUTE and is available from THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER. Price: 50¢ (N.Y.C. residents add 2¢ sales tax).

■ Secretary-General Horace Turner of the International College of Surgeons ordered, on behalf of the I.C.S., 2700 reprints of Leonard Peikoff's "Doctors and the Police State," for distribution at the 13th Biennial International and 27th Annual North American Federation Conference of the I.C.S., held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, Sept. 9-13, 1962. To date, over forty thousand reprints of this article have been purchased by medical associations and individual physicians.

■ Readers have inquired as to when *For the New Intellectual* will be available in paperback. New American Library informs us that the book will not be published in paperback until late 1963. Random House is now issuing a fifth printing of the hardcover edition.

Other activities: Daryn Kent, an NBI student, will play the title role in an off-Broadway production of *Medea* (a new version of the Jason-Medea myth), November 25 through December 1 at Caffe Cino, 31 Cornelia Street, New York, N. Y. Performances begin at 9 P.M. and 11 P.M.; on November 30 and December 1, an additional performance begins at 1 A.M.

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CHECK YOUR PREMISES

By AYN RAND

The Monument Builders

What had once been an alleged ideal is now a ragged skeleton rattling like a scarecrow in the wind over the whole world, but men lack the courage to glance up and to discover the grinning skull under the bloody rags. That skeleton is socialism.

Fifty years ago, there might have been some excuse (though not justification) for the widespread belief that socialism is a political theory motivated by benevolence and aimed at the achievement of men's well-being. Today, that belief can no longer be regarded as an innocent error. Socialism has been tried on every continent of the globe. In the light of its results, it is time to question the motives of socialism's advocates.

The essential characteristic of socialism is the denial of individual property rights; under socialism, the right to property (which is the right of use and disposal) is vested in "society as a whole," *i.e.*, in the collective, with production and distribution controlled by the state, *i.e.*, by the government.

Socialism may be established by force, as in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—or by vote, as in Nazi (National Socialist) Germany. The degree of socialization may be total, as in Russia—or partial, as in England. Theoretically, the differences are superficial; practically, they are only a matter of time. The basic principle, in all cases, is the same.

The alleged goals of socialism were: the abolition of poverty, the achievement of general prosperity, progress, peace and human brotherhood. The results have been a terrifying failure—terrifying, that is, if one's motive is men's welfare.

Instead of prosperity, socialism has brought economic paralysis and/or collapse to every country that tried it. The degree of socialization has been the degree of disaster. The consequences have varied accordingly.

England, once the freest and proudest nation of Europe, has been reduced to the status of a second-rate power and is perishing slowly from hemophilia, losing the best of her economic blood: the middle class and the professions. The able, competent, productive, independent men are leaving by the thousands, migrating to Canada or the United States, in search of freedom. They are escaping from the reign of mediocrity, from the mawkish poorhouse where, having sold their rights in exchange for free dentures, the inmates are now whining that they'd rather be Red than dead.

In more fully socialized countries, *famine* was the start, the insignia announcing socialist rule—as in Soviet Russia, as in Red China, as in Cuba. In those countries, socialism reduced the people to the unspeakable poverty of the pre-industrial ages, to literal starvation, and has kept them on a stagnant level of misery.

No, it is not "just temporary," as socialism's apologists have been saying—for half a century. After forty-five years of

government planning, Russia is still unable to solve the problem of feeding her population.

As far as superior productivity and speed of economic progress are concerned, the question of any comparisons between capitalism and socialism has been answered once and for all—for any honest person—by the present difference between West and East Berlin.

Instead of peace, socialism has introduced a new kind of gruesome lunacy into international relations—the "cold war," which is a state of chronic war with undeclared periods of peace between wantonly sudden invasions—with Russia seizing one-third of the globe, with socialist tribes and nations at one another's throats, with socialist India invading Goa, and communist China invading socialist India.

An eloquent sign of the moral corruption of our age is the callous complacency with which most of the socialists and their sympathizers, the "liberals," regard the atrocities perpetrated in socialistic countries and accept rule by terror as a way of life—while posturing as advocates of "human brotherhood." In the 1930's, they did protest against the atrocities of Nazi Germany. But, apparently, it was not an issue of principle, but only the protest of a rival gang fighting for the same territory—because we do not hear their voices any longer.

In the name of "humanity," they condone and accept the following: the abolition of all freedom and all rights, the expropriation of all property, executions without trial, torture chambers, slave-labor camps, the mass slaughter of countless millions in Soviet Russia—and the bloody horror of East Berlin, including the bullet-riddled bodies of fleeing children.

When one observes the nightmare of the desperate efforts made by hundreds of thousands of people struggling to escape from the socialized countries of Europe, to escape over barbed-wire fences, under machine-gun fire—one can no longer believe that socialism, in any of its forms, is motivated by benevolence and by the desire to achieve men's welfare.

No man of authentic benevolence could evade or ignore so great a horror on so vast a scale.

Socialism is not a movement of the people. It is a movement of the intellectuals, originated, led and controlled by the intellectuals, carried by them out of their stuffy ivory towers into those bloody fields of practice where they unite with their allies and executors: the thugs.

What, then, is the motive of such intellectuals? Power-lust. Power-lust—as a manifestation of helplessness, of self-loathing and of the desire for the unearned.

The desire for the unearned has two aspects: the unearned in matter and the unearned in spirit. (By "spirit" I mean: man's consciousness.) These two aspects are necessarily inter-related, but a man's desire may be focused predominantly on one or the other. The desire for the unearned in spirit is the more destructive of the two and the more corrupt. It is a desire for *unearned greatness*; it is expressed (but not defined) by the foggy murk of the term "prestige."

The seekers of unearned material benefits are merely financial parasites, moochers, looters or criminals, who are too limited in number and in mind to be a threat to civilization, until and unless they are released and legalized by the seekers of unearned greatness.

Unearned greatness is so unreal, so neurotic a concept that the wretch who seeks it cannot identify it even to himself: to identify it, is to make it impossible. He needs the irrational, undefinable slogans of altruism and collectivism to give a semi-plausible form to his nameless urge and anchor it to reality—to support his own self-deception more than to deceive his victims. "The public," "the public interest," "service to the public" are the means, the tools, the swinging pendulums of the power-lust's self-hypnosis.

Since there is no such entity as "the public," since the public is merely a number of individuals, any claimed or implied conflict of "the public interest" with private interests means that the interests of some men are to be sacrificed to the interests and wishes of others. Since the concept is so conveniently undefinable, its use rests only on any given gang's ability to proclaim that "The public, *c'est moi*"—and to maintain the claim at the point of a gun.

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*The Roosevelt Myth** by John T. Flynn

Reviewed by BARBARA BRANDEN

In the years of his power and the years since his death, eulogies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and his alleged achievements grew and spread, mushrooming into an elaborate mythology. It is particularly the young people, children of the New Deal—too young during the 1930's and early 40's to have a first-hand knowledge of political events—who have been deluged by the massive propaganda effort, via textbooks, articles, lectures and speeches, conducted by those who share Roosevelt's ideology.

In the wake of the 1929 depression, many of the country's intellectual leaders were declaring that free enterprise had failed, that government must now take a more active part in directing the economic activities of the nation—that Americans must be given a new deal. Interventionist practices—the introduction of government controls into the economy—had been brought into American politics long before, and had been increasing since the turn of the century. But Roosevelt's administration was the first deliberately to embrace Interventionism as a ruling philosophy of government and as a consistent policy; this was the "New Deal" which Americans were given.

Who were the creators of this policy, and what motivated them? What was its effect on the American form of government and economic system? What legacy has it left to our day? Was it a New Deal—or something very old, with a long and bloody history in Europe?

In his carefully documented, comprehensive account of the New Deal years, John T. Flynn provides the answers to such questions, by providing the facts which the mythology of Roosevelt and his times was intended to conceal.

The New Deal—states the myth—saved a desperate country from total economic collapse, and pulled it out of the worst depression in history. What are the facts?

When Roosevelt was inaugurated in 1932, there were over eleven million persons unemployed, over sixteen million on relief, and a government debt of sixteen billion dollars. Roosevelt was elected on a platform which promised to end the deficits, curtail spending, abolish useless bureaus, assure a sound currency and reduce taxes.

In the first one hundred days of his administration, he produced a deficit larger than Hoover had produced in two years, and created a burgeoning network of new bureaus, boards, administrations, commissions and agencies. One of these agencies, dedicated to "fighting" the depression, was the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, headed by Henry Wallace. The AAA paid men \$700,000,000 within two years to burn oats, kill millions of hogs and cut corn production—while the Department of Agriculture issued a bulletin "telling the nation that the great problem of our time was *our failure to produce enough food to provide the people with a mere subsistence diet*"—and while we imported oats, lard and corn from abroad.

By 1939, Roosevelt had spent more than seventeen billion dollars of borrowed public funds, he had gone off the gold standard, taxes had more than doubled—and there were over eleven million persons unemployed, over nineteen million on relief. The revival of business investment, essential to economic recovery, was nowhere in sight.

At a time when his carefully manufactured "public image" was that of a near-omniscient national savior, Roosevelt complained—after his cabinet informed him of the administration's failure to cope with the depression—"I am sick and tired of being told by Henry (Morgenthau) and everybody else what's the matter with the country while nobody suggests what I should do."

The New Deal—states the myth—was spearheaded and run by an intellectual, humanitarian elite, eminently competent to direct the course of the nation. With systematic detail,

Flynn describes the hectic, carnival atmosphere that characterized the activities of this "elite":

—Roosevelt deciding that the price of gold should be raised to twenty-one cents, because twenty-one, being three times seven, is a "lucky number"—

—Harry Hopkins informing the President that the Civil Works Administration had "got four million at work but for God's sake don't ask me what they are doing"—

—Eleanor Roosevelt "gushing over the air for toilet preparations, mattresses and other products," for which gushing she received from \$1,000 to \$4,000 an appearance, and basking in the attentions of the young leaders of Communist front organizations, while entertaining them on the White House lawn—

—Henry Wallace, in search of his soul, sampling mystic cult after mystic cult, practicing vegetarianism and boomerang throwing, while directing the activities of the Department of Agriculture—

—Roosevelt admitting to Frances Perkins, his Secretary of Labor, that he knew nothing of economics and had never read a book on the subject—

—the Office of War Information dropping over North Africa such items as cakes of soap, coloring books, and pin buttons with a picture of Roosevelt colored to look like an Arab, in order to "sell" America to the North Africans—

—Leon Henderson, head of the Office of Price Administration, reporting that his work "was fun all the time even when I was mad."

"It was fun," comments Flynn, "pushing 130 million people around."

The New Deal—states the myth—secured our democratic system and restored its waning vitality. What are the facts?

Immediately upon his inauguration, Roosevelt reversed a central principle of his campaign: his pledge to resist the trend toward a powerful centralized government. The tentacles of government began to encircle business in a manner unprecedented in America.

Prominent New Dealers were extolling the fascist system of Mussolini. Roosevelt emulated that system through such means as the establishment of the National Recovery Administration. The NRA undertook to organize each industry into a trade association which would regulate production, prices, distribution, etc., under the supervision of the government.

Together, Flynn points out, the NRA and the AAA constituted "a plan to take the whole industrial and agricultural life of the country under the wing of government, organize it into vast farm and industrial cartels, as they were called in Germany, corporatives as they were called in Italy, and operate business and farms under plans made and carried out under the supervision of the government."

The New Deal tentacles began encircling Congress. Roosevelt removed from Congress, and placed in the hands of the Executive, a significant part of the former's constitutional prerogative of law-making. The countless bureaus created by Roosevelt's demand were soon vested with virtual law-making powers; there were so many of them, their duties so complex and varied, that it was impossible for Congress to police them all; gradually, directives and regulations began to issue forth from them "so that they actually became legislative and appropriating instrumentalities of a large area of government."

A further step toward concentrating power in the hands of the Executive was the policy of "blank-check legislation." Congress put billions of dollars into the President's hands, to be spent as and when he chose. "The great purse—which is the greatest of all the weapons in the hands of a free parliament to oppose the extravagance of a headstrong executive—had been handed over to him."

Some of Roosevelt's power grabs—such as his plan to pack the Supreme Court with dedicated New Dealers—were blocked by Congress. Some of them—such as the NRA—were ultimately declared unconstitutional. But the basic tenet of the New Deal, the underlying philosophy of *statism*, was unchallenged. The "New" Deal had brought to America that "modern" resurrection of medievalism and mercantilism which was practiced by such distinguished "liberals" as Bismarck, Hitler and Mussolini.

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INTELLECTUAL AMMUNITION
DEPARTMENT

[Subscribers are invited to send in the questions that they find themselves unable to answer in philosophical or political discussions. As many questions as space permits will be answered. No questions will be answered by mail.]

■ What are the respective obligations of parents to children, and children to parents?

The key to understanding the nature of parental obligation lies in the moral principle that human beings must assume responsibility for the consequences of their actions.

A child is the responsibility of his parents, because (a) they brought him into existence, and (b) a child, by nature, cannot survive independently. (The fact that the parents might not have *desired* the child, in a given case, is irrelevant in this context; he is nevertheless the consequence of their chosen actions—a consequence that, as a possibility, was foreseeable.)

The essence of parental responsibility is: to equip the child for independent survival as an adult. This means, to provide for the child's physical and mental development and well-being: to feed, clothe and protect him; to raise him in a stable, intelligible, rational home environment, to equip him intellectually, training him to live as a rational being; to educate him to earn his livelihood (teaching him to hunt, for instance, in a primitive society; sending him to college, perhaps, in an advanced civilization).

When the child reaches the age of legal maturity and/or when he has been educated for a career, parental obligation ends. Thereafter, parents may still want to help their child, but he is no longer their responsibility.

A reasonable expectation that they will be able to afford the basic minimum necessary for food, clothing, shelter and education, should be the prerequisite of rational parents' decision to have children. However, parents are not morally at fault if, due to the father's illness or some other unforeseeable economic disaster, they are unable to provide for their child as they had expected to; in such a case, they are obliged simply to do the best they can.

If parents forgo other purchases in order to provide for their child's necessities, their action is *not* a sacrifice, and they have no moral right to regard it as such. One of the cruelest injustices that parents can perpetrate is to reproach a child for being a financial burden or for requiring time and attention, as if the child's legitimate needs were an imposition on them—to complain to the child of the "sacrifices" made for his sake, as if he were to feel apologetic or guilty—to state or imply that the child's mere existence is an unfair strain, as if the child had any choice in the matter.

Above the level of necessities, it is the standard of living of the parents that properly determines the standard of living of the child, appropriately scaled to his age and level of development. It is the responsibility of the child, as he grows older, to understand (if and when it is the case) that much of what he receives, above the ordinary, is an expression of his parents' benevolence and affection—and should be acknowledged as such in the form of reciprocated consideration and good will. If his parents are genuinely devoted to him, if they treat him justly and do their conscientious best to guide him, the appropriate response on the child's part is appreciation, affection, respect.

It is the child's further responsibility, as he grows older, to understand that his parents, too, have rights; that he may not make unlimited demands on them, as if their sole purpose were to live for and serve him; that he may not expect them to relinquish every other interest and value in order to work at satisfying any wish he may chance to conceive.

In accepting the basic necessities of food, clothing, etc., from his parents, the child does not incur an obligation to repay that support at some future date. The support is his by right. If, years later, when he is an adult, his parents encounter financial difficulty, it is not his *duty* to help them regardless of the cost to himself. There can be no *unchosen* obligations of this kind. If, however, they had treated him

at all well and if he has maintained cordial relations with them, he properly would wish to help them to the extent that he reasonably and non-self-sacrificially can do so.

By virtue of their unique biological relationship, parents and child are normally predisposed to feel benevolence toward each other. Parents expect to feel love for their creation. A child wishes to feel love for his protectors. But this biological tie must never be "traded on"—that is, used as a moral blank check, as a substitute for personal value. Parents cannot demand love as a duty—"because we're your parents." A child cannot demand absolution of any irrationality—"because I'm your child." Emotions are not causeless. Love, respect, admiration have to be *earned*.

It is immensely valuable, from the point of view of the child's happiness and psychological development, that he find human beings whom he *can* love, respect and admire. One of the chief obligations of parents is to offer the child this opportunity. One of the chief obligations of the child—and of all human beings—is to recognize this opportunity if and when it exists.

—NATHANIEL BRANDEN

The Monument Builders (from page 53)

No such claim has ever been or can ever be maintained without the help of a gun—that is, without physical force. But, on the other hand, without that claim, gunmen would remain where they belong: in the underworld, and would not rise to the councils of state to rule the destinies of nations.

There are two ways of claiming that "The public, *c'est moi*": one is practiced by the crude material parasite who clamors for government handouts in the name of a "public" need and pockets what he has not earned; the other is practiced by his leader, the spiritual parasite, who derives his illusion of "greatness"—like a fence receiving stolen goods—from the power to dispose of that which he has not earned and from the mystic view of himself as the embodied voice of "the public."

Of the two, the material parasite is psychologically healthier and closer to reality: at least, he eats or wears his loot. But the only source of satisfaction open to the spiritual parasite, his only means to gain "prestige" (apart from giving orders and spreading terror), is the most wasteful, useless and meaningless activity of all: the building of public monuments.

Greatness is achieved by the productive effort of a man's mind in the pursuit of clearly defined, rational goals. But a delusion of grandeur can be served only by the switching, undefinable chimera of a public monument—which is presented as a munificent gift to the victims whose forced labor or extorted money had paid for it—which is dedicated to the service of all and none, owned by all and none, gaped at by all and enjoyed by none.

This is the ruler's only way to appease his obsession: "prestige." Prestige—in whose eyes? In anyone's. In the eyes of his tortured victims, of the beggars in the streets of his kingdom, of the bootlickers at his court, of the foreign tribes and their rulers beyond the borders. It is to impress all those eyes—the eyes of everyone and no one—that the blood of generations of subjects has been spilled and spent.

One may see, in certain Biblical movies, a graphic image of the meaning of public monument building: the building of the pyramids. Hordes of starved, ragged, emaciated men straining the last effort of their inadequate muscles at the inhuman task of pulling the ropes that drag large chunks of stone, straining like tortured beasts of burden under the whips of overseers, collapsing on the job and dying in the desert sands—that a dead Pharaoh might lie in an imposingly senseless structure and thus gain eternal "prestige" in the eyes of the unborn of future generations.

Temples and palaces are the only monuments left of mankind's early civilizations. They were created by the same means and at the same price—a price not justified by the fact that primitive peoples undoubtedly believed, while dying of starvation and exhaustion, that the "prestige" of their tribe, their rulers or their gods was of value to them somehow.

Rome fell, bankrupted by statist controls and taxation,

(continued on page 56)

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while its emperors were building coliseums. Louis XIV of France taxed his people into a state of indigence, while he built the palace of Versailles, for his contemporary monarchs to envy and for modern tourists to visit. The marble-lined Moscow subway, built by the unpaid "volunteer" labor of Russian workers, including women, is a public monument, and so is the Czarist-like luxury of the champagne and caviar receptions at the Soviet embassies, which is needed—while the people stand in line for inadequate food rations—to "maintain the prestige of the Soviet Union."

The great distinction of the United States of America, up to the last few decades, was the modesty of its public monuments. Such monuments as did exist were genuine: they were not erected for "prestige," but were functional structures that had housed events of great historical importance. If you have seen the austere simplicity of Independence Hall, you have seen the difference between authentic grandeur and the pyramids of "public-spirited" prestige-seekers.

In America, human effort and material resources were not expropriated for public monuments and public projects, but were spent on the progress of the private, personal, individual well-being of individual citizens. America's greatness lies in the fact that her actual monuments are not public.

The skyline of New York is a monument of a splendor that no pyramids or palaces will ever equal or approach. But America's skyscrapers were not built by public funds nor for a public purpose: they were built by the energy, initiative and wealth of private individuals for personal profit. And, instead of impoverishing the people, these skyscrapers, as they rose higher and higher, kept raising the people's standard of living—including the inhabitants of the slums, who lead a life of luxury compared to the life of an ancient Egyptian slave or of a modern Soviet Socialist worker.

Such is the difference—both in theory and practice—between capitalism and socialism.

It is impossible to compute the human suffering, degradation, deprivation and horror that went to pay for a single, much-touted skyscraper of Moscow, or for the Soviet factories or mines or dams, or for any part of their loot-and-blood-supported "industrialization." What we do know, however, is that forty-five years is a long time: it is the span of two generations; we do know that, in the name of a promised abundance, two generations of human beings have lived and died in subhuman poverty; and we do know that today's advocates of socialism are not deterred by a fact of this kind.

Whatever motive they might assert, *benevolence* is one they have long since lost the right to claim.

The ideology of socialization (in a neo-fascist form) is now floating, by default, through the vacuum of our intellectual and cultural atmosphere. Observe how often we are asked for undefined "sacrifices" to unspecified purposes. Observe how often the present administration is invoking "the public interest." Observe what prominence the issue of international "prestige" has suddenly acquired and what grotesquely suicidal policies are justified by references to matters of "prestige." Observe that during the recent Cuban crisis—when the factual issue concerned nuclear missiles and nuclear war—our diplomats and commentators found it proper seriously to weigh such things as the "prestige," the personal feelings and the "face-saving" of the sundry socialist rulers involved.

There is no difference between the principles, policies and practical results of socialism—and those of any historical or prehistorical tyranny. Socialism is merely democratic absolute monarchy—that is, a system of absolutism without a fixed head, open to seizure of power by all comers, by any ruthless climber, opportunist, adventurer, demagogue or thug.

When you consider socialism, do not fool yourself about its nature. Remember that there is no such dichotomy as "human rights" versus "property rights." No human rights can exist without property rights. Since material goods are produced by the mind and effort of individual men, and are needed to sustain their lives, if the producer does not own the result of his effort, he does not own his life. To deny property rights means to turn men into property owned by the state. Whoever claims the "right" to "redistribute" the

wealth produced by others is claiming the "right" to treat human beings as chattel.

When you consider the global devastation perpetrated by socialism, the sea of blood and the millions of victims, remember that they were sacrificed, not for "the good of mankind" nor for any "noble ideal," but for the festering vanity of some scared brute or some pretentious mediocrity who craved a mantle of unearned "greatness"—and that the monument to socialism is a pyramid of public factories, public theaters and public parks, erected on a foundation of human corpses, with the figure of the ruler posturing on top, beating his chest and screaming his plea for "prestige" to the starless void above him.

The Roosevelt Myth (from page 54)

Roosevelt followed their inspiration not only in his domestic policies, but also in his foreign policy: by resorting to war in order to "solve" his internal problems. He had found a solution to the depression in the spending of vast sums for National Defense.

"I say to you fathers and mothers and I will say it again and again and again. Your boys will not be sent into foreign wars." This was Roosevelt's promise to the American people in 1940. In 1941, states Flynn, he "exposed our fleet and our soldiers in Hawaii and the Philippine Islands to an attack which he knowingly invited."

It was Roosevelt—states the myth—who led us through a great war for democracy and freedom, and who saved the civilization of Europe.

Eleven billion dollars of American taxpayers' money was given to Russia during the war, in the form of Lend-Lease—dollars whose consequences, I might add, we can now see ninety miles from our shores. In secret agreements between Roosevelt and Stalin, sixteen European and Asiatic countries and over 725 million people were surrendered to Russian tyranny.

In his own economic convictions, John T. Flynn is not an advocate of *laissez-faire* capitalism; although he does not indicate his views clearly, he seems to sanction some form of mixed economy. But his ruthlessly factual presentation of the events of the New Deal period, and of the long-and-short-range consequences of its policies, make his book absorbing and eminently valuable.

When one is reading *The Roosevelt Myth*, one is heartened by a single thought: that by some near-miracle, America survived the New Deal. But then, when one reads today's newspapers and considers the present political scene, one realizes that that is the question still to be decided.

OBJECTIVIST CALENDAR

■ On December 16, Ayn Rand will give a talk at the Ford Hall Forum in Boston. Her subject: "The Fascist New Frontier." Time: 8 P.M. Place: Jordan Hall, 30 Gainsboro St. Open to the public.

■ Nathaniel Branden will address the Young Republican Club at C.C.N.Y. on December 20, 12:15 P.M., in Room 106, Wagner Hall, 133rd St. & St. Nicholas Terrace, New York City. His subject, "Collectivist Myths about Capitalism," is based on several of his articles in THE OBJECTIVIST NEWSLETTER. Open to the public.

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CHECK YOUR PREMISES

By AYN RAND

Collectivized Ethics

Certain questions, which one frequently hears, are not philosophical queries, but psychological confessions. This is particularly true in the field of ethics. It is especially in discussions of ethics that one must check one's premises (or remember them), and more: one must learn to check the premises of one's adversaries.

For instance, Objectivists will often hear a question such as: "What will be done about the poor or the handicapped in a free society?"

The altruist-collectivist premise, implicit in that question, is that men are "their brothers' keepers" and that the misfortune of some is a mortgage on others. The questioner is ignoring or evading the basic premises of Objectivist ethics and is attempting to switch the discussion onto his own collectivist base. Observe that he does not ask: "Should anything be done?" but: "What will be done?"—as if the collectivist premise had been tacitly accepted and all that remains is a discussion of the means to implement it.

Once, when Barbara Branden was asked by a student: "What will happen to the poor in an Objectivist society?"—she answered: "If you want to help them, you will not be stopped."

This is the essence of the whole issue and a perfect example of how one refuses to accept an adversary's premises as the basis of discussion.

Only individual men have the right to decide when or whether they wish to help others; society—as an organized political system—has no rights in the matter at all.

On the question of when and under what conditions it is morally proper for an individual to help others, I refer you to Galt's speech in *Atlas Shrugged*. What concerns us here is the collectivist premise of regarding this issue as political, as the problem or duty of "society as a whole."

Since nature does not guarantee automatic security, success and survival to any human being, it is only the dictatorial presumptuousness and the moral cannibalism of the altruist-collectivist code that permits a man to suppose (or idly to daydream) that he can somehow guarantee such security to some men at the expense of others.

If a man speculates on what "society" should do for the poor, he accepts thereby the collectivist premise that men's lives belong to society and that he, as a member of society, has the right to dispose of them, to set their goals or to plan the "distribution" of their efforts.

This is the psychological confession implied in such questions and in many issues of the same kind.

At best, it reveals a man's psycho-epistemological chaos; it reveals a fallacy which may be termed "the fallacy of the

frozen abstraction" and which consists of substituting some one particular concrete for the wider abstract class to which it belongs—in this case, substituting a specific ethics (altruism) for the wider abstraction of "ethics." Thus, a man may reject the theory of altruism and assert that he has accepted a rational code—but, failing to integrate his ideas, he continues unthinkingly to approach ethical questions in terms established by altruism.

More often, however, that psychological confession reveals a deeper evil: it reveals the enormity of the extent to which altruism erodes men's capacity to grasp the concept of *rights* or the value of an individual life; it reveals a mind from which the reality of a human being has been wiped out.

Humility and presumptuousness are always two sides of the same premise, and always share the task of filling the space vacated by self-esteem in a collectivized mentality. The man who is willing to serve as the means to the ends of others, will necessarily regard others as the means to his ends. The more neurotic he is or the more conscientious in the practice of altruism (and these two aspects of his psychology will act reciprocally to reinforce each other), the more he will tend to devise schemes "for the good of mankind" or of "society" or of "the public" or of "future generations"—or of anything except actual human beings.

Hence the appalling recklessness with which men propose, discuss and accept "humanitarian" projects which are to be imposed by political means, that is, by force, on an unlimited number of human beings. If, according to collectivist caricatures, the greedy rich indulged in profligate material luxury, on the premise of "price no object"—then the social progress brought by today's collectivized mentalities consists of indulging in altruistic political planning, on the premise of "human lives no object."

The hallmark of such mentalities is the advocacy of some grand scale public goal, without regard to context, costs or means. Out of context, such a goal can usually be shown to be desirable; it has to be public, because the costs are not to be earned, but to be expropriated; and a dense patch of venomous fog has to shroud the issue of means—because the means are to be human lives.

"Medicare" is an example of such a project. "Isn't it desirable that the aged should have medical care in times of illness?" its advocates clamor. Considered out of context, the answer would be: yes, it is desirable. Who would have a reason to say no? And it is at this point that the mental processes of a collectivized brain are cut off; the rest is fog. Only the desire remains in his sight—it's the good, isn't it?—it's not for myself, it's for others, it's for the public, for a helpless, ailing public . . . The fog hides such facts as the enslavement and, therefore, the destruction of medical science, the regimentation and disintegration of all medical practice, and the sacrifice of the professional integrity, the freedom, the careers, the ambitions, the achievements, the happiness, the lives of the very men who are to provide that "desirable" goal—the doctors.

After centuries of civilization, most men—with the exception of criminals—have learned that the above mental attitude is neither practical nor moral in their private lives and may not be applied to the achievement of their private goals. There would be no controversy about the moral character of some young hoodlum who declared: "Isn't it desirable to have a yacht, to live in a penthouse and to drink champagne?"—and stubbornly refused to consider the fact that he had robbed a bank and killed two guards to achieve that "desirable" goal.

There is no moral difference between these two examples; the number of beneficiaries does not change the nature of the action, it merely increases the number of victims. In fact, the private hoodlum has a slight edge of moral superiority: he has no power to devastate an entire nation and his victims are not legally *disarmed*.

It is men's views of their public or political existence that the collectivized ethics of altruism has protected from the march of civilization and has preserved as a reservoir, a wild-life sanctuary, ruled by the mores of prehistorical savagery. If men have grasped some faint glimmer of respect for individual rights in their private dealings with one another, that

(continued on page 3)